PSQ

Political Science Quarterly

PoLRmC
PROPERTY OF
LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIES
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA
NOV 6 1980

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

Fall 1980

Raphael Israeli — Sadat's Egypt and Teng's China: Revolution Versus Modernization

Sidney Waldman — Majority Leadership in the House of Representatives

David C. Mowery, Mark S. Kamlet, John P. Crecine — Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking

Raymond L. Garthoff — American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978

Michael Bratton — The Public Service in Zimbabwe

Paul R. Dommel — Social Targeting in Community Development

K. Robert Keiser — The New Regulation of Health and Safety

Book Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

HUGH HECLO
Harvard University

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

IRA KATZNELSON
University of Chicago

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
University of Texas at Austin

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
Harvard University

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
Congressional Budget Office

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Rutgers University

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

SUZANNE R. WEAVER
Wall Street Journal

TOM WICKER
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, New York 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $17.50 a year. Three years, $46.00. Students, $13.00 a year. Libraries and institutions, $24.00 a year. Foreign postage, $2.00 additional per year. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and additional mailing offices. Volume 95 Number 3 Fall 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Editor
DEMETRIOS CARALEY
Barnard College
Columbia University

Managing Editor
MARY ANN EPSTEIN

Manuscript Editor
RICHARD SNYDER

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Published continuously since 1886.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Board of Directors of the Academy have elected Nils H. Wessell Executive Director, effective October 1, 1980. Robert H. Connery will continue as President.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, N.Y. 10025. Correspondence about advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science, 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, N.Y. 10025.

Correct preparation of manuscripts expedites production and therefore contributors must observe the following requirements: Submit manuscripts in triplicate, all copy double-spaced including main text, quotations, and footnotes. Place tables, graphs, and numbered footnotes on separate pages at end of manuscript. Include an abstract of 100 to 200 words that specifies the article's main theme or conclusions. Authors who want their manuscripts returned must enclose postage.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *United States Political Science Documents, The International Political Science Abstracts, Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index* to *Social Science Periodicals, Book Reviews Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in the Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1976 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Co., Route 100, Millwood, New York 10546. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $4.50. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Toll free number: 800-521-0600. One copy, $6.00. Additional copies, $3.00 each. Complete issue, $0.10 a page with a $10.00 minimum charge. All prices are subject to change.

Copyright © 1980 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 95
Number 3
Fall 1980

Contents

Sadat's Egypt and Teng's China: Revolution Versus Modernization — Raphael Israeli — 361

Majority Leadership in the House of Representatives — Sidney Waldman — 373

Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking — David C. Mowery, Mark S. Kamlet, John P. Crecine — 395

American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978 — Raymond L. Garthoff — 427

The Public Service in Zimbabwe — Michael Bratton — 441

Social Targeting in Community Development — Paul R. Dommel — 465

The New Regulation of Health and Safety — K. Robert Keiser — 479

Book Reviews — 493

Reference Books and Source Materials Received — 547

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Pechman, ed., Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s — JAMES R. STOREY 493

Barber, The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age — RICHARD M. PIOUS 494

Wayne, The Road to the White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections; **Watson,** The Presidential Contest — JOHN F. BIBBY 496

Katzmann, Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy — ERNEST GELLHORN 498

Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class — EVERETT CARLL LADD 499

van den Doel, Democracy and Welfare Economics — EVERETT M. EHRLICH 500

Lee and **Passell,** A New Economic View of American History — NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX 502

Wright, Class Structure and Income Determination — BERNARD BARBER 503

Alexander, Financing the 1976 Election — DAVID ADAMANY 505

Marshall, ed., Urban Policy Making — CHARLES H. LEVINE 507

Baldwin, Hon. Politician: Mike Mansfield of Montana — ROBERT L. PEABODY 509

Noyes, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy — ZALMAY KHALILZAD 510

Oye, Rothchild, and **Lieber,** eds., Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World — RODNEY W. JONES 511

Wolfe, The SALT Experience — ROBERT JERVIS 512

Clarke, Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — RICHARD K. BETTS 513

Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949 — J. GARRY CLIFFORD 515

Tutchings, Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Commissions and the Making of Public Policy — LARRY BERMAN 516

Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America — HOWARD S. BERLINER 517

Wilson, Unions in American National Politics — HARRY HOLLOWAY 519

Schmidhauser, Judges and Justices: The Federal Appellate Judiciary — PETER G. FISH 520

Hopkins, Puchala, and **Talbot,** eds., Food, Politics, and Agricultural Development: Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural Modernization — RICHARD E. STRYKER 521

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mazzolini, Government Controlled Enterprises: International Strategic and Policy Decisions — Irvin M. Grossack 523

M'Gonigle and **Zacher,** Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea — M. J. Peterson 524

Thompson, Ethics, Functionalism and Power in International Politics: The Crisis in Values — William V. O'Brien 526

Ware, The Logic of Party Democracy — John Petrocik 527

Griffith, ed., The European Left: Italy, France, and Spain — John T. S. Keeler 528

Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949–1977 — Steven I. Levine 530

Barnds, ed., Japan and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities; **Foster, Dornan,** and **Carpenter,** eds., Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia — Akira Iriye 531

Gil, Lagos E., and **Landsberger,** eds., Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970–1973 — Peter Goldberg 532

Fischer-Galati, ed., The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe — Zvi Gitelman 533

Migdal et al., Palestinian Society and Politics — Sylvia Kowitt Crosbie 535

Aronson, ed., Debt and the Less Developed Countries — William R. Cline 536

Etzioni-Halevy, Political Manipulation and Administrative Power: A Comparative Study — Carolyn Teich Adams 537

Barnes, Kaase et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies — Roberta S. Sigel 539

Selowsky, Who Benefits from Government Expenditures? A Case Study of Colombia — Dale Rogers Marshall 541

Connor, Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR — Paul S. Shoup 542

Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies — Richard W. Campbell 544

Dismukes and **McConnell,** eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy — Dov S. Zakheim 546

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

RAPHAEL ISRAELI analyzes the processes of modernization and revolution, which he regards as displacing each other in a cyclical fashion in non-Western societies. He uses case studies of Sadat's Egypt and Teng's China to illustrate the theory and to argue that the transition from modernization to revolution and vice versa hinge upon certain types of leaders.

SIDNEY WALDMAN reviews the role of the majority-party leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives in light of the House reforms of the past decade. He contends that notwithstanding some new leadership powers and resources, House reforms on balance have contributed to member independence.

DAVID C. MOWERY, MARK S. KAMLET, AND JOHN P. CRECINE examine presidential management of three parallel executive branch budgetary policy processes—domestic budgeting, defense budgeting, and fiscal policy. After surveying the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, the authors offer recommendations on how a president can balance the competing demands of fiscal and budgetary policy planning.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF draws on his own experience in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 to illuminate the understanding reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on aircraft as offensive weapons. He concludes that the introduction of new Soviet aircraft into Cuba in 1978 was not inconsistent with the 1962 understanding.

MICHAEL BRATTON describes the opportunities and constraints regarding public-service reform in Zimbabwe at the time of its political independence.

PAUL R. DOMMEL looks at the distribution of program benefits among income groups over the first four years of the community development block grant program. He finds that benefits to lower-income groups increased as the program progressed but concludes that further large increases in benefits to the lower-income groups are unlikely.

K. ROBERT KEISER contends that health and safety regulatory agencies are more likely to succumb to immobilization than to capture by industry. He concludes that when regulatory activism does take place, it is less the result of the professional commitment of the staff and more a response to political pressure from outside constituencies.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sadat's Egypt and Teng's China: Revolution Versus Modernization

RAPHAEL ISRAELI

When President Qadhafi of Libya challenged the West in a recent press interview to "keep your technology, your problems, and your evils," he was perhaps unwittingly echoing what Matthew Arnold had termed "this strange disease of modern life."[1] But his message could not have been clearer: modernization, that is, westernization, far from remedying the flaws of non-Western societies, has on the contrary aggravated them to the point that the West and its evils have been rejected in favor of restorative revolutions. When the young, enthusiastic, and fanatic leader of the Libyan junta announced his takeover of power from the Sanussi King in 1969, he was indeed intent on such a restorative revolution, not merely a revolt against monarchy. The memorable dialogue between Louis XVI and the Duke de la Rochefoucauld comes to mind: "It is a revolt?" asked the French monarch; "no Sir," retorted the duke, "This is a revolution."[2]

Disraeli was probably right when he said that revolution cannot be evaded; the same can perhaps be said of modernization, the antithesis of revolution, in spite of the paradox involved. Hence there is a continuous strain between revolution and modernization and an almost inevitable cycle of succession between the two, at least in non-Western societies. In such a social setting, revolution signifies a popular impulse for change, restorative or innovative that washes away

[1] Qadhafi quoted in *Newsweek*, 18 June 1979, p. 23.

[2] The exchange took place when the news arrived at Versailles of the fall of the Bastille in 1789. See the *Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, p. 407.

RAPHAEL ISRAELI is a lecturer in Chinese and Islamic history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of *Muslims in China* and *The Public Diary of President Sadat* (3 vols.) as well as the editor of two books on Islam in Asia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ancien regime, while modernization usually harbors a compelling ambition for "progress" on the part of the ruling elite, at times to the detriment of the masses of the people. Revolution is perceived as the cataclysmic search for a new order and is usually associated with creative and impatient minds; modernization is a gradual journey toward what is believed to be a safe harbor, to which mature, patient, and self-confident leaders hope to lead their people. Revolution is an exciting venture geared to attract those who have nothing to lose—namely, the poor, the young, and discontent intellectuals; modernization is a gradual, long-ranged enterprise that attracts those who stand to gain, such as the rich, the industrialists, developers, entrepreneurs, and some bureaucrats and intellectuals. Revolution is usually associated with the oppression of civil liberties; modernization, in the true sense of the word, is coupled with liberalization and freedom of the individual. Revolution wants to preserve the appearance of "rule of the people, by the people, for the people" by means of a continuous self-purging in order to stem the rise of a "new class"; modernization gives rise to new ruling elites who strive to perpetuate their state rule by means of monopolizing the instruments of power.

Thus, very seldom do revolutions adopt Edmund Burke's advice of "making the revolution a parent of settlement and not a nursery of future revolution."[3] The French and the American Revolutions have produced permanent new settlements that have allowed them to set revolutions aside and embark on modernization; but the non-Western nations have been vacillating between revolution and modernization and unable to achieve either goal in any satisfactory measure. At times these nations revolutionize under the impulse of change or of violence and throw themselves into chaos; at other times they settle down and modernize at a tremendous cost of ideological resignation, which in turn may sow the seeds of future revolutions. Only when revolution has been adopted as a necessary, though temporary and transitional, step toward modernization has stability returned once the drive to modernization has commenced.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union, which is considered by many nations the mother and patron of contemporary revolutions, is itself susceptible to this vacillation between revolution and modernization. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union remains the model and the "big brother" for many revolutionary regimes in the non-Western world, even though modernizing nations (including the Soviet Union itself when the swing of the pendulum so allows) often turn to the United States and the West for help. Modernization implies stability and high expectations, because the welfare of the population is its stated objective. Revolution connotes unrest and unpredictability, because the state and the social order, not the individual, stand at the focus of its objectives.

Some of these reflections and generalizations can be tested in Egypt under Anwar Sadat and in the People's Republic of China under Teng Hsiao-p'ing. One should bear in mind, nevertheless, that in many ways the Egyptian Revolution may appear superficial when compared with the Chinese Revolution; thus,

[3] From Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, quoted in ibid., p. 102.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this may help explain the relative ease with which Sadat has been reversing the trend in Egypt.

Sadat the Revolutionary and the Modernizer

Sadat, himself a product of the ancien regime, had participated in the planning and implementation of the Egyptian Revolution, the success of which he assumed the honor, and experienced the thrill, of announcing to the stunned and enthusiastic public on the morning of 23 July 1952. Disgusted with prerevolutionary corruption and aroused against the "modern Egypt" in which he grew up, Sadat associated modernization with British colonialism, in whose jails he had spent a good part of his life. Soon after the revolution succeeded, however, Sadat was relegated to the secondary roles allotted to him by the towering figure of Nasser. Sadat thus became a journalist, a side-line politician, a protocolary figure, and a resigned pawn on Nasser's chessboard before he was recalled from oblivion in 1969 and appointed to the vice-presidency of Egypt, merely one year or so before President Nasser passed away.

As president, Sadat could no longer sit by and admire Nasser's masterly strokes in domestic and international affairs, but had to tackle the awesome problems of Egypt by himself and to determine the course the country should take under his direction. He was indeed a revolutionary; but he was also an Egyptian, an Arab, and a Muslim. Nasser could discard everything else for the sake of revolution and Pan-Arabism, but when Sadat came to power, Egypt and the Arab and Muslim worlds had changed. Moreover, Sadat, himself a devout Muslim, was more susceptible to reflect upon his traditional background and to find a way to walk the tight rope between the demands of his patrimony and the imperatives of modernity. On the one hand, traditionalism precluded change and innovation, and value was imputed to the ancient order. If there were change, Islam would only approve of such a change that would restore the simpler, better conditions of earlier times, when Allah was more immediate and more intimate. But the encounter with the West entailed a change and presented a challenge of "progress" to the Arabs: Could history stand in the way of will, or could will have its way in spite of history? Progress, itself implying change and modernization, offered a new dimension to the Arab sense of history—the notion of a better future that lent a meaning and a purpose to history.

In this setting, the more advanced are the steps toward modernization, the more intense is the strain between an innovative world imposed from above and the unaffected layer of tradition which nurtures the popular demand for restoration of the old heritage and the repulsion of the foreign intrusion. Thus, while modernization becomes the realm of the ruling elite, the masses carry the potential for revolution as the means of checking too reckless an encroachment, on the part of their lay leaders, upon the patrimony they cherish. And they find natural allies in that part of the religious leadership that is not totally subdued by the regime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since traditionalism in Arab-Muslim societies has been the prescription for stability, in recent decades we have become used to associating conservatism with tranquility, modernization, and pro-Western attitudes (for example, in Saudi Arabia and the Arab sheikdoms); radicalism, on the other hand, has evoked associations of upheaval, revolution, and anti-Western attitudes (Algeria, Iraq, Syria). At present these equations have been upset: Islamic fundamentalism has proven that it can become as radical, revolutionary, and anti-Western as in the traditional strongholds of Arab radicalism (Iran, Libya). Only the nonradical Muslim-Arab states (for example, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan) now face the anomaly that is immanent in the pursuit of modernization, and its concomitant westernism, and the mounting wave of radicalism that is sweeping the Arab-Muslim world. This helps clarify Sadat's serious dilemmas. In July 1972, only twenty months after he took office, he ousted the Russians—his revolutionary friends—out of despair from their inability to resolve the basic problems of Egypt: restitution of the lost territories, overpopulation, and a shattered economy. He started to lean toward the Americans, in the hope that they, through modernization and technology, could lay the foundations for remedying Egypt's ills and at the same time pressure the Israelis out of their intransigence in matters of occupied lands.

Since 1973, Sadat has been rationalizing his compelling gravitation toward the United States in terms of "90% of the cards of the game are in American hands."[4] Sadat has achieved through great skill and ingenuity not only even-handed treatment from the Americans (who, in Sadat's words, had been "100% blindly aligned with Israel")[5] but also preferential treatment on occasion as, for example, during the recent Camp David conference and the ensuing peace talks. With the Americans solidly on his side, Sadat could embark on the modernization he has been seeking, with its concomitant liberalization and democratization. The American model of the Far West comes from the cowboy movies that Sadat reportedly watches every day, which inspire the Egyptian president's vision of enterprising young men conquering the barren desert of Egypt.

Sadat is operating within a society imbued with traditionalism and Islam, however, and paradoxically perhaps, the more liberal and democratic he wants to be, in order to carry out his dream, the more attentive and responsive he must become to popular demands to revert to the tradition of Islam. To be sure, the Islamic establishment in Egypt is tame and can be harnessed, as it indeed has been, to justify Sadat's policies of either modernization or revolution or war or peace. But the sweeping resurgence of Islam throughout the world has been in evidence in Egypt too. Recent surveys in Egypt have demonstrated the preva-

[4] See, for example, Sadat's interview in *al-Hawadith* (Lebanon), 15 and 21 August 1975. The full text appears in Raphael Israeli, *The Public Diary of President Sadat*, vol. 3, *The Road of Pragmatism* (Leiden, Holland: Brill, 1978–79), p. 993.

[5] See, for example, Sadat's speech before the conference on "Egypt in the Year 2000," delivered on 2 January 1975, Radio Cairo. Extracts from the text in Israeli, *The Public Diary of President Sadat*, vol. 2, *The Road of Diplomacy*, p. 741.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lence of Islam in the value systems of all strata of the Egyptian society, even among the middle classes, the urban population, the intelligentsia, the state bureaucracy, and, of course, among peasants in the countryside which has been the permanent stronghold of tradition. Although this new tide of Islam does not necessarily signify that the believers are engaged in a search of Allah, it is an indication that Egyptian Muslims are frustrated by the modernization process and their inability to cope with its demands; it remains true nevertheless that Islam as a culture and focus of identity is reasserting itself in the minds of many Egyptians, as it does for many other faithful all over the world of Islam.

The new tide of Islam is not only marked on the fringes of Egyptian society, such as the extremist *Jama'at a-Takfir wal-Hijra* (a fundamentalist group which is disgusted with the norms of Egyptian society and seeks a new breakthrough in the faith), but in the very heart of Egyptian society. Newspapers have restored the publication of a daily page on religious thought, and the proliferation of new religious periodicals has become a regular feature of Egypt's life. This tide of fundamentalism has also generated throughout Egypt changes in dress habits—particularly among women who have restored the veil and the *zay-al-shar'i* (religious dress)—in the growing of beards as a hallmark of identification with the Muslim Brothers, in abstention from tobacco, in increased attendance in mosques, notably of youth, and in a keen interest in studying and researching the Islamic heritage. This movement, whose driving force is the Muslim Brotherhood, has coupled with its refutation of modernization, technology, and Western manners in general a stern demand that the *Shari'a* (Holy Law of Islam) law be restored. The Brotherhood's religious preaching (*da'wa*), which is apparently well received by the Egyptian public at large if one judges from the widespread distribution of their literature and tracts and by the fact that a large portion of the student body in Egyptian universities voted for supporters of the Brothers, also includes the exhortation to rescue the entire Abode of Islam and to terminate the existence of Israel. These exhortations, which have revolutionary import, obviously run counter to Sadat's peace initiative, which has been primarily motivated by his obsession with modernization. When Sadat proclaims "No more war, no more bloodshed!" he does not imply that he has converted to Isaiah's ploughshares and pruning hooks; he means that an atmosphere of stability and predictability is the prerequisite for foreign investment and economic development.

Sadat does not, perhaps cannot, move decisively against the Muslim extremist groups, which pose a revolutionary danger to his modernizing drive. He is unable to follow the example of Nasser who had quelled the Brothers, either because of his own religious convictions that he has often voiced or because of the "hands-off" warning that is implicit in the Saudi aid he is still receiving; it may also indicate that he is caught in the contradiction that modernization also means liberalization of the regime. Sadat is well aware of the negative model of the Shah of Iran, another champion of modernization who had quelled Islamic and other opposition groups, much to the dismay of his chief benefactor—the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States. The collapse of his regime emanated mainly from his inability to walk the tight rope between modernization and Islam.

Sadat has repeatedly voiced his commitment to Islamic values, not only to the Egyptian public (that is, his praise of the slogan "Allah Akbar!" which became the battle cry of the armed forces after October 1973), but also to the Western world. In an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor* on 2 July 1976 he said:

> I welcome the resurgence of Islamic orthodoxy that has gathered strength in Egypt this past year and was brought home to most Egyptians when the Parliament passed last May a law banning drinking in public. . . . I will approve this law, although it was watered down to allow sales and drinking of liquor in private or in tourist establishments. . . . We have the official religion of Islam. It is in our Constitution. . . . We should return to the main principles of our heritage. I do not want the next generation to become a lost generation like we see in Europe and the U.S. . . . In time of rapid change and technological development, as Egypt is certain to experience in the years ahead, a firm culture and value system will be essential.

Sadat is, nevertheless, as committed to science and technology as he is to Islam. He tried to capture the two in his vision of *Dawlat-al-'ilm wal-Iman* (the state of science and faith), whereby Egypt would revive and preserve its rural tradition that feeds upon the Egyptian, Arab, and Islamic heritage, but at the same time make the best use of technology in order to strengthen these innate values, not to displace or replace them. Computers, contends Sadat, cannot win wars, as the Vietnamese conflict had demonstrated. It was faith that had enabled the Vietnamese, and later the Egyptians in October 1973, to achieve the "miracle" that permitted "camel-riders to prevail upon missile-riders."[6] Thus, he is determined to usher in the technology of the twentieth century, but without allowing his people to slip into degeneration. "For others," once quipped Sadat with disdain, "the mere movement of the hand has become so cumbersome that they need an electric brush to clean their teeth."

Nasser had been able to oppress the Muslim opposition in the name of revolution, because his revolution also implied a vituperative anti-Israeli stance, itself a major component of Islamic ideology. Nasser had also demonstrated, like the Soviets, that revolution could attain a certain degree of economic growth and social betterment; economic growth, however, ultimately was crippled by the built-in "socialist" inhibitory factors of bureaucracy, lack of material incentives, a nationalized economy, low motivation for creativity and innovation, and rampant corruption. When Sadat opts for modernization over revolution, albeit only implicitly so, he advocates an open-door economy, the strengthening of the private sector, and the encouragement of free enterprise and investment; at the same time when he signs a peace with Israel and gives leeway to the Muslim opposition in his country, he thereby removes all the limitations that had hitherto barred the way before a restorative revolution.

[6] Sadat interview in *al-Hawadith* (Lebanon), 2 October 1972. Also in Israeli, *The Public Diary of President Sadat*, vol. 1, *The Road to War*, p. 268.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Egypt's fateful course toward either modernization or revolution, therefore, would very much hinge upon the developments relating to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Sadat can continue to push for modernization only if the heavy price he has paid for it—peace with Israel and the pariah status to which he has been relegated in the Arab and Islamic world—does not continue to mount to the point of making it prohibitive. If his drive for modernization succeeds and he can correlate prosperity with the peace settlement, then perhaps the Islamic revolutionary opposition can be silenced or put in abeyance as politically irrelevant. It is noteworthy that when Sadat regained Al-'Arish from Israel, the street banners that awaited him in welcome carried the double slogan of *Salam wa Rakha'* ("peace and prosperity"). Moreover, the crowds in the streets paraphrased the Islamic *shahada* to read: "There is no God but Allah and Sadat is His Favorite." Thus, peace, modernization, and religious zeal coalesced in a high expectation for a bright future.

If, however, modernization fails and the enormously high expectations of the Egyptian masses are not met, and the peace treaty can be exposed as a failure, then the falling back on Islam as the alternative source of comfort will perhaps become unavoidable. Then, Israel and Zionism, together with the broken image of the West, could be easily blamed for the fiasco, and Egypt would be dragged back into an extreme anti-Israeli and anti-Western position, the like of which we have recently witnessed in Khomeini's Iran. Thus, Sadat or his successors either will have to come back into the fold of Islam, not only on the declaratory level but also on the level of anti-Israeli policies, or risk being overthrown, as the example of the Shah has demonstrated. It is no wonder then that opponents of the Sadat peace initiative, and its correlative modernization, have likened him to the deposed Shah, and speculations as to who could play the role of the Egyptian Khomeini in the forthcoming restorative revolution have already been wildly circulating.

Teng's China: Socialism and Modernization

In his opening address to the Fifth People's Congress which convened in Peking in June 1979, Yeh Chien-ying, the octogenarian chairman of its Standing Committee, drew a negative correlation between modernization and revolution: "Promoting China's socialist modernization lies in giving full scope for democracy. . . . An improved legal system could guarantee the people's democratic rights." These words were echoed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's speech which laid, in no uncertain terms, the blame for China's "ten lost years" (1966–76) upon the "chaos prevailing under the Gang of Four."[7] Thus, the Chinese have become aware of the limits of growth in a revolutionary setting, despite the impressive achievements that they had scored during the first ten years of Communist rule. Teng Hsiao-ping's new campaign for the "Four Modernizations" (agriculture, industry, technology, and the armed forces) was announced only

[7] Reuters dispatch from Peking, 4 June 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after the revolutionary Gang of Four came to epitomize, as it were, Pierre Vergniaud's epigraph: "There was reason to fear that the Revolution, like Saturn, might devour in turn each one of her children."

During the thirty years of the revolutionary Chinese Communist regime, and with the exception of the ephemeral attempt at freedom of expression during the Hundred Flowers Movement in the mid-1950s, almost nothing was heard of public dissenters and pamphleteers or of protest movements in China. But when the recent drive for modernization began two years ago, the "Democracy Wall" in Peking became a sort of Chinese Hyde Park. Daring posters went up on the walls; free speech, Western movies, and even Western music and dancing became almost everyday occurrences. The Chinese realize the inextricability of modernity from democratization, because Western techniques cannot be divorced from ideas and values. Yeh, who announced the new measures to the People's Congress, is one of the last vestiges of the May Fourth (1919) generation—whose adherents refuted Confucian values and advocated Western technology—and his unique position perhaps symbolizes the mood of the young dissenters who have been attempting to erect an ideological bridge to the youth movement of sixty years ago. That generation had grasped, as the modernizers of today's China do, the fallacy of the *t'i-yung* formula which had been in vogue among the conservative reformers at the end of the nineteenth century. That philosophy had purported to use *yung* (utility), that is, the material things of Western technology and expertise, in order to preserve the *t'i* (essence) of the Confucian civilization, much like what Sadat says he wants to achieve today in his cultural context. The conservative reformers failed to recognize that one cannot change the material technology of a civilization without affecting the core of the civilization itself. That was one of the lessons of the May Fourth Movement.

Paradoxically, though, it was the revolutionaries in the era prior to Teng's ascendancy to power who had unwittingly, but in vain, attempted to revive the *t'i-yung* formula, but this time *t'i* was the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist essence. They thought that they could modernize amidst revolution; that they could adopt Western technology and at the same time maintain a permanent revolutionary spirit as the prescription against a reaction of Khrushchev's brand of communism. They believed that in democratic-centralism the latter component was the more important part of the construct; that the "red" ideologue should retain primacy over the "expert" technocrat; that the value of egalitarianism was more important than the imperative of economic development; that the course of revolution took precedence over individual considerations; that all human resources and talents, including art and other creative endeavors, should be put at the service of revolution; and that in a revolutionary setting, far from being permitted to partake in the "bourgeois" freedom of speech, man could not even enjoy the freedom of silence, because his revolutionary zeal had to be demonstrated constantly.

No wonder, then, that the nostalgia for the May Fourth Movement now comes to the fore. To be sure, China of the 1920s was not free from contro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

versies among people who were torn between loyalties to the China they knew, and the new, but uncertain, China that loomed in the horizon. The idea of Hamlet was expressed in novels of those days, where characters were torn between these two alternatives (for example, the trilogy of the novelist Pa Chin). In the 1920s, the philosophical conflict between Western science and Chinese spirituality was reflected in social tension. The younger generation, interested in social change, identified with science; the older generation, interested in tradition, identified with Eastern spirituality. In those days, the antitraditionalists had to justify their break with tradition by seeking to demonstrate that the new system would be better. Hu Shih, for example, in self-conscious honesty, admitted that Confucianism was useless for any program of modernization and sought to learn from the West.

Now, of course, the setting has changed. Youths in their twenties and thirties are spearheading the demand for liberalization and are insisting that modernization cannot make headway unless it is coupled with the civil liberties that had been curtailed under the revolutionary atmosphere of Maoism and the Gang of Four.

But the advocates of modernization within the current leadership, although they may in effect harbor similar feelings toward democratization, cannot afford to rush ahead carelessly and arouse in the process the cadres of the party who had been indoctrinated for many years in a different vein. If one judges by Teng's oft repeated dictum "It is not important whether the cat is black or white as long as it captures rats" and by the fact that he was twice purged (by revolutionaries) and twice rehabilitated (by modernizers), one is inclined to deduce that the functional specialization of the "experts" must now replace the functional diffuseness of the "reds" who had previously prevailed. The young of today are the experts of tomorrow; however, the red cadres, who are versed in Maoism but little else, in effect carry no relevant luggage in their bags for the new era of modernization.

The decline of the ideologues in China and the mounting role of the experts may carry with them far-reaching implications. The social prestige of the technicians and the managers may well displace, in the long run, the primacy of the political commissars; and the return to material incentives in order to encourage production and enhance the authority of the skilled will no doubt increase the differential of salaries and perhaps deliver the final blow to the similitude of egalitarianism that has been cultivated by the previous regime. Moreover, economic development in conjunction with the West may signify the abandonment of self-reliance and autarchy. Investments, the development of trade, and credits from foreign bodies will mean that China will owe debts and will thus become part of the world financial system. And industrialization will increase urbanization, which in turn will lend impetus to westernization, as increasingly larger portions of the population will come in contact with foreigners and with urban Western values.

It is also likely that the revolutionary zeal of the Chinese people will recede, which will not only make for more stability at home, but also for less inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ference on the party-to-party level in "revolutionary" insurgencies around the globe. Moreover, if free speech and freedom of publication become the norm, we shall witness a shift toward more Western music, art, literature, and mannerism. The sight of old Chinese leaders rocking to the sound of American music at the American New Year celebrations of 1979, the Western-style dancing balls which are now allowed in Peking and where Chinese and Westerners mix and intermingle, the Western beauty parlors which seem to attract many Chinese women in the large cities, and the penetration of Coca-Cola into the Mainland all provide more than an indication of this trend.

Finally, when the Chinese begin the process of slipping, gradually, into the advantages of an eclectic communism, maybe their controversies with the Soviet Union will lose much of their virulence. After all, both Communist countries are embracing almost the same course: a "socialist" regime at home; coexistence with Western investments; open borders for tourism; a certain degree of leeway to intellectuals, dissenters, and civil rights fighters; the rise of consummerism, and the like. The ideological accusations of the Soviets as "renegades" and "reactionaries" seem no longer valid in this light.

China seems to be heading toward modernization and away from revolution faster than the Soviet Union, and the reason lies perhaps in the different attitudes among the respective leaderships of these two rival nations. The Kremlin is perhaps reluctantly paying the price for its relative opening up to and coexistence with the West, in order to import the technology that will allow it to catch up to and then challenge its adversaries. In China, the enthusiastic attitude toward the West belies a hidden impulse to westernize as a matter of desire and choice. Thus, the more modern China becomes, the more difficult it will be for prospective revolutionaries, if the pendulum should swing again, to take away from an avid population the trappings of modernity.

Revolution and National Essence

Can this general sketching of modernization and revolution in China and Egypt allow for any specific conclusion? What has happened to twenty-five years of Arab revolution in Egypt and to thirty years of Communist revolution in China? Did these revolutions really change the people? or is the conventional wisdom that claimed that these two revolutions have profoundly transformed the social, political, and cultural fiber of the Egyptian and Chinese societies simply foundering before reality?

In almost one stroke, however, and curiously enough at about the same time, things appear to be reversed in China and Egypt, precisely when these two countries are achieving closer ties than ever before and are equally poised against the Soviet Union. In Egypt, Islam and local Pharaonism are on the rise again, despite the years of oppression of both under the Pan-Arab and revolutionary regime of Nasser. In China, a revival of liberalism of the May Fourth type seems to be under way, despite the years of revolutionary zeal and passionate socialism and antiwesternism that had prevailed up to the beginning of the 1970s. Was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this passion for revolution, which has all but vanished now, genuine? Are Nasser and Mao historical aberrations, while Sadat and Teng represent the norm? Is modernization the outcome of the respect-admiration that the non-Western world senses toward the West, or is revolution the result of the correlative hate-fear that these non-Western nations feel toward the countries who have made it into modernity?

In the democratic, open, and stable West, one tends to look at these reverses with a mixture of awe, indignation, disbelief, and condescension. Some view with horror the new tide of Islam and question the relevance of the "Dark Age" *Shari'a* law in the modern world. Some are incredulous at the new turn of events in China, as if things should change according to our frame of mind and under our own terms. Some stand in awe before events that are ill-comprehended at best, misinterpreted at worse, not knowing whether the new wave of modernization in China and in Egypt is the beginning of a real turn of events that will place them on a course of stability and democratization or whether this is only a swing of the pendulum, a prelude to more revolution and instability. One thing is certain in both cases: the determination of Sadat and Teng to lead their nations to a level of modernization that will stem the need for a new revolution. Both leaders seem to have grasped that the survivability of their national essence has been stronger than the coercive power of the revolutionary regimes that preceded them. When the revolutionary tide receded, they abandoned their shields and came back into the open to assert the revival of the values that their people relish.

Indeed, the cycle of radical revolution and modernization in China and Egypt reveals an interesting constant of human nature: man's desire to be what he is, nothing else. No matter how radically each revolution has attempted to alter its national character, the core has remained unaffected. And no matter how we misconceived or misunderstood, in the past, the impact of these revolutions on these two cultures, they have remained what they want to be: Muslim in one case, Chinese in the other. Their prerevolutionary contours have survived the revolutionary cosmetics that are now being washed off without compunction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Majority Leadership in the House of Representatives

SIDNEY WALDMAN

In 1967 Randall Ripley, in a major work on House leadership, noted changes in this century that had weakened the legislative hold of House leaders on party members, in particular reduced resources, greater committee autonomy, and the growing power of seniority.[1] Paradoxically, despite major reforms of the House in the 1970s that increased leadership resources in certain ways, reduced committee autonomy in a limited, but important way, and reduced the rights and power of seniority, majority leadership in the House (the Speaker, majority leader, majority whip) has *not* grown stronger. On balance, the majority-party leadership may well have grown weaker as compared with the 1960s and continues to be quite constrained and limited, even under a relatively strong Speaker like Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, Jr. Because majority-party leadership can to some extent counterbalance the tendency in Congress toward policy fragmentation and lack of coordination, parochialism, and the overrepresentation of highly organized groups, and because this leadership not only affects the degree to which the president—especially when he is of the same party as that of the congressional majority—can effect his major legislative goals, but also affects the kind of representation and accountability Americans have, it is necessary to reassess the capacities and limits of the leadership in light of a decade of House reforms.

This reassessment will be done in two ways: by reexamining the leadership in terms of categories that previous scholars have used (which allows for con-

[1] Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 186.

SIDNEY WALDMAN is associate professor of political science at Haverford College. He is the author of *Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics* as well as a contributor to various edited books and journals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinuity of analysis over time), and by looking at specific, illustrative cases taken from the Ninety-fourth (1975–76) and Ninety-fifth (1977–78) Congresses with occasional comments about the Ninety-sixth Congress (1979–80). The basis for part of the analysis is 110 semistructured interviews completed in the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses with leaders, members, and their staff, as described in the appendix. As several cases in this article show, House leadership requires support or, as one member put it, followship.[2] Leadership therefore is constrained by where the votes are. What the leadership can achieve is very much constrained by the context and situation in which the Congress finds itself in a given period and even with regard to a given issue. A second critical factor involves the expectations or norms of the members with regard to what they owe the party and its leaders. Because the House leadership usually has quite limited and even marginal influence on the national and congressional mood, on member norms including obligations to the party (although the leaders could affect this more than they have), and, often, on where the votes are, these factors become major constraints on what the Speaker and his team can achieve and on what they attempt. Although the leadership's need for member support is not new, the reduced ability of the leaders to motivate and count on such support is. This has occurred because the leaders lack the leverage they once had. In particular, the advent of record votes on most amendments, the substantial weakening of committee chairmen, and the dispersion of power that accompanied the rise of subcommittee influence have all reduced the leverage of the leadership.

House Reforms and Leadership Resources

With these important contextual variables in mind, one can begin to assess the effects of recent House reforms on the leadership by using some of the categories Randall Ripley developed in the 1960s.[3] The two leadership resources that have been most limited as a result of changes in the House are the tangible benefits the leaders can give members and what Ripley referred to as "psychological preferments," which involve members wanting leadership approval.

[2] Ralph Huitt makes a similar point about leadership in the Senate. See Huitt, "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The Senate," in *The Congress and America's Future*, ed. David Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 82–83. For similar conclusions also see Ripley, *Party Leaders*, and John F. Manley, "Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence," *American Political Science Review* 63 (June 1969): 443 and 450.

[3] Ripley, *Party Leaders*. Also see Ripley, *Majority Party Leadership in Congress* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1969) and idem., *Congress: Process and Policy*, 2d ed. (New York, W.W. Norton, 1978), pp. 211–21, as well as Lewis Froman and Randall Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," *American Political Science Review* 59 (March 1965): 52–63, and Robert Peabody, *Leadership in Congress* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), pp. 41–47 and 50–60. Ripley analyzed leadership techniques and functions as well as resources and conditions for success. This article is concerned with the latter two categories of analysis because they proved sufficient in revealing the major changes that have occurred since the 1960s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congressmen in the congressional majority no longer have to wait a decade or more to become subcommittee chairmen, a major source of House influence; they can usually obtain chairs in their third or fourth term, occasionally earlier. Under new party and committee rules members of the majority party no longer are dependent on committee chairmen to appoint them to subcommittees; nor can committee chairmen determine the jurisdiction of their subcommittees, what bills are referred to them, the subcommittee staff, and the budget.[4] These matters are now settled by the Democratic members of their committee. Thus members do not need or depend on party leadership or the committee chairmen to get desirable assignments as they did in the 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, members of the majority party have less need for leadership approval, and there has been growth in the independence of party and committee members. One must note, however, that since subcommittee chairs are generally determined by seniority on the committee and since members care a great deal about which committees they join and when they are appointed to the committees of their choice, the majority-party leadership has substantial *potential* leverage because of its present dominant role on the Democratic Committee on Committees, formally known as the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. The leadership has used this source of power quite sparingly, focusing primarily on appointments to the Rules and Budget Committees (and Ways and Means in 1975) and playing only a marginal role in putting members onto other committees.[5]

The leadership has also lost some of the leverage it once had through the influence of committee chairmen, who could be and were strong allies as well as formidable opponents. In the 1950s and 1960s committee chairmen on occasion caused the leadership difficulty and sometimes "cooperated" with the leadership more on their own terms than on the leadership's.[6] Ironically, in a historical period (the 1970s) in which House reforms and turnover created

[4] A good review of these changes can be found in Norman Ornstein and David Rohde, "Congressional Reform and Political Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives," in *Parties and Elections in an Anti-Party Age,* eds. Jeff Fishel and David Broder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

[5] This information comes from a limited number of interviews in the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses with members of the Steering and Policy Committee. Ken Shepsle, whose work on the committee assignment process during the period, 1958–1974, is much more extensive and systematic, comes to essentially the same conclusion. He suggests that since Rayburn there has been a reduction in the overall influence of party leaders in the committee assignment process. I found no evidence to suggest any more substantial influence in the Ninety-fifth and Ninety-sixth Congresses, although the potential is there. Shepsle also reports Albert as playing a strikingly minimal role in the Ninety-fourth Congress; see Shepsle, *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 306, n. 34.

[6] See Richard Bolling, *House Out of Order* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1965), chap. 4; Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives* (New York: David McKay, Co., Inc., 1963), chap. 7; George Goodwin, *The Little Legislatures* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), pp. 138–39; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 January 1971, pp. 242–47. While Barbara Hinckley, *Stability and Change in Congress* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

committee chairs who were more cooperative with the leadership, those same chairs lost substantial leverage that could have served the leaders.[7] The leadership's difficulties are even greater than the previous analysis suggests because members not only have fewer incentives to go along, but also find it more difficult to do so in one critical way. Prior to 1970 many votes on amendments to bills were unrecorded, which made going along with the party and committee leadership easier.[8] Since 1970 most votes on amendments have been recorded, which may have limited the leadership as much as any of the other changes noted.

Nonetheless, majority-party leaders still have important tangible benefits to offer members. They still schedule bills and call them up. (This can be particularly important on minor bills of substantial interest to certain members.) They still can determine when certain members will be recognized on the floor, which affects the order in which amendments come up and who offers them. Working with the floor manager of a bill, usually the subcommittee chairman, the Speaker is sometimes in a position to use the powers of his chair to affect legislative outcomes through parliamentary tactics.[9] This reinforces the Speaker's relative dominance over the communications process, another resource, because members who believe they can get his parliamentary support may come to him with their requests and plans prior to and during floor battles. Related to the Speaker's control of legislative procedure is the greater control he has gained over the Rules Committee through his power to nominate the chairman and members of that committee. Since the Rules Committee can affect which amendments are in order during floor debate, the Speaker's influence over that committee gives substantial additional leverage. For example, in the Ninety-fifth Congress the limitation on outside earned income members could make came up under a closed rule (no amendments allowed; the legislation had to be voted up or down), which precluded weakening or gutting the bill through amendment. Similarly, the final major energy bill in 1978, an aggregation of five separate bills, came to the floor as one package under the rule from the committee, which may have saved the most important part of the bill, natural-gas price decontrol, from defeat. In both cases Speaker O'Neill's influence with

---

correct in suggesting that chairmen and party leaders often cooperated in their mutual interest, she does not ask what the "terms of trade" of that cooperation were in a period of chairman influence clearly greater than what we see now (pp. 127–33).

[7] See Norman Ornstein and David Rohde, "Seniority and Future Power in Congress," in *Congress in Change*, ed. Ornstein (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 72–87, on turnover in committee chairmen. Bruce Oppenheimer makes a related argument in his "Subcommittee Government and Congressional Reform," *D.E.A. News Supplement* (published by the American Political Science Association) (Summer 1976), in pointing out that subcommittee chairmen, who have gained part of the influence committee chairmen once had, lack the wide policy jurisdiction the latter also had, which has reduced their leverage.

[8] See Froman and Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership," pp. 39–61.

[9] See Peabody, *Leadership in Congress*, and Richard Bolling, *Power in the House* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the members of the Rules Committee affected the legislative outcome in significant ways.

Another important resource that has not abated is the leadership's domination of the communications process. The leadership has information (particularly when the president is of the same party as the House majority) about White House strategy, tactics, and bottom-line requirements not available to members. They have information about Senate intentions and developments and about the strategies, tactics, and vote counts of cooperative lobbies, which also are not available to most members. Because majority-party leaders usually work with committee and subcommittee chairs to pass legislation, they learn useful political information from them. Because of an improved whip system and because members will respond more candidly to leadership polls than to lobbyist or White House polls, they have perhaps the most important information in a legislative struggle—information on where the votes are and (sometimes) what it will take to win certain people over.[10] Their information about all of this, of course, is far from perfect, but they dominate the communications process as no one else in the Congress does, and the political information thereby gained is a source of influence. While recognizing the importance of this dominance, one must remember that it has limited utility in helping the leaders attain their legislative goals. Member independence of party, a questioning by Democratic congressmen of past Democratic solutions, and popular skepticism toward government all limit the utility of this communications dominance. If the leadership finds that the votes are simply not there for something they wish to do, there is little they can do about it. One sees this in the defeats of the Agency for Consumer Protection, the situs picketing bill, and the voter registration bill in the Ninety-fifth Congress and the defeat of public financing of congressional elections in the Ninety-fifth and Ninety-sixth Congresses.

The leadership cannot switch votes as often as it would like and needs to, given its high-priority legislative goals, because in fundamental ways its resource situation remains as constrained as it was in the 1960s before the reforms. It continues to lack important sanctions. Since in the last several congresses (through the Ninety-sixth) party loyalty has not determined the selection of committee and subcommittee chairmen, the leadership has lacked a potentially very important sanction.[11] Work on the committee assignment process has shown that general party loyalty has also failed to affect assignments to most

[10] For a discussion of the whip system in the Ninety-fifth Congress see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 May 1978, pp. 1301–6.

[11] Some might argue, not unpersuasively, that Bob Pogue (Tex.) and F. Edward Hebert (La.) were deposed as chairmen in the Ninety-fourth Congress at least partly because of their conservative records, but the reelection of George Mahon (Tex.) and James Haley (Fla.) as chairmen in the same Congress suggests that more was involved in the selection process, as does the selection of Clement Zablocki (Wisc.) in the Ninety-fifth Congress and Jamie Whitten (Tex.) in the Ninety-sixth Congress, despite efforts to oust them. See Sidney Waldman, "Leadership in the House of Representatives: The 94th and 95th Congresses" (Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1977), pp. 16–17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

House committees, another illustration of a resource the leadership is not using.[12] The leadership's role in appointments to two major control committees of the House—Ways and Means, and Appropriations—has been limited (except for appointments to an expanded Ways and Means Committee in 1975).[13] Other rewards the leadership uses, such as raising a limited amount of money for members and campaigning for them in their districts, seem to have limited "cash in" value, or so leaders have complained in the last two congresses. Of course, as a top aide to one of the leaders said, "Everyone needs help sometimes, and they may not get it if they haven't helped in ways that can reasonably be expected of them." What this aide did not say, and it is critically important, is that the expectations of members and their practice affect what the leaders can "reasonably expect." The relatively light hand of the leadership in the 1960s and 1970s and its nonuse of potential resources reflect and support their own and member expectations of limited leadership. Whether a firmer leadership hand would be acceptable will only be known if and when a strong leader attempts it.

What has and has not changed in House leadership since the 1960s can also be assessed by examining whether the conditions for successful leadership have changed since that period. Two conditions of success emphasized in earlier literature continue to be important and have become even more significant because of changes in the House. Froman and Ripley point out that the leadership is generally more successful when the issues and actions on which it seeks support are less visible or salient. That continues to be true. Since the advent of recorded votes on most amendments, however, floor votes are more visible. Consequently, the party unity that Froman and Ripley found in the early 1960s in unrecorded teller votes on amendments has probably been reduced.[14] A number of members believe this to be the case, and the changed circumstances of voting lends credence to their perception. This, of course, makes the task of the party and committee leadership more difficult. On the other hand, the importance of visibility of action as a condition affecting leadership success has aided the leadership in another regard. The apparent general willingness of committee and subcommittee chairmen to allow the House to vote on major legislation that a majority of House Democrats strongly wish to vote on, an important change from the 1950s and 1960s, depends at least partly on the lesser visibility and salience of reporting legislation out of committee.[15] Furthermore, com-

[12] Shepsle, *Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*. Shepsle's investigation of the assignment process in the Ninety-fourth Congress when the Steering Committee took over as the Democratic Committee on Committees, uncovered no new emphasis on party loyalty, and my own observations of the Ninety-fourth, Ninety-fifth, and Ninety-sixth Congresses support his findings, except for the Speaker appointed Rules Committee and the Budget Committee.

[13] See Shepsle, *Giant Jigsaw Puzzle*, and Waldman, "Leadership in the House."

[14] Froman and Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership," p. 60.

[15] A more extended discussion of this can be found in Waldman, "Majority Party Leadership," pp. 37–38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mittee members and their chairmen can always explain their action as allowing the House to vote its will, a procedural explanation which, as Froman and Ripley have noted previously, is easier to justify than a substantive one. A top aide of the Speaker described the change in cooperativeness of committee chairmen in this way: "The three chairmen being thrown out in 1975 has affected the willingness of chairmen to cooperate with the leadership. In 1973 when we voted on them, they didn't get the message. They took the positive vote as continuing support for them. In 1975 when three were deposed, they got the message. That was important." The chairmen of the committees in the House now have to "go along to get along," a norm they once preached but did not always practice.

Froman and Ripley note how constituency pressures on members can limit leadership success. This of course is a long established fact in congressional studies and continues to be important. Many observers, as well as a number of members and the leadership itself, believe that the factor of outside pressure has grown in importance in recent years. Interest-group influence has increased as the Republican and Democratic parties have weakened locally, nationally, and within Congress. House leadership has external as well as internal competitors. To the extent that House reforms have reduced leadership resources, the leadership is in a worse position vis-à-vis one of its major external competitors, interest groups, than it used to be. This is true notwithstanding its improved position vis-à-vis two formerly major internal competitors, hard-bargaining conservative Southern chairmen, almost all of whom have retired, and the Conservative Coalition, which has been reduced in size for the time being and has had its leverage reduced by various House reforms, especially at the committee level. Furthermore, the relatively junior nature of the House, partly a result of House reforms, has in the view of a number of observers produced more cautious and timid members, still uncertain of their political footing, especially in an era of public disaffection with government. Data on party-unity scores, controlling for region, however, do not show junior Democrats to be less loyal in their voting records than their senior colleagues.[16]

When one lists the various conditions that affect leadership success—the visibility of issues to constituents, the visibility of specific actions in the legislative process, defining issues in procedural rather than substantive terms, constituency pressures, where the votes are in the House, the mood of the country, whether the president is actively cooperating with the leadership, the size of the congressional majority, and whether the majority is a new one—*one realizes that the leadership continues to have quite limited control over most of these conditions,* especially when dealing with its highest priority issues, notwithstanding a half decade of House reforms. Observers recognize these limits on the leadership and their causes, even while acknowledging that the two parties

[16] For a more complete discussion of the problematics of interpreting this data see Waldman, "Majority Party Leadership," pp. 38–39, 43–44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continue to be major organizing forces in Congress and major factors in voting and the bargaining process.[17]

The Leadership and the Steering and Policy Committees

The leadership of the Ninety-fourth Congress devoted much effort to passing two of its highest priority items, an emergency public-service jobs bill and an energy bill. The jobs bill effort was a substantial success, but the energy effort was a failure in important ways.

Early in the Ninety-fourth Congress, informal discussion among key Democrats indicated strong support in the Democratic contingent for a large appropriations bill for public-service jobs legislation, given the current recession. The leadership realized that the support of George Mahon (Tex.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee, would be critical to the bill's chance of passage over President Ford's veto. Consequently, Speaker Albert and a couple of his closest confidants prepared a resolution to take to the Steering Committee that urged Mahon's committee to report out such a bill.[18] One of the leaders then went to Mahon to inform him of the Speaker's intention. Mahon's response was quick. According to one source, he said, "Let's avoid that. I'll run my committee myself. I'll do it. I'll do whatever you want." Another source said that Mahon himself proposed a $5.5 billion appropriation, which in fact was *twice* the amount the leadership had in mind. Mahon's response apparently occurred, despite his serious reservations about public-service jobs programs, not only because he was aware that three chairmen had been dumped a few weeks before and knew that he would be up for reelection as chairman in two years, but also because he knew that both the Steering Committee and the caucus could urge and even instruct him to do this. One of Sam Rayburn's (Speaker, 1940–47, 1949–53, 1955–61) chief aides quoted him as saying, "The most important thing is a man's dignity in front of his peers." Mahon clearly did not wish to be formally and publicly told what to do either by the Steering Committee or the caucus so he cooperated. Mahon may have accepted the fact that, as a committee chairman elected by the caucus, he was responsible to House Democrats, or perhaps he just wanted to be reelected chairman. Because Mahon agreed to cooperate at the Steering Committee meeting, Albert never introduced the resolution he had brought with him. Mahon not only supported the bill in his committeee and helped report it out, but was active in urging its adoption on the floor and apparently won over some conservative votes, both in original passage and during the veto override, which failed by five votes. The

[17] See, for example, Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), revised edition by Edward V. Schneier, Jr., 1970.

[18] The Democratic Steering and Policy Committee has two major functions. Since 1975 it has served as the Democratic Committee on Committees. It also discusses and endorses party policy, often with limited effect. See Sidney Waldman, "Leadership in the House," pp. 27–30, for a more extended discussion of the limits of the Steering Committee in dealing with legislative questions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leadership could not have used the Steering Committee in this way, with the caucus as the "gun in the closet," as one leadership aide put it, had it not been for the reforms in chairmen selection, the assertiveness of the caucus in deposing three chairmen, the creation of the Steering Committee as the new Democratic Committee on Committees, and, most important, the changed expectations of what one could legitimately expect of chairmen. These expectations were relevant in this case because the Democrats were united on this high-priority issue and seen as willing and able to act.

The energy bill, however, produced a different result. In the Ninety-fourth Congress one of the obvious ways of dealing with the nation's energy problem involved raising the price of oil to stimulate both production and conservation. Substantial decontrol of oil prices, however, would result in large windfall profits for the oil producers, even by President Ford's admission, and this was viewed as unacceptable by many in Congress. Thus, if decontrol were to occur, it would have to be combined with a windfall-profits tax, which could allow a plowback provision that would let oil companies keep a larger part of their new profit only if they invested in the discovery and development of additional petroleum sources. One problem in Congress's opting for this approach, however, lay in the fragmented and overlapping committee jurisdictions in the energy field, a problem particularly acute in energy but characteristic of many policy areas with which Congress deals. The Interstate Commerce Committee and particularly its Energy and Power Subcommittee, chaired by John Dingell (Mich.), was responsible for oil pricing, while the Ways and Means Committee under its new chairman, Al Ullman (Ore.), had authority over the taxing of oil-company revenues. The Commerce Committee was unwilling to decontrol oil prices unless it could be sure the companies would be taxed so as not to reap excessive profits, and even then the vote would be very close. The Ways and Means Committee refused to be constrained by the Commerce Committee as to what its taxing policies should be and would not commit itself to any particular solution to the problem prior to its own examination of the questions, and it too was closely divided. Consequently, the leadership, partly through the Steering Committee, tried to get Dingell and Ullman together so a unified and coherent approach to energy could be passed. Members of the leadership met on several occasions with these two chairmen and also brought them to several Steering Committee meetings devoted to the question. One of the leaders described what happened: "Dingell was very stubborn and persistent, and Ullman somewhat stubborn. You have no idea how stubborn they were. Ullman, Dingell, and Staggers [the chairman of the full Commerce Committee] were very, very jealous of losing power. They did not like it when the Steering and Policy Committee passed a resolution or made statements in their jurisdictions. They openly refused to do what we asked them. . . . The Speaker and the majority leader can't force legislation out of committee by their own acts. The only thing over these chairmen's heads is the possibility that the younger members might revolt against them. They [the younger members] don't care about the chairman's authority."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The failure of the leadership in the energy bill contrasts sharply with the jobs bill case and is instructive in showing some of the conditions that facilitate or limit leadership success. The most important fact about the energy issue was the substantial division among House Democrats on the questions involved, along philosophical and, especially, regional lines. As a top leadership aide put it, "Energy is not a party issue; it's a regional issue. This limits what the leadership can do." The point was made in a slightly different way by another leadership strategist speaking about another aspect of the energy question that posed great difficulty for House Democrats, the deregulation of natural gas prices. "Why call a meeting of the Steering Committee and vote 12 to 9 for deregulation of gas prices. The Commerce Committee could then call a meeting and vote 12 to 9 the other way. That just shows the opinions of the particular committees. Ultimately, the House as a whole, including the Republicans, will decide what the Congress will pass so why bother?" A leader described why they did not pass a resolution in the Steering Committee urging the committees involved to report out particular energy bills. "The energy bill was too controversial; therefore you don't deal with that in Steering and Policy. The Democratic Caucus would not have supported the approach we took with Mahon on the jobs bill, had we tried it in dealing with Ullman and Dingell."

This case brings out other important factors that limit leadership success. Because Dingell and Ullman did not have sufficient control of their own committees, as several respondents pointed out, the chances they could be brought together were limited since they did not want to agree publicly to strive for a particular result only to find themselves stranded from a majority of their committee. Their problems reflected not only the independence of committee members but also the reduction of their power as chairmen. Equally important, the division within the party on energy meant they would be less subject to potential pressure from the caucus, either directly or by way of the leadership, if they refused to cooperate. The fragmented and overlapping committee jurisdictions in the energy area created additional problems for members and gave those members who did not like the price decontrol–windfall-profits tax approach another lever through which they could resist leadership efforts. In addition, some members did not trust Speaker Albert on this issue since he was seen as somewhat sympathetic to the oil and gas industry, given his Oklahoma district. Although all these factors limited what the leadership could achieve in energy, the most important by far was the division within the Democratic contingent in the House. The leadership and the Steering Committee would not do what House Democrats were unwilling to support and could not provide a consensus where it was substantially lacking. This is consistent with what Charles Jones found in studying the Republican Policy Committee in the 1960s, the Republican counterpart to the Democratic Steering Committee.[19]

[19] Charles O. Jones, *Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To summarize, the Steering Committee, like the caucus, can be "a gun in the closet" in dealing with potentially recalcitrant chairmen and, perhaps, with recalcitrant committees (the latter is more problematic), but this seems to be true only in a context of a fairly well unified Democratic Caucus on a major issue. Because the Steering Committee is generally effective in that context, it usually does not have to be used. As long as caucus expectations of chairmen and committees are met (and they are few and limited), the leadership will not have to resort to Steering Committee resolutions urging particular committees to report out given legislation. Problems will be dealt with informally by the leadership and the relevant committees, but the leadership can be supported in these efforts by the potential action of the Steering Committee and caucus.

Leadership Success in the Ninety-fifth Congress

Unlike the leadership of the Ninety-fourth Congress in trying to solve jurisdictional conflicts in the energy area, the leadership of the Ninety-fifth Congress was able to pass a major and relatively comprehensive energy bill fairly close to what President Carter proposed within four months of receiving his proposal. Examining how the leaders met certain problems in doing this is instructive, both in showing what the leadership can do in certain situations and, perhaps more important, in highlighting some of the major forces they must take into account in gaining the support necessary to lead.

Many with whom I spoke early in the Ninety-fifth Congress agreed that energy policy would probably be the biggest challenge facing the House and its leadership in that Congress. The problems the leadership ran into in the Ninety-fourth Congress suggest some of the reasons why this was the case. The context of the battle over energy had changed, however, in ways that aided the leadership. In the Ninety-fifth Congress the country had a united government, which made it more difficult to pass the buck, escape responsibility, and blame the other branch. A new Democratic president was strongly committed to a national energy policy; and the House had a new and strong Speaker, who was more trusted on the question of oil and gas pricing than Speaker Albert had been. The problems the Ninety-fourth Congress had run into were known by the membership, the leadership, and the administration. Nevertheless, that Carter's energy proposal fell under the jurisdiction of five House committees, the bulk of the program going to Ways and Means and to Commerce, meant the problem faced by the previous Congress might occur with different parts of the bill not hanging together, perhaps conflicting, and with a possibility that committees might try to outmaneuver each other in working up the legislation. Thus, a month before the Ninety-fifth Congress convened, Speaker O'Neill met with forty-seven freshmen Democrats and publicly committed himself to setting up an ad hoc energy committee that would deal with the whole question and help avoid the problems of fragmented jurisdictions that had plagued previous efforts. Carl Albert had proposed this in the Ninety-third and Ninety-fourth Congresses and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had met resistance from members and chairmen on the relevant committees. One leadership staffer commented on why O'Neill was able to create such a committee, given the previous failures: "The committee was accepted in the Ninety-fifth because the times have changed; the issue is more acute. You have Carter and his commitment to an energy policy and a new Speaker who is trusted and in whom the members have confidence. The Speaker got in early with his proposal and those who opposed the effort couldn't do much anyway by the time they got in; they and the committees have power anyway under the arrangements that were made."

Before examining the purpose of the Ad Hoc Energy Committee, a leadership innovation meant to deal with the jurisdictional problem, it is necessary to look at the problems O'Neill ran into in setting up the committee and how he dealt with them, since that tells much about the House and what is required to lead it. His proposal to set up an ad hoc energy committee met with substantial resistance as had Carl Albert's earlier proposal. Consequently, Speaker O'Neill, after close and continuing consultation with some of the members most affected by his proposal, suggested a compromise. Original legislative jurisdiction would still go to the relevant standing committees, but under rules previously passed by the Democratic Caucus early in the Ninety-fifth Congress, at the initiative of the leadership, the five committees to which parts of the bill were referred had to report their legislation to the Ad Hoc Energy Committee by a fixed date, the same date for all the committees. Thus, one committee could not delay, as Commerce had in the Ninety-fourth Congress, while watching another committee's bill go down to defeat, thereby increasing the chances its own approach would pass.

Once the parts of the package were reported to the Ad Hoc Energy Committee, that committee could only recommend amendments to the entire package rather than itself amending the bill before it went to the Rules Committee and to the floor. These proposed amendments, however, were expected to be privileged under the rules by which the bill would go to the floor. O'Neill said he would recommend to the Rules Committee that the standing legislative committees be allowed to manage on the floor those parts of the bill falling in their jurisdictions and that they would have primary responsibility in the conference with the Senate for working out differences in their areas of jurisdiction. The Speaker then assigned to the Ad Hoc Energy Committee members from the legislative committees with original jurisdiction. Thus, of the forty members of the committee, eleven came from Commerce, ten from Ways and Means, and five from Banking, with a number of others coming from committees that had in the past been involved in energy issues. The Speaker also recognized the regional conflicts involved in the energy question by giving each of the four sections of the country almost identical representation on the Democratic side of the committee. The committee was also noteworthy in that its membership included five committee chairmen and eleven subcommittee chairmen, most of whom presumably had learned the need for compromise and cooperation, given their positions, and all of whom would need the leadership's support on other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matters in the future. In these ways the Speaker recognized the need to win and maintain support in the standing committees, the need to have regional balance, and the need to have a committee with clout. The bases he touched in setting up this committee are instructive. A Speaker needs support to be successful; that is why he needs to know what bases to touch, as O'Neill demonstrated.

What did O'Neill gain by his "compromise"? To begin with, *he* appointed the Democratic members of the committee, a majority of whom had previously supported oil and gas price control. (The 1977 Carter energy bill opposed decontrol.) The committee was created to see that the parts of the energy bill, as reported by five committees, would hold together and that gaps could be filled if necessary. If substantial damage that was rectifiable were to occur as a result of initial committee consideration, the Ad Hoc Energy Committee would serve as a forum where that rectification could be attempted before the bill went to the floor. Clearly, the Speaker hoped that the Ad Hoc Energy Committee, given its makeup and the legitimation of its role through creation by the House, would influence voting on energy questions. The committee gave the leadership, the Democrats, and the administration a second crack at the legislation after it was reported out of committee. The amendments that were recommended by the Ad Hoc Energy Committee, and there were a few major ones, had a leadership and party imprimatur that would have been lacking had these amendments been made through the ordinary amendment process on the floor.

O'Neill's overall strategy worked. Before each Ad Hoc Energy Committee meeting the committee Democrats met in caucus and decided which proposed amendments would pass and which would not. Throughout the process they commanded and held a majority, one strongly influenced by the leadership and generally supportive of the Carter plan. The Ad Hoc Energy Committee proposed a key amendment to the bill, one acceptable to the administration, that expanded the definition of new natural gas, which could be sold at higher prices. This amendment passed on the floor and, in the judgment of a number of key participants on both sides, allowed the House to avoid decontrolling natural gas, which would have been a major defeat for the Carter bill. The House passed an energy bill reasonably close to what Carter wanted, unlike the Senate, and did so in less than four months after Carter's initial message. Speaker O'Neill played a critical role in facilitating that noteworthy achievement. By examining how O'Neill proceeded in this case, we see both the constraints on the leadership and the ways in which these constraints can be faced and, on some occasions, handled.

The House Leadership and the Standing Committees

On most matters, even on relatively major programs, the leadership gives the committees their head and, if the leaders get involved at all, it is usually late in the legislative process after the bill has been reported out of committee. At that stage the task is vote mobilization, scheduling (for example, waiting for the time when the votes are there), and (sometimes) affecting the rules under which the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legislation is considered on the floor. As a general rule, neither the leadership nor the caucus wishes to substitute its own work for that of committees and subcommittees. When the president is of the same party as the congressional majority, however, the leadership is somewhat more likely to get involved on matters of high priority to the administration when that is required to deal with divisions in the committee that are affecting the chances the legislation will be reported out; this happened in the Ninety-fifth Congress with the Consumer Protection Agency Bill. Such intervention by the leadership, however, is rare because the executive in a united government has the primary responsibility for working with committees. Moreover, leadership intervention is rarely needed; in the words of one leader, "we would go crazy if we tried to stay on top of all these committees." And the leadership economizes its limited credit by saving it for major problems.

In general the leadership's intervention in the committee process during the Ninety-fifth Congress followed the pattern of the previous Congress (except for the notable case of energy). Speaker O'Neill, however, has been willing to exert more influence in turning around a few close committee votes. For example, when the ethics bill went to the House Administration Committee, according to one source, the Speaker switched a couple of votes so that a provision eliminating the unofficial office account and replacing it with a $7,000 official account for each member was reported out. The same source said it was easier to switch votes in committee to get a bill to the floor than it was to switch votes on the floor.[20] To give another example, O'Neill successfully intervened in getting the Rules Committee to report out an amendment limiting the outside earned income of members, despite serious reservations and opposition to that amendment by a majority of the committee.

It is difficult to get member confirmation of leadership intervention in committee affairs, partly because that intervention is sometimes indirect with the leadership getting other people, such as lobbyists, the executive, or other congressmen, to speak to given members. Members do not like to speak about their being moved by the leadership or even about having to reject personal leadership appeals. Further, as one aide suggested, the leadership staff sometimes works with the committee staff to resolve problems in committee with committee members not always being aware of this. For these reasons, the data that provide the basis for this article do not allow a more precise assessment of how frequently and with what significance this intervention occurs, aside from the examples discussed.

The leadership is not always able to control what committees do, even when they intervene. To quote a leadership staff man, "We have trouble with com-

[20] This is, of course, consistent with Ripley's point about the importance of the visibility of action (*Party Leaders*, pp. 8–10). I must point out, however, that the leadership cannot always turn committee votes around. For example, in the Ninety-sixth Congress the leadership was unable to switch a sufficient number of votes in the same House Administration Committee to report out a bill that provided public financing of House elections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mittee A and with the chairman of committee B. Not very much can be done about this. When a majority on a committee wants to report more liberal legislation than the House will accept, there isn't much we can do, except perhaps to have a backup position ready if and when the first one fails." In this situation the House is not prevented from voting its will on the floor. At the same time, one must point out that in the case of the jobs bill the leadership was not willing to have Mahon report a smaller and more limited bill than it and most Democrats wanted, even though the House could have amended that bill on the floor. The leadership recognized the importance of Mahon's support in committee and on the floor if they were to override the expected veto of a large appropriation. House Democrats were strongly united in wanting a large appropriation for public-service jobs during a fairly deep recession, whereas on more controversial matters of the committees Democrats are more divided. This may explain what seems to be two different standards in dealing with committees.

On some occasions when committee chairmen seek the leadership's help in dealing with problems in their committees, the leadership is limited in what it can do and, for that matter, what it thinks it should have to do. One respondent described a particular chairman who could not get certain things out of his committee because he did not want to build the coalitions required. This chairman went to the Steering Committee for help. "Chairman X wants to come over here and use the Steering and Policy Committee as a damn garbage dump. He can't get something out of his committee so he wants us to do it for him. Ridiculous! Why should we have to come over here for those lousy breakfasts of cold eggs and greasy bacon to waste our time on something like that?" Clearly this individual felt the leadership and Steering Committee should not be building coalitions to report legislation out of committee when the chairman could be doing it, but was unwilling to.

In general, even on major issues, the leadership does not substitute its judgment of what the entire House membership and House Democrats will accept for that of the sometimes more parochial committees and subcommittees, which after all are generally self-recruited. Consequently, the fate of committee bills on the floor depends to a large extent on how willing and able committees are to be attuned to the House. Given the large number of subcommittees (about 155) and committees (20), the limited resources of the leadership, and a general faith in the committee system, this is understandable. A test of successful leadership, however, will be whether leaders are willing or able to deviate from this normal course when the issue is important enough and the need to do so clear. O'Neill did work with committee leaders in weakening the voter registration bill in such an attempt in 1977, but even a highly weakened version of the bill failed to pass the House. In some major matters the leadership does get involved in modifying committee bills on the floor when this is required for passage, but even then the consent or at least tacit acquiescence of the committee chairman or bill manager (usually the subcommittee chairman) is obtained before this is done.[21] The

[21] Larry Dodd, "The Expanding Roles of the House Democratic Whip System" (Paper presented

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leadership somewhat more frequently gets involved in making sure that fallback positions, compromises, are ready when initial committee bills fail to get enacted. This of course must be handled delicately since chairmen and committees may resent being undermined by a leadership that is preparing a weaker version of their bill.

To sum up, the leadership generally does not intervene in committee matters before a bill is reported out, although the exceptions are interesting and important. The leadership is sometimes able to facilitate reporting out a bill when its help is requested. Committees, often working with the executive, generally determine the substance of their own bills, but the leadership on occasion helps prepare fallback positions when it realizes a committee bill will be defeated. Not surprisingly, the relationship between the leadership and the many committees of the House varies with the committee, the issue, and the situation; thus, one cannot describe the relationship neatly and simply.

The Whip System and Vote Mobilization

A number of major floor votes in the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses would have gone the other way had ten to fifteen (and sometimes fewer) members switched their votes. Thus the ability of the Democratic leadership to mobilize and switch votes affects its success in important ways. Critical to this ability is the whip system, an important leadership tool for counting and then mobilizing votes.[22] Many members of the House voiced major criticism of the whip system, especially in the Ninety-fourth Congress, in interviews about leadership attempts to mobilize and change the votes of members because they were dissatisfied with a perceived lack of vigor in these efforts, though some conservative Democrats were quite content with the "light hand" of the leadership. A number of members resented the fact that they had rarely, if ever, been contacted by the Speaker or majority leader in an effort to affect their vote and that the contacts they had received from Speaker Albert were on the question of sending a congressional delegation to fetch the Magna Carta or on the question of extending the West Front of the Capitol, both of which they considered a silly use of Speaker influence. Some of those most critical of the whip system were liberals with high party-unity scores, who generally supported the leadership

at the 1977 Midwest Political Science Association Committee, Chicago, Ill., April 1977), p. 31 ff. See also a version of this paper, "The Expanded Roles of the House Democratic Whip System: 93rd and 94th Congresses," *Congressional Studies* 7 (Spring 1979): 27–56.

[22] The best work on the whip system as it operated in the mid-1960s is that of Froman and Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership." The best work on the whip system as it operated in the mid-1970s is by Larry Dodd, "Expanding Roles." My material on the whip system in the Ninety-fourth Congress contains findings which in certain ways differ from what Dodd reports in his study of the same Congress. While he analyzed the system primarily from the inside, I interviewed numerous respondents who were the objects of the whip efforts and found substantial criticism, which Dodd's research design did not elicit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and were frustrated by the failure to override most of the Ford vetoes. They probably did not expect to be the object of the vote-switching efforts they had in mind. However, even some Southern conservative Democrats were unhappy with the whip effort. One put it this way: "During my first three years in Congress, 1969–72, the leadership never put its arm on me. . . . I don't particularly want the party to tell me what to do, but they just have had no discipline at all. Carl Albert called me a couple of weeks ago on the Magna Carta. The only time I'd been contacted previously for a vote was by Nixon!"

The whip system, as understood by those centrally involved and by the members themselves, has two major functions: the whip count, and mobilizing votes once the initial count is done. Members had numerous complaints in the Ninety-fourth Congress about the counting operation as well as the vote-mobilizing effort. Several said they had never been directly contacted by their own regional whip on how they intended to vote.[23] (Whip counts usually involve the zone whip's staff member contacting the *office* of a member to find out his voting intentions rather than a direct contact from whip to congressman.) One congressman did not even know who his zone whip was. The twenty-one zone whips vary substantially in how responsibly they take their assignments. Speaker O'Neill in effect acknowledged this weakness when he made a plea in the Ninety-fifth Congress organizing caucus that members responsibly select zone whips who would do a good job; however, he opposed an effort to require that all zone whips be elected.

Interviews with four of the six members who were either majority whip, chief deputy whip, or deputy whip and six of the twenty-one zone whips during the Ninety-fourth Congress were instructive. One of the zone whips, who took his job seriously in personally contacting the members of his region when the leadership showed particular concern, said "there is a lack of vigor both in the leadership and the whip system." One member involved in the vote-mobilizing part of the whip operation described the task this way: "In the meetings where we [the Speaker, the majority leader, the majority whip, the chief deputy whip, and the three deputy whips] divide up the list as to who will see whom in trying to affect votes, if someone looks pretty good, we may have Tip O'Neill [then the majority leader], McFall [majority whip], or the Speaker make the contact, but that's usually not necessary. Usually you can present members with the facts and reasoning and either persuade them or realize no one can." One is struck by the sparing use of the leadership in this account. Perhaps the demands on the leadership in the Ninety-fourth Congress precluded more active involvement. More likely, Speaker Albert was spending his time on less important details and

[23] There are twenty-one regional or zone Democratic whips, each of whom is responsible for taking whip counts of Democrats in his region. Each zone has its own method of selecting these whips. In some the senior zone member appoints the whip (sometimes himself), while in others the whips are elected by their zone colleagues. The former method has sometimes caused weakness in the quality of the whip effort in particular zones, but does not account for all the weaknesses in the operation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was less active than he should have been, as a few members suggested. Perhaps the leadership felt its personal approach was not needed or was inappropriate; probably it was aware of its own limits, given Albert's personality and limited conception of his job. Only on a very few matters did the majority-party leadership of the Ninety-fourth Congress exert a large personal whip effort. According to one source, "on the jobs bill override Albert made twenty calls himself. The leadership made about forty calls in all. Originally, we had a list of sixty people we would lose on the vote, and we ended up losing twenty-two Democrats." The interviews reported on in this article suggested this sort of direct, personal leadership effort was unusual in the Ninety-fourth Congress. It has been more frequent in the Ninety-fifth and Ninety-sixth Congresses under O'Neill's speakership.

One has to be careful in assessing the whip system vote-mobilization efforts on the basis of interviews with members. Frustration at the inability of the Ninety-fourth Congress to override Ford vetoes created a need, as one member put it, "to have to blame someone," and the leadership, including the whip system, were obvious targets, partly because they did have weaknesses. Furthermore, vote mobilization often involves the indirect contacting of congressmen. Members of the whip operation may work through lobbyists, people from the member's district, or other members so congressmen are not fully aware of the role the leadership and whip system play in efforts to influence them. It is also possible that some members are reluctant to discuss leadership contacts they do get. It is difficult, however, to know what weight to give these factors, primarily because analysts lack the needed information, and thus difficult to evaluate member complaints about the whip system. It is still important to note, however, that many members were quite unhappy with the leadership's whip efforts in the Ninety-fourth Congress. We did not interview a sufficient number of members in the Ninety-fifth Congress to be able to say with certainty that this unhappiness abated, but the noninterview sources used did not contain complaints about the leadership's mobilization efforts that were fairly common in the Ninety-fourth Congress in the same sources, for example, in newspaper accounts. Speaker O'Neill and his colleagues have been substantially more active in vote mobilizing in the Ninety-fifth Congress.[24] They have of course faced a significant number of Democrats who were prepared to leave their party and President Carter on several major votes. O'Neill and his team have been more personally involved than Albert, and the whips have more vigorously pursued the votes of uncommitted Democrats than they did in the Ninety-fourth Congress, partly because of the incentives a united government brings to our system. The leadership of the Ninety-fifth Congress improved the whip operation by creating ten at-large whips, who have aided the leaders in vote mobilization. Six of these ten were sophomore members and one was a freshman. In creating these at-large whips the leadership used the class ties of members as well as regional ties to improve their operations. This additional manpower has

[24] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 April 1978, pp. 1301–6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allowed more extensive tallying, mobilizing, and vote monitoring than occurred in the previous Congress. The leadership under O'Neill deserves credit for its greater and more systematic mobilizing efforts. That those efforts were unsuccessful on some major bills, such as situs picketing, voter registration, the Consumer Protection Agency, and tax reform, simply highlights once again the limits of House leadership and followship.

Unfortunately, the data on which this article draws do not allow a more precise estimate of the significance of these changes in the whip operation. Such an assessment would be difficult because of all the factors impinging on voting decisions. Nevertheless, one can qualitatively distinguish effort and success in the mobilizing of the two leaderships, O'Neill's being the more effective; and in some cases, for example, House passage of the final version of the energy bill in 1978, this difference proved quite important.

Conclusion

After reviewing various House reforms affecting leadership capacity, Dodd and Oppenheimer conclude that "the sum total of the changes seems to constitute a real resurgence of the Speakership."[25] In my judgment, as of this date, that conclusion is not merited. Close study of House leadership over the past five years reveals unutilized potential power. It shows power which, when used, proved insufficient on numerous occasions. It also reveals major constraints, which on balance have proved more important than the additions to the power of the leadership that have resulted from reforms. It is not difficult to identify the changes that might lead one to see a resurgence in the speakership—in particular, Speaker influence over the Democratic Steering Committee and the Rules Committee, an organizationally strengthened whip system, joint and sequential referral power, and the new congressional budget process.[26] This analysis, however, has shown the leadership's limited use of the Steering Committee, both in its committee assignment role and in dealing with substantive questions, and has pointed out the limits of even a strengthened whip system. The new referral powers have been of limited use and have not enabled the leadership to deal seriously with the general problem of jurisdictional fragmen-

[25] Larry Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 44–49. In an article dealing with the efforts of the leaderships of the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses in the energy area, Oppenheimer points out important limits in what contemporary House leadership can achieve in light of major constraints they face. See Oppenheimer, "Policy Effects of U.S. House Reform: Decentralization and the Capacity to Resolve Energy Issues," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 5 (February 1980): 5–30.

[26] The new congressional budget process passed in 1974 has been a limited leadership tool and has facilitated some centralization in the House. The potential of the process in both regards probably is greater than the use made of it to date, primarily because of the difficulty of gaining majority support for the budget resolutions, support which is required to keep the process intact. For a discussion of the leadership and the budget process see Joel Havemann, *Congress and the Budget* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), especially pp. 83 and 153–56.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tation and policy coordination. Control of the Rules Committee has helped, but that can carry the leaders only so far, especially given their still limited use of modified closed rules in floor action. More important, recorded votes on amendments, weakened committee chairmen as leadership allies, and the new rights of members in committee and subcommittee, all of which facilitate or contribute to members' independence of the party, seem to have more than countered leadership gains. Careful analyses of the changes in leadership resources and in the conditions affecting their success support this conclusion, as do the numerous failures of the leadership and the limited number of their significant successes. The interviews with the leadership reported on here indicate that leaders are aware of their limits and would like to figure out what they can do about them. Some power that has remained only potential will have to be used for their situation to change. An important task facing the leadership is to figure out how and when to do this so that they can maintain at least the tolerance of and, perhaps, the support of those members who like the autonomy they have achieved.

Methodological Appendix

This research on the Ninety-fourth Congress had as its major but not exclusive source open-ended, semistructured interviews with leaders, members, and staff. Ninety-seven semistructured interviews were conducted, sixty-eight of which were with Democratic members of Congress, the rest with staff. Although a number of the same questions were asked during most interviews, new questions were added and refinements made during the course of the research.

Interviews with members during the Ninety-fifth Congress were similar in method and format, although relatively more reliance was placed both on my experiences in the House as a congressional fellow and on press accounts and less on interviews. A total of thirteen interviews were conducted; six of them were with leaders or their chief staff people.

In the Ninety-fourth and Ninety-fifth Congresses three of the top five leaders (Speaker, majority leader, majority whip, chief deputy whip, caucus chairman) were interviewed. In the Ninety-fourth Congress the top staff people who worked for four of these five leaders were interviewed and three in the Ninety-fifth Congress; there were no refusals. Also in the Ninety-fourth Congress three of the four deputy whips, eight of twenty-four members of the Steering Committee, and six of twenty-one regional whips were interviewed.

A variety of criteria was used in selecting whom to interview. Among those interviewed were members who had either strongly advocated or adamantly opposed reform; freshmen members, who as a group in the Ninety-fourth Congress had played an important role in the reform process; members of varied seniority and region; and members with varied ideological complexions. Eleven percent of those contacted refused or were not available at a suitable time. When this happened, an attempt was made to replace them with members with similar characteristics.

The *Congressional Quarterly*'s Conservative Coalition Score was used to classify members as liberals, moderates, and conservatives (those who scored 0–30 in their Conservative Coalition support score were classified as liberals, those who scored 31–70 as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moderates, and those who scored 71–100 as conservatives). Use of this classification reveals that House Democrats in the Ninety-fourth Congress consisted of 55 percent liberals, 26 percent moderates, and 20 percent conservatives. The sample used for this article contained 64 percent, 26 percent, and 11 percent, respectively. The Ninety-fourth Congress House Democrats contained 28 percent Southern Democrats; the sample for this article contained 25 percent. Classifying House Democrats by seniority in terms of freshmen-sophomores, those having served three to five terms, and those having served over six terms, House Democrats contained 34 percent freshmen-sophomores, 22 percent having served three to five terms, and 45 percent having served six terms or more. The sample used for this article contained 25 percent, 21 percent, and 54 percent, respectively. Thus the sample used for this article had characteristics that fairly closely approximated those of the full House Democratic contingent in the Ninety-fourth Congress.*

* I thank John Coleman and Rusty King for their help in this research and also thank the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Haverford College Faculty Research Fund for the financial support that made the work possible. I also wish to thank the American Political Science Association for my Congressional Fellowship and Congressman Bob Eckhardt and his office for their support.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking

DAVID C. MOWERY
MARK S. KAMLET
JOHN P. CRECINE

Since the appearance of Neustadt's work on the presidency in 1960, the works of Allison, Halperin, Kanter, and others have developed an important intellectual approach to the study of the presidency that views the occupant of the White House as a person embedded in an organizational, rather than an exclusively political, context.[1] Presidents preside at the apex of a complex structure with important intraorganizational politics; they may persuade, or they may delegate, but they function within a sometimes constraining organizational context. This article analyzes an aspect of the managerial role of the president—management of the several policy processes that culminate in the annual president's budget transmitted to Congress. The approach to this management task adopted by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson mirrored the political goals, staff organization, and even the personalities of each man. Despite substantial variation in the demands placed upon the policy processes

[1] See, for example, Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971); Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974); and Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

DAVID C. MOWERY is assistant director of the Public Policy Program and research associate at Stanford University. MARK S. KAMLET is assistant professor of economics and public policy in the social science department and School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University. JOHN P. CRECINE, professor of political economy and dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Carnegie-Mellon University, is author of *Government Problem Solving*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by each president, however, the nature of these processes and the recurrent tensions between them have remained fairly constant across time.

This article will focus upon the nature of the relationship among the White House, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the federal agencies, as well as the linkage between fiscal and budgetary policies. Within the executive branch of the federal government, a fundamental linkage exists among domestic budgetary policy, defense budgetary policy, and fiscal policy—one that gives rise to a need for presidential management and coordination of policy processes. As shall be seen, the interdependence of these three areas affects both the policy planning within any given fiscal year and the relationship between short-run and long-run budgetary and fiscal policy choices.

Federal Budgetary and Fiscal Planning Processes

Within the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Management and Budget—formerly known as the Bureau of the Budget—is the principal manager of the domestic budgetary process, functioning as a presidential staff arm. The director and the deputy director of OMB are at the top of the organization. Beneath them are grouped a number of staff offices and program divisions. Among the staff offices is the Budget Review Division (BRD). Until the reorganization of the Bureau of the Budget in 1970, BRD served as both "secretariat" and manager of the budgetary process within the executive branch. Roughly 200 budget examiners are organized into program divisions that both carry out OMB's line function of evaluating agency budget submissions and provide program analysis. Federal agencies are assigned to a specific program division, for example, the Department of Interior to the Natural Resources Division. The program divisions have changed marginally over time in number, title, and composition, but the divisions' functional roles have remained fairly constant.

The annual domestic budget cycle in the executive branch for fiscal year t begins in the spring of calendar year t minus two years $(t-2)$, and is concluded when the president's budget for fiscal year t is presented to Congress in January of calendar year $t-1$. Planning of the fiscal year 1980 budget, for instance, began in the spring of 1978, and the fiscal 1980 budget was presented to Congress in January 1979.[2] In most budgetary planning cycles, agencies make formal budgetary requests to OMB at two points in the cycle—near the end of the "spring preview" (May-June), and early in the "fall review" (generally late September to October). Formal agency submissions are evaluated by OMB program division personnel on the basis of guidelines developed by the director and his staff and occasionally with explicit guidance from the president.

[2] During the period examined in this article, the fiscal year began on July 1 and ended on June 30. Beginning with fiscal year 1977, the beginning and ending dates were changed to October 1 and September 30, respectively.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The spring preview often, but not always, ends with a high-level meeting of the president with his senior advisers from the White House, National Security Council (NSC), Defense Department, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), the Treasury Department, and OMB. Ideally, such a meeting serves to draw together the various executive branch policy decision streams—*domestic budgetary, defense budgetary, and fiscal policy.* In nearly every year, this meeting produces a "target total" for outlays and, occasionally, for budget authority. In order to produce a target total for domestic and defense outlays, a decision must be made regarding the defense-nondefense split of the budget. Some resolution, however tentative, of the "guns versus butter" tradeoff for the upcoming fiscal year is reached at this point, if not before.

A central function of OMB is the allocation of such a target total among domestic agencies, based upon guidelines developed by the director and senior staff within OMB. This process results in a set of OMB "planning figures." The target total serves an important function in OMB's management of the domestic budgetary formulation process, as it provides the information necessary for coordinating the activities of the 200 or so budget examiners in OMB program divisions and serves as a means of assessing and monitoring progress toward the achievement of a budget that meets the president's policy goals. OMB's planning figures for agencies are consistent, in the aggregate, with presidential fiscal policies of the moment—they aggregate to a proper outlay total.

The fall review period is slightly different from the preview, although it also serves to pull together and coordinate the various policy streams. OMB planning figures for principal federal agencies are again developed by budget examiners in the various program divisions in early October, following receipt of agency requests and any new guidelines from the president or director of OMB. These agency requests and planning figures form the basis for the director's review, a series of high-level evaluations attended by the director or assistant director, program division personnel, and representatives from the agencies. Recommendations from these sessions are sent to the president, who makes the final decisions based upon desired fiscal, legislative, defense, and domestic policies. Agency dissatisfaction with the decisions made in the director's review may result in appeals to the director and the president, for restoration of cuts, in late November and December. The final budget is generally "locked up" in early January, when it is sent to the printer.

In some planning cycles, important decisions concerning fiscal policy or the defense-nondefense split either are not specified firmly early in the year or are revised at the last minute in response to unexpected changes in the economic or political outlook. In such instances, the review phase becomes much more difficult for OMB, as agency allowances must be revised quickly so as to be compatible with a new total. In some cases, accomplishing this task has necessitated the use of a "ratcheting" exercise, in which the budgets for the domestic agencies are reviewed and reduced on a daily basis until a satisfactory overall reduction has been obtained. During such ratchet exercises, one often observes the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use of fairly radical reduction techniques, such as across-the-board percentage cuts, asset sales, and outlay-budget authority "side payments." These techniques are considerably effective in achieving outlay reductions for a given fiscal year, but often may contain dubious allocative implications.

The budgetary process for defense agencies has long been under the control of the Pentagon and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with only occasional staff-level contacts with the OMB-controlled domestic budgetary process. OSD acts as budgetary overseer of the military services, just as OMB does for the domestic agencies.[3]

Fiscal-policy formulation, on the other hand, historically has been characterized by a more fluid structure and process than either the domestic or the defense budgetary process. The structure of the fiscal-policy advisory apparatus also has changed somewhat during the time period of this analysis. The fiscal-policy advisory group is charged with forecasting the behavior of the economy during the fiscal year for which the president's budget is being planned and with recommending a set of policies based on this outlook. Invariably, the budgetary total is central in these recommendations. The fiscal-policy advisory apparatus traditionally has been an interagency one, with analysis and advice coming from at least three offices, referred to as the "Troika": the Council of Economic Advisers, the Treasury Department, and OMB's Fiscal Analysis Division.[4] Generally, forecasts of gross national product, federal tax revenues, and, often, unemployment and the price level are generated for meetings with the president in the preview and review phases, meetings at which the target total for outlays and the defense-nondefense split are determined. Disagreements in fiscal-policy formulation may and do arise over forecasts of key indicators, including forecasts of total federal revenues under a given tax structure and the appropriate size of the deficit (the difference between total revenues and outlays), the principal policy instrument for economic growth and stabilization objectives.

This discussion of the coordination requirements within the executive branch can be summarized by a budgetary accounting identity[5] (Figure 1), which portrays both the interdependence of the various policy streams and the different executive branch policy groups associated with each. The number of autonomous groups involved in budgetary- and fiscal-policy formulation is substantial. Despite the presence of numerous conflicting groups and forces within the

[3] A fuller discussion of defense budgetary processes is found in John P. Crecine, "The Shape of the Defense Budget: Internal DOD Resource Allocation," in *Appendices: Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy*, vol. 4, ed. Graham T. Allison (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

[4] For a history of the fiscal-policy apparatus during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, see Lawrence C. Pierce, *The Politics of Fiscal Policy Formulation* (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1971).

[5] John P. Crecine, "Defense Budgeting: Organizational Adaptation to Environmental Constraints," in *Studies in Budgeting*, eds. Byrne et al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1971); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

The Budgetary Identity and the Organization of Fiscal and Budgetary Policy in the Executive Branch



budgetary-policy process, the logic of fiscal policy as expressed in the budgetary identity requires that changes in any one term of the identity must be offset by compensatory changes in one or more of the other terms.

The President as Coordinator

Figure 1 shows the interdependence of fiscal and budgetary policies and the tensions inherent between them. The close connection between decisions concerning individual program spending and the state of the economy may limit severely the set of feasible presidential policies and programs, regardless of the political temperament of a president. The necessity for coordination among these policy processes is highlighted by the fact that the president's annual *Economic Report*, which outlines and explains general economic policies and objec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tives, is released shortly after the *Budget Message*. Both documents must contain the same recommendations for total federal outlays and estimated revenues.

Several kinds of tension result from the relationship depicted in this accounting identity: tensions among recipients of proposed policy outcomes (for example, among Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Defense); between the timing and "flexibility" in tentative choices made as policy proposals evolve; and between types of budget planning figures (outlays v. budget authority). Conflicts arise over timing and flexibility because the budgetary management and control tasks within the domestic and defense budgetary processes are simplified by settling on desired target totals at an early point in the process and maintaining these target totals throughout. For purposes of fiscal and economic policy, however, the uncertainties (both political and economic) inherent in economic-forecasting exercises provide strong incentives for preserving flexibility in the choice of a desired outlays total until late in the cycle.

The annual president's budget is actually two budgets—every line item in the budget has associated with it an outlays recommendation and a budget authority recommendation, both of which are results of the executive budgetary planning processes.[6] Budget authority essentially entitles agencies to incur obligations for making outlays and is often multiyear in scope for nonpersonnel items. Outlays for an agency is that amount of available budget authority that is expended in a particular fiscal year. (Congressional appropriations represent decisions on budget authority, not outlays.) While outlays represent the critical planning variable for fiscal and economic policy in a given year, and thus are of major concern to White House personnel, budget authority, because it often carries with it multiyear spending implications, may be of far more importance to agency bureaucrats concerned with the long-run health of their programs.

A natural temptation faced by OMB, when confronted with the necessity of reducing the agency outlay totals for fiscal-policy purposes, is to allow for side payments to agencies in the form of increased levels of budget authority in exchange for agency acquiescence in lower levels of outlays. This may appease federal agencies, since they gain control of additional resources to support growth over the long run. At the same time, such a technique may also satisfy some presidents, since it allows for lower total outlays for the upcoming year and a lower deficit (or larger surplus). Thus, such side payments can ease the short-run tensions that normally exist between fiscal and budgetary policies; OMB may also resort to side payments in an effort to generate a budget that is at least minimally acceptable to both agencies and the White House. Clearly, this tactic cannot be used constantly. Were budget authority for agencies continually allowed to exceed outlays by amounts greater than the annual growth in

[6] Outlays formerly were referred to as expenditures; budget authority formerly was referred to as new obligational authority.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

total federal revenues, future budgets would become increasingly committed, and the amount of control exerted over these budgets by the president or OMB would diminish.[7]

OMB is far more influential than agencies in settling the inevitable disputes over their allocations in the president's budget; the president nearly always sides with OMB on appeals from agencies.[8] The only exception to this general pattern concerns OMB-agency disagreements over budget authority late in the planning cycle. In such situations, agencies often have been successful in obtaining larger allowances for budget authority than those initially recommended by OMB, in spite of very limited success on outlay disputes. These findings are consistent with the notion of outlay-budget authority side payments.

While desirable, coordination of the three parallel policy streams—defense budget, domestic budget, and fiscal policy—is difficult to achieve in practice. Each planning process is under the control of a different bureaucratic actor and structure; each is concerned with fundamentally different policy issues. Points of direct contact among the decision streams are relatively few.

Given the division of labor with respect to the three policy streams and the rank of the officials responsible for the respective streams, coordination of the policy processes must take place at the presidential level. There is no other authority to which all of the policy-planning processes are subordinate. There is no other authority with the power or the mandate to enforce necessary trade-offs. To understand any one of the policy streams requires an understanding of the context and environment within which they exist. This requires understanding the role of the other two policy streams and of the president in coordinating the three.

The following three sections examine the ways in which executive branch policy-planning processes were managed during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. In each case, the analysis begins with a general discussion of presidential goals, personality, and staff structure and then relates these to presidential coordination of the budgetary- and fiscal-policy planning processes.

The Eisenhower Administration

During the Eisenhower administration the demands of domestic legislative development and fiscal policy largely were subordinated to the managerial and organizational requirements of budgetary planning. Eisenhower's personal and political goals involved limited domestic initiatives and precluded any but a

[7] For a discussion of what is known as the "bow wave effect" in defense budgeting—that is, pushing outlays ahead into the future by letting budget authority exceed outlays—see Crecine, "The Shape of the Defense Budget."

[8] See John P. Crecine et al., "The Relative Influence of the Office of Management and Budget in Executive Branch Budgetary Decision Making" (Social Science Department Working Paper 810-Y, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minor role for discretionary fiscal policy in managing the economy.[9] Instead, Eisenhower was committed to a reduction in both the size of the federal government and the extent of its intervention in the economy, and to stabilization of the size of the defense establishment.

To describe Eisenhower's political goals as limited, however, is not to characterize him as a weak president. The conventional portrait of Eisenhower as the smiling, passive, military hero—a prisoner of his conservative businessmen advisers in his choice of policies—is belied increasingly by evidence from recent archival openings and scholarship. In the revisionist interpretation, Eisenhower is more often portrayed as a politically astute president, projecting an image of being "above politics," while intervening strategically and effectively.[10]

Most of Eisenhower's career involved service as a member of various military command staffs, training certain to develop strategic abilities in dealing with bureaucracies and organizations.[11] This background influenced the development of a White House staff system with a formal structure and clear lines of authority. Throughout the Eisenhower presidency, great store was placed on the maintenance of an orderly flow of memorandums, position papers, and decisions. Agency actions were expected to be consistent with presidential preferences.

The cabinet was an important component of this administrative structure. Decisions and managerial authority to a great extent were delegated to cabinet members and agency heads on all but a very few issues. Only the most important disputes received presidential attention. Presidential intervention in departmental affairs was infrequent, but strategic; Eisenhower did not make many requests of the bureaucracy, but when he did, they generally were fulfilled. Cabinet meetings were frequent and quite formal, with agenda, position papers, and minutes compiled and transmitted by the cabinet secretariat, a staff office of considerable importance in the Eisenhower presidency.[12] These meetings

[9] Major domestic initiatives were limited primarily to the areas of school and highway construction; the latter program was financed by a specially earmarked gasoline tax, rather than by general revenues, and thus had a minimal impact upon the budget.

[10] See, among others, Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972), and Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979-80): 575-99. Neustadt (*Presidential Politics*, 3d ed., 1976) also provides a favorable reevaluation of Eisenhower as an astute politician, describing Eisenhower's careful husbanding of his presidential popularity and prestige. Parmet attests Eisenhower's remarkable popularity noting that "the final Gallop Poll in January, 1960 showed confidence in him at 50%. . . . only once, during the first quarter of 1958, did it dip below the 50% level" (p. 573).

[11] In the editor's introduction to *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, vol. 1 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), Alfred D. Chandler provides an interesting discussion of Eisenhower's role as supreme allied commander in Europe in designing a military command structure for the unified control of air, sea, and land forces of several nations, an unprecedented task.

[12] Maxwell Rabb, cabinet secretary in the first years of the Eisenhower presidency, noted in a memorandum to Eisenhower in 1955 that bringing policy matters up in cabinet meetings helps to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were used by Eisenhower as forums for enunciating presidential policies and positions, in order to obtain support from agency heads.[13]

Eisenhower's approach to fiscal policy was consistent with other aspects of his administrative style—a distinct style that combined the acceptance of certain political realities and the legacy of Roosevelt and Truman with rhetoric of an extremely conservative nature. Eisenhower retained the institution of the Council of Economic Advisers, despite Republican and congressional opposition to its continued existence. In a campaign speech in 1952, Eisenhower pledged that "the full power of private industry, of municipal government, of state government, of the Federal government" would be mobilized to prevent a recession or depression.[14] Candidate Eisenhower, however, also was committed to balancing the budget, reducing government size and spending, and cutting taxes.[15] Particularly among congressional Republicans, the balanced-budget pledge was viewed as extremely important.[16]

In all but the most urgent circumstances, Eisenhower placed a balanced budget above fiscal-policy goals for the budget. The "automatic stabilizers" of tax receipts and unemployment payments, and especially monetary policy, were expected to smooth economic fluctuations. Inflation was viewed as the major threat to the economy under Eisenhower; as time went on, the administration's commitment to budgetary balance became increasingly rigid. The 1957–58 recession was more severe and the White House response less rapid than was the case in 1953–54. The same was true of Eisenhower's response to the persistent economic stagnation after 1958.[17] This was part of an overall reorientation of

---

ensure that presidential decisions will not be misinterpreted by different departments and that they will be "known, understood and supported with a teamwork impervious to divisive counter-attacks from the outside" (Memorandum for the president from Maxwell Rabb, 22 February 1955, Cabinet Series, Ann Whitman File, Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, p. 7).

[13] The cabinet meetings took on an increasingly ritualistic air over the course of Eisenhower's administration. At the same time, the cabinet secretariat, as well as the National Security Council, assumed increasingly important roles. See Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 3d ed., for a brief discussion of the development of Eisenhower's White House staff (p. 53).

[14] Eisenhower's statement is taken from A. E. Holmans, *United States Fiscal Policy, 1949 to 1959: Its Contribution to Economic Stability* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower—The Inside Story* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), refers to cabinet minutes in support of his analysis of Eisenhower's concern with policies to combat the first recession of his presidency (pp. 214–22).

[15] In Peoria, Illinois, in 1952, Eisenhower pledged that "my goal, assuming that the cold war gets no worse, is to cut Federal spending to something like $60 billion dollars within 4 years" (*New York Times*, 3 October 1952; also referred to in Holmans, *United States Fiscal Policy, 1949 to 1959*, p. 198).

[16] Sherman Adams (*Firsthand Report* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961]) notes that Ohio Senator Robert Taft, Senate majority leader in 1953 and a one-time rival of Eisenhower for the Republican presidential nomination, "exploded" when told by the president in April 1953 that the fiscal 1954 budget drawn up by Truman could not be sufficiently reduced to achieve budgetary balance: " 'With a program like this, we'll never elect a Republican Congress in 1954,' he shouted. 'You're taking us down the same road Truman traveled. It's a repudiation of everything we promised in the campaign' " (p. 21)!

[17] Holmans found "a striking contrast between the tone of the Economic Report of 1958 and that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the federal budget toward a "peacetime" outlays posture. Eisenhower's concern with reductions in government spending in general and military spending in particular reflected his beliefs that the cold war was not a passing phenomenon and that an important component of national security was a strong economy. In his view, military spending had to be reoriented toward the "long haul," so as to minimize the burden of government spending on the national economy. Heavy reliance on strategic nuclear devices and a strategy of massive retaliation allowed for an affordable defense posture.[18] Given the preponderance of military items in the overall budget (roughly 60 percent), Eisenhower's goal of a smaller budget could not be implemented without major reductions in military spending.

Eisenhower was far less involved in the details of domestic program decisions than in defense decisions. Although he received progress reports from OMB throughout the entire planning cycle, the most substantive and meaningful presidential involvement in the domestic budgetary process was Eisenhower's establishment of firm and unambiguous guidelines for domestic budgetary policy, including spending totals, *early* in the planning cycle. OMB had the responsibility of enforcing these guidelines and the backing of the president to do this.

Eisenhower's approach to the domestic budgetary process was feasible for two reasons. First, since major domestic policy initiatives were few and far between (for example, interstate highway system, school lunch program), there was less need for presidential attention to budgetary details of programs connected with major policy initiatives. Further, because no stock was placed in discretionary fiscal policy, uncertainty concerning the desired target totals was minimized.

Such policy concerns meant that effective presidential intervention in the domestic budgetary process could occur early in the annual planning cycle in most years. During the spring preview, budgetary policy for the upcoming fiscal year was developed, along with specific guidelines for implementation of policy, in a series of meetings involving Eisenhower, the director of OMB, and representatives from the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Council of Economic Advisers. Once specific guidelines were developed, generally by midsummer, a cabinet meeting would be called. Recognizing the importance of clear presidential support for OMB policies, Eisenhower would convey formally to the cabinet agencies his broad budgetary goals and general guidelines for their implementation. OMB handled the remainder of the process, determining specific outlay and budget authority targets for each agency. Subsequent presidential involvement was limited to major decisions and the approval of final OMB planning figures.

---

of the Economic Report of 1954," with the 1954 report placing a far heavier emphasis on the "formidable arsenal of weapons" at the government's disposal to combat any recession (Holmans, *United States Fiscal Policy, 1949 to 1959*, pp. 278–79).

[18] Crecine, "Defense Budgeting"; and Huntington, *The Common Defense*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Consistent with general concern with long-run budgetary management and control, considerable attention during the Eisenhower administration was devoted to examination of the multiyear implications of budgetary actions.[19] Thus, budget authority allocations were important in Eisenhower's budgetary policy.[20] Indicative of this emphasis on budget authority is the fact that in many years OMB planning figures and agency "ceilings" or "marks" were formulated solely in terms of budget authority during much of the planning cycle.

The Budgetary Process for 1955 and 1957

Budgetary processes under Eisenhower were extremely orderly. In most years, the preview phase included detailed OMB-agency negotiations, focused heavily on budget authority allocations, and produced allocations that were altered only minimally during the rest of the process. In many years, virtually all major budgetary issues were settled in the preview phase, and the review phase was one of relative inactivity.

The formulation of budgets for fiscal years 1955 and 1957 represented the high point of Eisenhower's control and coordination of the various budgetary policy streams. The fiscal 1955 budget, planned during 1953, was the first Eisenhower budget, and it included the implementation of the "New Look" for defense. Presidential goals for this budget—budgetary balance in outlays, a substantial tax cut, and holding budget authority below outlays—were spelled out to agency heads in a cabinet meeting in June of 1953. Consistent with these goals, OMB's internal guidelines to division personnel during the preview noted that outlays

> must be reduced more than 10 percent below the 1953 level, or to above the 1952 levels in total.
>
> To accomplish this reduction in [outlays], total [budget authority] for 1955 will have to be reduced at least 15 percent under the 1953 level. . . . Reductions in [budget au-

[19] A policy memorandum to Eisenhower from the director of OMB in 1957 stated, "The budget determinations for the fiscal year 1959 should be made in the longer run framework of the policies the administration wants to follow in the next four budgets at least" ("Budget policy—the next four budgets," memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Director Brundage to Eisenhower, 23 May 1957, Office of Budget Review files, 1959 Budget Projections, OMB Records Division, Washington, D.C., p. 1).

[20] A memorandum sent to Eisenhower by OMB Director Rowland Hughes in 1955, concerning the planning of the fiscal year 1957 budget, noted that "new obligational authority [as budget authority was then known], the genesis of future spending, was also cut substantially [over the previous four fiscal years], and was kept below budget receipts and expenditures [outlays] in each year" ("The 1957 Budget," memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Director Hughes to Eisenhower, 12 May 1955, Office of Budget Review files, OMB Records Division, pp. 2-3). Hughes recommended that for fiscal year 1957 the president "continue the practice of this administration of keeping proposed new obligational authority less than anticipated receipts."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thority] for military, foreign aid, and atomic energy combined will have to be greater than 15 percent and should be related to projected [outlay] levels.[21]

By late July, OMB had developed planning figures for domestic agencies, as well as a range of revenue estimates. In these July figures, "controllable" domestic outlays had been cut 22 percent below their level in the fiscal 1954 budget, one that Eisenhower already had reduced substantially from the levels that had been formulated during the Truman administration. In terms of spending reductions, Eisenhower's fiscal 1955 performance has not been equaled since—nor is it likely to be.

Throughout the remainder of the fiscal 1955 budget process, Eisenhower voiced strong support for the stringent budgetary ceilings that OMB imposed upon the agencies. On August 6, shortly after planning figures for fiscal 1955 were transmitted to the agencies, Eisenhower sent to all agency heads a memorandum reiterating his desire for a balanced budget in fiscal 1955 and endorsing OMB's planning figures and policies. In November, during the director's review, OMB Director Dodge again requested and received Eisenhower's public approval of OMB policies, in order that agencies would understand that the policies imposed on them had presidential backing, which, in turn, made it less likely that allowances would be appealed.

It is evident that the parallel policy-planning processes were well coordinated, in general, during the 1955 budgetary planning cycle. By July, OMB was firmly in charge of implementation of the goal of a balanced budget, to the point of specifying the requisite outlay allocations and the corollary range of defense outlay targets necessary for the achievement of this goal. However, the defense total which eventually appeared in the president's budget for 1955, $41.85 billion, was some $2 billion above the highest of the proposed totals made by OMB in July, thus indicating that there were limits to the reductions that could be imposed upon the military sector; the Defense Department total was the result of high-level bargaining, in which OMB was but one of several powerful participants. (The fiscal 1954 defense total was $45.5 billion.) Partly as a result of this, Eisenhower's 1955 budget as presented to Congress in January 1954 was out of balance by $2.5 billion.

While in the fiscal 1955 budgetary planning cycle, pursuit of Eisenhower's policies necessitated major reductions in the budget, the fiscal 1957 budgetary process, by contrast, was one in which a major reduction in domestic outlays was not necessary. Still, there was little room left for growth, and OMB again pursued restrictive policies which benefited from clearly articulated presidential guidelines. The overall goals for fiscal 1957 were a balanced budget which, for the first time during the Eisenhower administration, seemed within reach, and a budget authority total below the outlays total. Tax reductions were ruled out, as they would have required either deficit spending or deep cuts in military spend-

[21] "Staff Guides for Preparation of 1955 Budget Ceilings," June 1953, Office of Budget Review files, fiscal year 1955, Box 1, OMB Records Division, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing, and Eisenhower was concerned about political criticism of his budgetary stringency in the area of defense.[22] Also ruled out early in the planning cycle was an attempt to reduce total federal outlays to $60 billion, as Eisenhower had promised when he was running for president. A balanced budget was seen as meeting the spirit, if not the exact figure, of this campaign pledge.

Eisenhower announced his goal of a balanced budget at a cabinet meeting in mid-May, just as the preview got underway. Budgetary balance was to be achieved by holding each agency's fiscal 1957 outlays to its fiscal 1956 level, whenever possible. Each agency also was asked to keep budget authority requests below outlays requests.

Detailed budgetary ceilings were negotiated during the preview, and by the end of July, agencies were apprised of the new ceilings. The review phase of the fiscal year 1957 domestic budgetary planning cycle was of minimal importance. Eisenhower was incapacitated for much of the autumn as a result of his heart attack in September, although he did become involved again in budgetary activities by mid-November. The low level of review activity in the domestic budgetary process, however, reflected, more than anything else, the lack of major unresolved issues.

The major policy decisions in the review phase concerned the level of defense spending, which remained a political issue through the summer of 1955. The economic outlook improved substantially between the preview and the review phases, producing an increase in forecasted revenues of roughly $2 billion over the preview projection; virtually all of this revenue increment went to increase military spending. Eisenhower thus moved to blunt political criticism, but only to the extent that his balanced-budget goal for fiscal year 1957 was not violated. As had been true in the fiscal year 1955 planning cycle, the defense budget was constrained by the requirements of budgetary balance. These "last-minute" changes, however, diverged from Eisenhower's preview guidelines somewhat in that budget authority increases for defense exceeded those in outlays. As a result, for the first time during the Eisenhower administration, budget authority exceeded outlays for the overall budget.

Subsequent budgetary planning cycles were less successful than that for fiscal 1957 in achieving Eisenhower's budgetary goals of reductions in outlays and the national debt. The gradual transformation of agency administrative heads into agency advocates, as well as the departure of such key administration figures as John Foster Dulles, George Humphrey, and Sherman Adams, contributed to the greater difficulties in the later Eisenhower budgets. These problems also reflected the difficulty of maintaining stringent budgetary policies over a long period, particularly in military spending, where Eisenhower had begun to yield

[22] Also of importance were Eisenhower's concerns about the fate of a tax cut bill in a Democratic Congress during an election year (1956). Herbert Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1973) claims that "no small tax cut was possible" in the 1955–56 period (p. 312). The strong similarities among the three presidents examined here in their difficulties in altering the revenue term of the budgetary identity are striking.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

somewhat to the advocates of increased spending as early as 1955.[23] Increasingly, the review phase became an important period for negotiations and revision of agency allowances, and agency appeals were more frequent. Budget authority drifted above outlays. Having sharply reduced the budget for fiscal year 1955 and achieved a balanced budget in fiscal 1957, Eisenhower found it difficult to hold the line in ensuing years against budget authority increases and budgetary deficits.

The "success" of planning cycles such as 1955 and 1957—the orderliness of the process and the early resolution of major issues—was dependent upon the specific nature of the presidential goals. Since legislative development and fiscal-policy processes were of little importance to Eisenhower, the burdens of coordination were less substantial than was to be the case under Johnson or Kennedy. Indeed, the only coordination necessary during Eisenhower's planning cycles involved developing revenue estimates and fixing defense and domestic totals that added to total revenues. The budgetary planning for fiscal years 1958–62 revealed the disadvantages of the administration's predominant concern with budgetary management and control, a concern that excluded any discretionary response to economic conditions or projections in the president's budget.

The goal of Eisenhower and his staff between 1958 and 1960, for example, remained that of budgetary balance at any cost and, if at all possible, a reduction in the national debt through surpluses.[24] The guidelines for planning the fiscal 1960 budget stated that examiners should "reject agency proposals for 1960 which are made mainly for anti-recession purposes."[25] The resulting insensitivity of budgetary policy to the economic downturn in early 1958 has been interpreted by many to have contributed to the severity and duration of the 1959–1960 recession.[26] One of the results was a huge $12 billion deficit in the fiscal year 1959 budget brought on by unrealized federal revenues. Eisenhower

[23] It is interesting to note as well a strengthening of the White House staff in the later years of the Eisenhower administration, indicating a move toward somewhat less delegation of decision authority to cabinet heads. See Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 3d ed., p. 53.

[24] An idea of the stringency that Eisenhower's later budgets attempted to achieve is conveyed in the preview memorandum from OMB Director Brundage to Eisenhower, concerning policies for the fiscal 1959 budget: "There can be no doubt that from the end of the fiscal year 1955 through 1958, the Administration's emphasis on enlarged program objectives has conflicted with its fiscal and budget objectives. Our string of balanced budgets is largely due to budget reductions made earlier by the Administration and to increases in revenue from a growing prosperity, but not since 1955 to retrenchments in spending" ("Budget policy—the next four budgets," memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Director Brundage to Eisenhower, 23 May 1957, p. 2).

[25] "Recommendations of Budget Director for Present Planning Purposes," 23 May 1958, Office of Budget Review files, 1959 Budget Policy, OMB Records Division.

[26] As Herbert Stein has written, "The fiscal policy of the last three Eisenhower years came to be regarded as a great mistake, the main fiscal policy mistake of the twenty years between the end of World War II and the acceleration of the Vietnam War in 1965" (Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America*, p. 367).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(and Nixon, who blamed his 1960 defeat upon the recession) was thus hoist upon his own petard of budgetary balance.

The Kennedy Administration

Much of John Kennedy's administration—the image its members tried to project, its administrative structure and practices, and its domestic policy goals—could be interpreted as a reaction to the style and substance of the Eisenhower administration. This was true as well of budgetary policy. Kennedy's commitment to discretionary fiscal policy, a less rigid advisory structure, and "nonarbitrary" practices in resource allocation all made for a very different presidential approach to budgetary management.

Having spent his career in legislative positions, Kennedy's preferences in staff arrangements evoked the more confused administrative traditions of Capitol Hill, rather than the orderliness of the army staff upon which the organization of the Eisenhower White House was based. The Kennedy presidency assailed the formal advisory structure of Eisenhower's administration as one which promoted unimaginative policy advice and endless meetings. The cabinet secretariat was dismantled, reflecting Kennedy's preference for a more modest role for the cabinet. Cabinet agencies such as the State Department were bypassed altogether in certain areas of policy formulation and administration. Cabinet meetings were far less frequent and were not used by Kennedy to build a consensus of support for presidential policies, as had been true under Eisenhower.

All of this derived from Kennedy's deep-seated distrust of the federal bureaucracy as unimaginative and stagnant; policy in areas of personal interest to the president, such as foreign and, subsequently, economic policy, was to be made in, and controlled from, the White House. This White House interest in foreign policy meant that the National Security Council remained important, but it was shorn of its formal structure of memorandums and meetings. Delegation of authority under Kennedy was neither so complete nor so clearly delineated as had been the case during the Eisenhower administration. Formal channels and lines of command were viewed by Kennedy administration staffers as inimical to the goals they wished to achieve at home and abroad.

The state of the economy had been a major issue in the presidential campaign, debated against the backdrop of a recession, and sustaining the economic recovery was one of Kennedy's most important political goals. White House concern over the balance of payments was such as to preclude a resort to easier monetary policy to spur the recovery, due to the impact of lower domestic interest rates upon the balance of payments. For this reason, as well as the persuasiveness and intellectual power of his "growth-oriented" economic advisers, fiscal rather than monetary policy was seen as the major economic policy instrument during Kennedy's presidency.

Kennedy was content to allow OMB to handle domestic budgetary formulation. Significant involvement by the president in the details of domestic budget-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ary decision making was limited to a small number of "pet" programs such as the Peace Corps, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation. The domestic legislative agenda, which was to become a very important policy stream under Johnson, was quite modest under Kennedy, due in part to the president's slender electoral mandate, his short period in office, and the congressional resistance he encountered. Although personally committed to the design and conduct of foreign policy and national security policy, Kennedy relied heavily on Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to formulate the defense budget. McNamara was seen as the "president's man" and exercised considerable influence in both defense and nondefense policy debates in the Kennedy administration, including economic policy.

The reaction within the Kennedy administration to the perceived empty formalism of the Eisenhower administrative structure and procedures influenced the character of presidential budgetary management. Budgetary ceilings, such as those developed by the prior administration during the preview stage, were seen by the White House as holdovers of the arbitrariness from the Eisenhower past. The annual planning process would not be directed at the development of budgetary ceilings, using "crude" rules of thumb; instead, program allowances would be determined on their merits. The use of budgetary targets was seen as *something to be avoided and certainly to be denied in public.*[27] Still, budgetary management per se was not a central presidential interest. When economic growth and stabilization objectives conflicted with the managerial requirements of the domestic budgetary process, as was often the case, fiscal-policy concerns took precedence. As a result, presidential budgetary policies often were not articulated early in the planning process, nor were they conveyed with the clarity and strong presidential backing that had typified the planning process during Eisenhower's administration.

An important result of Kennedy's preoccupation with the fiscal-policy implications of the president's budget was a lack of concern with budget authority allocations. The focus upon fiscal policy, which implied a concern with outlays, combined with OMB's substantial autonomy in formulating domestic budgetary allocations and produced a situation conducive to outlay-budget authority side payments. The only budgets prepared entirely under President Kennedy's management were those for fiscal 1963 and 1964 (during calendar 1961 and 1962).

The differences between Eisenhower's and Kennedy's management of spending and resource allocation, on the one hand, and discretionary fiscal policy, on the other, may be inferred from a comparison of the impact on the budget of the transition from one administration to another. Shortly after taking office, Kennedy instructed OMB Director David Bell to "temporarily accelerate planned

[27] For a description of the "nonarbitrary" nature of defense budget formulation under McNamara and Kennedy, see Crecine, "Defense Budgeting."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government procurement, construction, and related activities by every means consistent with efficiency."[28] Such a directive to step up spending across the board in order to stimulate the economy contrasts with Eisenhower's desire to minimize the size of the federal budget. A draft public statement from OMB in early 1961 noted: "The Eisenhower administration believed that the budget placed a heavy burden on the people of the Nation. The Kennedy administration believes that by keeping the economy growing at a satisfactory rate, we can meet public needs without placing a heavy burden on the people—while an overly restrictive budget policy can frustrate economic growth and indeed did so in recent years."[29] For Kennedy, the budget was a policy lever, a means to the goal of economic stabilization; for Eisenhower, the budget was an end in itself. Federal spending was increased nearly 25 percent during the first two years of the Kennedy administration. In early 1962, at the beginning of the fiscal 1964 planning cycle, federal outlays were $20 billion above their level in the fiscal 1962 budget as proposed in January 1961 by Eisenhower.

The Planning Cycles for 1963 and 1964

The planning cycles for fiscal 1963 and 1964 were remarkably similar, particularly in the preview phase. The preview in each year was devoted primarily to discussions between agencies and OMB concerning program management and development issues. The formulation of specific financial plans and budgetary ceilings was secondary, and the figures developed were not viewed as particularly binding. OMB Director David Bell told agency heads that the fiscal 1964 preview phase would be one "concentrating on the major long-term issues, as far as they now can be foreseen, which will affect Government programs and budgets through the fiscal year 1967. . . .there is no intention during this phase of reaching firm budget decisions or negotiations over detailed figures."[30] Describing this preview to President Kennedy, Bell noted that it was "intended to deal primarily with longer term trends; and changes in tax or expenditure policies which may be made later this summer in order to influence the economy would of course have to be incorporated into our 1964 budget planning."[31]

In June 1962, at the close of the preview phase, a high-level meeting was held, with the director of OMB, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, President Kennedy, and other major political advisers in attendance, to discuss

[28] Memorandum from the President to Bureau of the Budget Director Bell, 4 February 1961, White House Central Files, FG11-1, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Waltham, Mass. (hereafter JFKL).

[29] "Federal Expenditures in Recession and Recovery, 1957-59 and 1960-62," memorandum to Kennedy from Bureau of the Budget Director Bell, 24 July 1961, White House Central Files, FG11-1, JFKL, p. 2.

[30] "Sample Letter to Cabinet Officers and Certain Agency Heads," 30 March 1962, Office of Budget Review files, 1964 Preview, OMB Records Division, p. 1.

[31] "Preliminary Recommendations on the 1964 Budget," 22 June 1962, Presidential Office Files, Box 70, JFKL, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the budgetary and economic outlook and to decide upon tentative target totals for domestic and defense outlays. OMB planning figures developed during the preview were revised only slightly by the president and formed the basis for budgetary ceilings issued later in the summer by OMB to the domestic agencies. The lack of attention to budget authority in these preview meetings contrasts sharply with budgetary decision making under the Eisenhower administration and is particularly striking in view of Bell's earlier description of the "long-run" focus of the preview.

The substance of preview negotiations between OMB and the domestic agencies also differed in the two presidencies. Under Eisenhower, the preview phase followed a presidential statement at a cabinet meeting, in which specific budgetary guidelines and overall targets were announced. This phase was devoted to the development of permanent budget ceilings for specific agencies, requiring the submission of formal agency requests, development of division examiners' recommendations, evaluation by the director and his staff, and extensive negotiations with agencies. These ceilings were then examined and approved by the president.

In contrast, the Kennedy budgetary preview phases began, and were concluded, without any cabinet meeting or public presidential statement of budgetary goals. The lack of presidential endorsement of the preview planning figures reflected the impermanence of these figures. As Bell noted in his memorandum to Kennedy discussing fiscal 1964, the importance of fiscal policy was such that the budgetary total, and thus the planning figures for agencies, could not be finalized until later in the planning cycle.

The fiscal 1963 and 1964 preview phases concluded with Kennedy's tentative approval of OMB's planning figures, but no public commitment to these figures or their total was made. Under Eisenhower, cabinet meetings provided the forum for a public statement of goals and policies, the implementation of which was left to OMB, acting unmistakably on the president's behalf and with unambiguous directions with respect to budget totals and the terms of the identity. No such function was fulfilled by the cabinet under Kennedy in the preview, and OMB's authority prior to the review to make binding decisions on the president's behalf was, as a result, much less clear.

The review phases in the fiscal 1963 and 1964 planning cycles were difficult; in both cases, problems stemmed from a lack of coordination among the parallel fiscal policy, defense, and nondefense budget policy streams during the earlier portion of the planning process, as well as the failure to resolve major budgetary issues in the preview. Budget reduction exercises of major proportions were required in both review phases. In the fiscal 1963 review, difficulties stemmed from Kennedy's public pledge to submit a balanced budget, coupled with increases in defense spending sparked in July 1961 by the Berlin crisis. The combination of this public pledge and increased military spending, in the logic of the budget identity, meant that domestic spending would have to be severely reduced; yet Kennedy took no action on this conflict of policy goals until much later in the budget cycle.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On 25 October 1961 Kennedy convened a cabinet meeting at which he reaffirmed forcefully his commitment to balancing the fiscal 1963 budget, which would require a reduction of $2 billion in domestic outlays. This resulted in a review "ratchet" which lasted well into December 1961, and the budget eventually was submitted in balance. However, this balanced budget used highly optimistic forecasts of GNP for 1962, in order to yield sufficient revenues to balance the budget. CEA Chairman Walter Heller and staff member Arthur Okun had developed the forecasts; both men were concerned lest Kennedy's fiscal 1963 budget be overly restrictive and choke off the recovery.

OMB treatment of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in the fiscal 1963 review period is of particular interest, as the changes in HEW's budgetary allowances are consistent with the occurrence of outlay-budget authority side payments. Headed by a powerful Northeastern liberal, Abraham Ribicoff, HEW was an important agency in the Kennedy years. The new administration had come into power, however narrowly, only with the strong support of liberal Democrats, and could ill afford to alienate this group. With its host of social programs and its politically astute and well-connected secretary, HEW clearly was in a strong position to make trouble for a stringent fiscal budgetary recommendation from OMB, through direct appeals either to the president, the Congress, or interest groups. Accordingly, the agency received careful treatment at the hands of the staff of BRD. Indeed, comparing the agency request, the recommendation from the Labor and Welfare Division of OMB, and the director's review decision, evidence exists of a side payment of budget authority in exchange for outlays reductions in the HEW budget. For outlays, the agency request was for $5.43 billion; the Labor and Welfare Division recommended $5.33 billion; and the director's review allowance following negotiations with the agency was $5.28 billion, $150 million less than the agency request and $50 million less than the division recommendation. For budget authority, however, a rather different pattern emerges. HEW requested $6.35 billion and the Labor and Welfare Division recommended $6.20 billion. Yet the director's review "mark" equaled $6.38 billion, higher even than the agency request. This allowance was reduced subsequently, by $110 million, but it still remained above the division recommendation, while outlays were reduced further below the division recommendation.

The review for fiscal 1964 was similarly afflicted with the necessity to effect large domestic budgetary cuts in agency requests and OMB planning figures. In this case, stabilization of the economic outlook for fiscal 1964 (which had appeared very bleak early in the preview) over the course of the summer, a shrinkage in forecast revenues, and the president's desire to gain a tax cut from Congress (which required an image of fiscal prudence) were the primary factors giving rise to review difficulties. It was the conjunction of these developments, however, with a lack of presidential intervention in the budgetary process, that gave rise to severe uncertainties over budgetary policy for OMB, culminating in Director Bell's October 1 appeal to the president: "*We recommend* that you consider the attached memorandum and decide what expenditure [outlay] target

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

you wish to use. Agency budgets are now beginning to arrive in the Bureau of the Budget and we need an overall expenditure target to guide our review of them."[32] Only then did Kennedy make a firm decision on the outlays total, thereby deciding upon a figure of $98.5 billion and announcing this at a cabinet meeting. This situation was made even more difficult than the previous year's by Kennedy's slight upward revision in November of defense outlays, following the Cuban missile crisis.

The reductions made by OMB late in the fiscal 1964 review relied heavily upon "nonprogrammatic reductions," that is, reductions that do not affect the substance of a program or its activities, operating instead through changes in assumptions or accounting conventions. Examples of nonprogrammatic reductions include revisions of estimates of exogenous factors influencing the level of agency outlays, "stretching out" procurement and construction schedules, delaying the start of programs, and such other activities as the sale of financial assets from the portfolio of the Federal Housing Administration. These are among the same types of "arbitrary" methods of resource allocation that the Kennedy administration had earlier criticized as typical of budgetary decision making during the Eisenhower administration.

Strong evidence also exists of outlays-budget authority side payments in the fiscal 1964 review. This reduction technique was possible because of Kennedy's limited involvement in the details of the domestic budgetary process as well as his lack of concern with budget authority. Comparison of the reductions made in outlays with those made in budget authority between November and the January president's budget reveals a remarkably consistent pattern of budget authority increases, or small cuts, combined with substantial reductions in outlays. Of the twenty-two major agencies and departments involved, seven experienced reductions in outlays and increases in budget authority, two experienced significant cuts in outlays and only minor reductions in budget authority, and nine received minor increases in outlays but much larger increases in budget authority. No agency or department fared significantly worse in terms of budget authority as compared to outlays. In aggregate over the period, projected outlays were reduced from $100.3 to $98.8 billion while projected budget authority rose from $103.8 to $107.9 billion.

The tradeoff pattern is particularly marked for the Peace Corps and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, two agencies endowed with high presidential saliency, and therefore able to contest strenuously any budgetary reductions imposed by OMB. During the November to January period, an appeal to OMB from NASA Director Webb for restoration of budget cuts was decided in the following manner: "Webb . . . wants highest NOA [budget authority] level possible within budget policy to sustain proper Admin. posture and national posture. Willing to shrink expenditures [outlays]. Thinks 5750 [million dollars] lowest he can take—but can hold exp [outlays] to 4400 or 4350.

[32] "Budget Policy Guidance for Fiscal Year 1964," Bureau of the Budget Director Bell to Kennedy, 1 October 1962, Office of Budget Review files, 1964 Review, OMB Records Division, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Final figures—NOA 5712, exp 4200."[33] A Treasury Department appeal during this period also received a positive recommendation on a budget authority increase for fiscal 1964: "Division recommends that NOA [budget authority] be restored with the understanding that expenditures [outlays] will be held to a minimum in 64."[34]

Kennedy's approach to budgetary management, and the subordination of budgetary management to fiscal-policy considerations, created high expectations within the various agencies and difficulties for OMB, leading to last-minute budgetary "crunches" in which allocative decisions of dubious merit frequently were made to keep the all-important outlays total within a "reasonable" range. Presidential policies were not always defined clearly, and Kennedy's intervention in the budgetary processes was not sufficiently early or decisive to avoid overloaded review phases. The nonprogrammatic reductions and side payments in the fiscal 1964 review provide excellent examples of the allocative consequences of a particular presidential approach to budgetary management.

It is interesting to note that the preview phase of planning for the fiscal 1965 budget gives some evidence of having been reoriented toward a somewhat longer-range goal structure. There appears to exist a greater concern with budgetary resource allocation per se, a goal requiring greater attention to budget authority. An internal OMB memorandum of 12 March 1963 noted that "the Administration is committed to a goal of (a) annual reduction in the budget deficits, and (b) a balanced administrative budget in fiscal 1967."[35] Such goals for budgetary policy are similar to those of Eisenhower a decade earlier; whether this indicated a change in Kennedy's approach to budgetary management, and thus an acknowledgment of the realities of the situation, remains unknown.

The Johnson Administration

Lyndon Johnson brought to the presidency a very strong personality, great skill at negotiation and political horse trading, and a commitment to substantial and costly initiatives in domestic programs. His years in the Senate, where he served as majority leader and as a member of the Armed Services Committee, gave Johnson great familiarity with the ways of Congress, enabling passage of nearly all of his civil rights and Great Society legislation during the first three years of

[33] Handwritten comment on "Discussion of NASA 1964 Budget Recommendation with Mr. Webb," memorandum from Military Division to the Director, 12 December 1962, Program Division Files, Director's Review 1964, Box 42, OMB Records Division.

[34] "Treasury Department Appeal of 1964 Allowances," memorandum from the Commerce and Finance Division to the Director, 16 November 1962, Program Division Files, Appeals 1964, 1963-64, Box 39, OMB Records Division, p. 3.

[35] "1965 Preview First Round," 12 March 1963, Office of Budget Review, 1965 Preview Instructions and Policy, OMB Records Division.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his presidency. In general, Johnson was much more successful in dealing with the Congress than was Kennedy.

The White House advisory structure under Johnson was not altered greatly from the organizational form it had assumed during the Kennedy administration. Advisers were used in a rather different manner, however, reflecting, among other things, LBJ's ambitious legislative agenda. Under Johnson there emerged, for all practical purposes, four parallel executive branch planning processes related to the budget: fiscal policy, domestic budgetary policy, defense budgetary policy, and new legislative development. Johnson was heavily involved in each of these policy streams.

In his approach to presidential administration, Johnson tended to centralize authority, to make sure he was personally involved in all decisions of a major or minor variety. As Doris Kearns writes:

> In contrast to both Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy, [Johnson] adopted many of the orthodox administrative practices and techniques associated with the Presidency of General Eisenhower. . . .
>
> Yet if Johnson's system resembled Eisenhower's in some of its aspects, it was markedly different in others. His hierarchy was an orderly structure with many fixed relationships, but he alone was at the top with direct lines of communications and authority to the several men who occupied the level below. In Johnson's administration there was no Sherman Adams. The President was his own chief of staff: he made the staff assignments; he received the product of his staff's work and reconciled or decided between the competing reports; he set the pace of action and the tone of discussion. And, unlike Eisenhower, the kind of personal control that Johnson could not establish over the government he retained over that more manageable domain—the White House Staff.[36]

In general, Johnson drove himself and his staff much harder than had Kennedy or Eisenhower, and his desire for loyalty, rather than disagreement, from his advisers may have prevented them from assuming independent positions or exerting a major influence upon presidential decisions. And, despite his substantial presence within each of the policy planning processes, Johnson's approach to managing these policy streams did not serve to coordinate the decision streams over much of the planning cycle. Coherence and organization of the parts generally did not appear until near the end of the budget planning cycle. This was exacerbated by the growing turbulence of the external environment during the Johnson administration—an uncertain economy and an amorphous, but growing, military involvement in South Vietnam.

Tensions between budgetary- and fiscal-policy processes were acute under Johnson. His concern with sustaining economic stability and growth through the use of discretionary fiscal policy was no less pronounced than was Kennedy's. Indeed, Johnson's tendency to intervene late in the budgetary plan-

[36] Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 239-40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ning process derived in part from a desire to maintain flexibility in fiscal policy. With growing economic instability in the 1966–68 period, the determination of optimal fiscal policy became increasingly difficult, placing greater strains upon the budgetary process.

Johnson made heavy use of "task forces" composed of nongovernmental personnel, White House staff, and members of various agencies in the design of his legislative programs. This reflected his conviction that the career staffs of most federal agencies were incapable of developing innovative social programs. The task force device had been employed by previous presidents, but not nearly as extensively.[37] Although these task forces were often successful in developing legislative proposals of an innovative character, the degree of integration with the ongoing formulation of the domestic budget and the accuracy of the "costing out" of these legislative proposals left much to be desired. The proposals developed by these task forces frequently would appear only late in November or December, at which time offsetting reductions in existing programs often had to be found quickly to accommodate these proposals within a fixed domestic outlays total.

Coordination of defense and domestic budgetary policies was also poor in many instances, due primarily to uncertainty over the spiraling Vietnam outlays. The American intervention in South Vietnam reached major proportions during the 1965–66 period, and this escalation greatly increased defense outlays in a manner not easily or effectively predicted by those outside the defense budgetary process (nor by many persons within the Pentagon). Uncertainties concerning defense outlays and the state of the economy and, hence, desired total outlays made the domestic outlays target an uncertain and highly volatile number. OMB had a difficult time. In addition, the financing of the Vietnam War through supplemental appropriations increased the uncertainty of even the previous fiscal year's level of military outlays through much of the planning cycle.[38]

Within the domestic budgetary process, Johnson's general strategy was one of forcing agencies and OMB to generate options throughout the planning cycle, with final decisions to be made, often by the president himself, at the very end of the year. This placed great strains on OMB's ability to manage the domestic budgetary process. These difficulties, however, were not due to a lack of presidential intervention; it was the late date at which definitive aggregate decisions were made by Johnson, as well as the president's failure to integrate

[37] Norman C. Thomas and Harold L. Wolman, "The Presidency and Policy Formation: The Task Force Device," *Public Administration Review* 39 (September-October 1969): 459–71.

[38] Supplemental appropriations are presidential appropriation requests for a given fiscal year that are submitted to Congress after the regular president's budget for that fiscal year has been transmitted to Congress. It has been alleged that McNamara kept Vietnam spending separate from the regular DOD Budget, through the use of supplementals, not so much to "hide" Vietnam spending from the American public but rather to preserve the "virtues of scarcity" in the preparation of the rest of the defense budget (John P. Crecine, "The Defense Budget in Fiscal Planning and Management," *Appendices*, vol. 4, ed. Allison).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the separate policy streams or terms of the identity, that made OMB's function as manager of the domestic resource allocation process so difficult, giving rise to hectic and overburdened late-review phases. The character of presidential policy goals and concerns under Johnson was such that the management of the domestic budgetary process had to adapt to fiscal policy, defense spending, and new legislative development to an unusual extent. Within the identity, "domestic spending" was subsidiary to the other terms.

Despite the hectic character of the review phase in many budgetary planning cycles under Johnson, evidence of outlay-budget authority side payments similar to those discussed earlier is lacking. Indeed, in at least one severe review reduction exercise (for fiscal 1967), the director of OMB transmitted revised agency ceilings in terms of budget authority. The evidence on this issue is not definitive, but it is likely that Johnson, aware of the minutiae of budgetary accounting as few presidents before or since have been, did not wish to limit his future flexibility by the budgetary consequences of such side payments. The removal of budget authority side payments as a negotiating technique served to make negotiations and reductions in the review period even more complicated and generated even more agency-OMB conflict. As a result, the life of the budgeteer was more difficult under Johnson than under either Eisenhower or Kennedy.

Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking for 1966 and 1967

Unlike Eisenhower, Johnson did not specify a target total for domestic outlays, nor did he specify general guidelines for developing budget ceilings, at any point during the preview phase. The preview under Johnson was devoted to program analysis; direct agency inputs, if submitted at all, were very informal and received little high-level scrutiny until near the end of the preview phase, if at all. Like Kennedy, Johnson did not endorse the preview planning figures developed by OMB at a cabinet meeting or through any other action, such as memorandums to agency heads. The OMB director, however, did provide agencies with target budget authority and outlays figures at the end of the preview. The nature of the preview phases for fiscal 1966 and 1967 reflected Johnson's emphasis upon the development by OMB of budgetary alternatives and options, which were designed to allow him the largest possible range of options until late in the review period. In both years, agencies were requested by Johnson to identify possible reductions in ongoing activities amounting to 10 to 20 percent of their current budget, in case such cuts were needed. In the planning of the fiscal 1967 budget, in June 1965, Johnson called a cabinet meeting to impress upon agency heads his need for "bands" of lower-priority programs for possible reduction and ordered that such bands be included in agency requests.

Yet, in the absence of a target total for domestic outlays, agencies found very difficult the task of assigning relative priorities within their budgets; decentralization of the process without firm high-level guidelines was infeasible. Robert

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Weaver, head of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, commented on his problems during the fiscal 1967 preview in a memorandum to OMB Director Charles Schultze:

> I simply do not know for example of any way to assess the "relative priorities" of the Federal-State training program as against the creation of open space for urban parks. Both are important; both are proposals of the President which we strongly support. But, I know of no common index to which both can be related so one could say that either is priority item no. 4 and the other no. 5. . . .
>
> This is not meant to say, of course, that Housing Agency budget proposals cannot be reduced when reductions are necessary. Obviously, if the Administration finally concludes that next year's budget cannot be stretched to cover everything the Agency would like to have the President recommend, I can and will reshape the budget to fit within whatever boundaries the President sets. But, doing this involves the application of judgement within the situation as it may then exist.[39]

The lack of strong presidential backing, as well as the lack of a target outlays total and specific budgetary guidelines during the preview, left OMB in a very weak position for the resolution of budgetary issues with agencies. This difficulty was described in a memorandum from the Military Division to the Office of Budget Review concerning OMB's efforts to settle budgetary issues in the preview phase of the fiscal 1967 planning cycle: "In our experience to date, the Director has not made any decisions of this type. . . .We wonder by what authority—short of going to the President—the Director would be disposing of issues or modifying agency plans."[40] Partly as a result of such difficulties, OMB was not able to complete the fiscal 1967 preview until mid-August 1965, very late in the planning cycle.

Johnson used the preview as a mechanism to identify and analyze policy alternatives and options. He reserved the major decisions in fiscal, legislative, and domestic and defense budgetary policy for later in the review phase, when he personally decided upon the budgetary total and scrutinized agency budgets in great detail. When Johnson did intervene in the preview, his purpose was to exhort agencies and OMB to provide him with viable program analyses and alternatives, rather than to bring together the strands of fiscal, legislative, domestic and defense budgetary policy. Johnson's approach to the budgetary preview was thus different from Eisenhower's and Kennedy's. Eisenhower used the preview to tell agencies what his choices and priorities were; Johnson used the preview to help him make up his mind. Whereas Kennedy may have been negligent in specifying budgetary policies and guidelines in the preview phase and in specifying a firm target total for domestic outlays, he did allow OMB to

[39] Memorandum from Administrator Robert Weaver to Director Schultze, 23 June 1965, Office of Budget Reivew files, 1967 Preview, Box 1, OMB Records Division.

[40] "Comments on draft memorandum on 'Remainder of 1967 Preview Process'," memorandum to Carl Tiller from the Military Division, 26 July 1965, Office of Budget Review files, 1967 Preview, Box 2, OMB Records Division.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

manage domestic budgetary formulation and to make decisions on program issues. Johnson, on the other hand, was extremely energetic and concerned about numerous programs and details; OMB was allowed less independent decision-making authority.

Following such an amorphous preview phase, the review phase of the planning cycle was bound to be a very difficult one. The planning cycle for the fiscal 1967 budget, hampered by economic instability as well as coordination problems, illustrates this. As late as 1 June 1965, the economic outlook for fiscal 1967 was so gloomy that outside consultants to the CEA recommended a stimulative tax reduction in fiscal 1967.[41] By November, the outlook was such as to elicit recommendations for a tax increase. The earlier economic projections had underestimated the strength of consumer and business spending during 1965, providing additional economic stimulus.

This change in the economic outlook, and the resulting need for a substantial tax increase if the deficit could not be held down, led Johnson in November to demand major downward revisions in domestic agency budgetary figures, figures that he had approved personally in August of 1965. At the same time, however, the president wanted budgetary increases for various Great Society programs, as well as for proposed new legislation. OMB was thus forced to adjust precipitately to fiscal-policy requirements.

Further difficulties in fiscal 1967 planning stemmed from the major American commitment of ground troops in South Vietnam, which began and grew rapidly over the course of 1965. Although the costs of this intervention escalated quickly, neither OMB nor the domestic agencies were adequately apprised of these rapid changes. Thus, an August 1965 meeting between OMB Director Charles Schultze and President Johnson forecast Vietnam outlays for fiscal 1967 at roughly $4 billion; by the time of the January release of the budget, however, these outlays were estimated at nearly $11 billion (also a substantial underestimate). The defense and domestic budgetary coordination problem thus was severe in the closing months of 1965 and worsened drastically in succeeding years, as the uncertainty surrounding the defense spending increased.

Major decisions for fiscal 1967 in all areas of fiscal policy, defense and domestic budgetary policies, and new legislation were made personally in December 1965 by Johnson. Gardner Ackley, chairman of the CEA, and OMB Director Schultze both recommended to Johnson in mid-December that tax increases of some sort be sought with the fiscal 1967 budget. Of particular interest is Ackley's analysis of the fiscal-policy implications of the fiscal 1967 budget.[42] Despite the very late stage of the planning cycle during which Ackley was analyzing fiscal policy, the only figures for fiscal 1967 outlays available to

[41] "Economists' Views on the Outlook," memorandum from Gardner Ackley to the President, 2 June 1965, White House Central Files, FG11-0, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL).

[42] "Policy Implications of the Budget," memorandum from Gardner Ackley to the President, 17 December 1965, White House Central Files, FI4, LBJL.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

him ranged from $110 to $115 billion, that is, no target total had yet been determined. Similarly, on 30 December 1965, the senior staff members within BRD were not fully apprised of the exact number and subject matter of the legislative task forces, to say nothing of the costs of the bills being planned.

With the budget document due soon at the printer, Howard Stone of the Office of Budget Review noted that "it is essential that I get a firmer fix on 1967 new legislation and contingency items as soon as possible."[43] Two other aspects of the December budgetary crunch are of interest and reveal the difficulties that Johnson faced in trying to pursue his "guns *and* butter" policy. Such a policy essentially meant that the terms of the budgetary identity—particularly for defense spending, deficit, and revenues—could not be altered greatly from a "peacetime" policy posture. Defense spending could not increase massively, taxes could not be raised sharply, and the deficit could not reach "wartime" levels (that is, comparable to those of the 1940s), unless Great Society plans were to be dropped; Johnson would have to mobilize the nation to support the Vietnam War as a military cause comparable to the Korean War or World War II. Johnson's decisions on fiscal 1967 defense spending and tax policy must be placed in this political context.

Defense-spending outlays for fiscal 1967 were projected as of mid-December to fall between $57 and $60 billion. In his December memorandum to the president, Director Schultze noted that a $57 billion figure for the Defense Department would allow for a $10 billion increase for Vietnam and an outlays total of $110 to $111 billion, yielding a deficit equaling either $7 billion without tax increases or $2 billion with tax increases of the type that Schultze and Ackley strongly advocated. Defense Secretary McNamara recommended a $60 billion defense-spending total, reflecting his desire to sustain the administration's "credibility both in budget terms and in terms of Vietnam."[44] Johnson chose the $57 billion figure. Similarly, in the area of tax policy, Johnson's economic advisers offered two alternatives for increasing fiscal 1967 revenues. One plan involved seeking congressional approval of a tax increase; the other was a mélange of proposals to speed up tax collections and withholding and to increase some excise taxes.[45] Schultze, Ackley, and McNamara favored the first alternative, but Johnson chose the second, in December, to avoid seeking major congressional legislation. In the end, of course, the first recommendation was more nearly correct—the tax policy adopted was only a palliative, and major new tax legislation had to be sought in 1967. The cost of congressional

[43] Memorandum from Howard Stone to Program Division heads, 30 December 1965, Office of Budget Review files, Fiscal Year 1967 Director's Review, Box 1, OMB Records Division.

[44] As Joseph Califano, then aide at the White House, described his attitude to Johnson in a December 23 telegram to Texas (Memorandum from Joseph Califano to the President, 23 December 1965, White House Central Files, FG11-1, LBJL).

[45] "The 1966 Outlook," memorandum from the Troika staff to Treasury Secretary Fowler, Director Schultze, and Gardner Ackley, 23 December 1965, Office of Budget Review files, Fiscal Year 1967 Director's Review, Box 1, OMB Records Division.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

approval, however, was a series of reductions in domestic social programs, as Johnson had foreseen in December of 1965.

Johnson's willingness to tolerate ambiguity and goal conflicts throughout the planning cycle enabled him to preserve flexibility until the very end of the planning cycle and then resolve a vast number of disparate issues. Johnson relied more heavily on direct negotiations with agency heads in such situations than had either of his predecessors, and the level of detail with which he was occasionally concerned in these meetings is remarkable. However much Johnson tended to bring chaos into the budgetary process, his personal abilities were such that he was able to pull together these separate streams during the final month, with the assistance of exhausted staff members from the White House and OMB.

The amorphous and conflicting nature of presidential budgetary goals, however, as well as Johnson's failure to face up to the conflicting managerial requirements of the several parallel policy-planning processes throughout the planning cycle, prevented the resolution of issues in the preview phase and led to extremely frenetic review periods throughout his administration. Thus, while Johnson's approach to budgetary process management was well suited to the preservation of flexibility in decisions on budgetary issues, fiscal policy, new legislation, and defense policy, it imposed substantial costs upon the participants. The burdens on OMB, as manager of the domestic resource allocation process, were particularly severe. OMB, operating with no explicit presidential policy guidance until the end of the planning cycle, was possessed of an uncertain mandate for resolving program issues and faced occasional presidential forays into direct negotiations with agencies.

The budgets in the later Johnson years continued to reveal the important influence of the economic environment on budgetary planning. No amount of personal stamina, drive, and energy on Johnson's part could overcome the combined impact of the Vietnam War and inflation upon the domestic budget. The result was the squeezing of Great Society programs to a mere fraction of their originally planned scale. Schultze noted in a memorandum to the president written in November 1966:

> As I get deeper into the review of the 1968 budget, one major problem stands out above all the others—a problem which could be very troublesome in the 1968 campaign.
>
> That problem is simply that *we are not able to fund adequately the Great Society programs.* At the same time, States, citizens, depressed areas and individuals have been led to expect immediate delivery of benefits from Great Society programs to a degree that is not realistic.[46]

As with many other aspects of the Johnson administration, it is interesting to speculate on the character of budgetary management and formulation in the later years of his presidency in the absence of Vietnam. For both Kennedy and

[46] "Great Expectations v. Disappointments," memorandum from Director Schultze to the President, 7 November 1966, White House Central Files, F14, LBJL, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eisenhower, the first two to three years of a presidency seemed to be devoted to reorienting the budget toward some new steady state. For Eisenhower, this was budgetary balance, a goal achieved in fiscal 1957, combined with substantial reduction in taxes and a reorientation of military spending toward a "long haul" peacetime basis. For Kennedy, the fiscal 1965 preview seemed to be directed toward the achievement of budgetary balance in fiscal 1967, combined with a tax cut. Johnson also may have had some equilibrium point in mind, to be achieved following completion of his legislative agenda (hence his concern with budget authority allocations). The demands of Vietnam for military spending, and the impact of this spending on the domestic economy, were such as to prevent any reorientation of budgetary management toward stabler goals and a less harried process of formulation.

Conclusions

The ability of OMB to reach budgetary settlements with agencies that are "acceptable" to the president is crucially dependent upon presidential specification of budgetary goals and policies, and well as upon presidential coordination of the executive branch policy-planning processes. These two functions are closely linked; the way in which they are carried out often reflects closely the larger political goals and preferences of the president. In the absence of either a clear budgetary target total for outlays or presidential support for specific policies, the position of OMB may be very difficult indeed, as has been shown for the Kennedy and Johnson years. Further, the absence of clear guidelines established at an early point in the planning cycle increases the coordination difficulties between such policy processes as the formulation of fiscal policy and the domestic budget or the planning of domestic and defense budgets.

This points to a conceptualization of the president's budget that is different from that implicit in much of the scholarly literature. Rather than a mere listing of agencies' requests for funding, the presidential budget is a unified document, containing legislative and other proposals, and reflects presidential political goals and preferences among programs. The importance of the outlays total for fiscal policy, as well as for OMB's control and management of the domestic budget, introduces a need for tradeoffs. The fiscal-policy aspect of the president's budget also enforces the logical interdependence among the budgetary allowances for individual agencies suggested by the identity above. "Incrementalist" interpretations of federal budgetary processes suggest no fiscal-policy influence on budgetary allocations and treat individual agency budgets as independent from one another.[47] Such a view of the executive branch process ignores several important elements.

[47] See, for example, Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review* 60 (September 1966): 529–47; idem., "On the Process of Budgeting II: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," in *Studies in Budgeting*, ed. Byrne et al., pp. 292–375; idem., "Toward a Predictive Theory of Government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The tensions between fiscal and budgetary policy are inherent in the logic of the budgetary identity and in the differing managerial requirements of the various policy processes, but specific aspects of presidential management and coordination of the policy-planning processes can be very important in either suppressing or exacerbating these tensions. Given the ambitious and conflicting character of the goals that are likely to appear on the agenda of present and future presidents, are there ways in which flexibility for fiscal policy and legislative development may be combined with clear presidential guidelines to achieve rational resource allocation decisions?

As the Eisenhower experience in budgetary management suggests, the requisites for orderly budgetary policy processes are clear: unambiguous policy guidelines enunciated early in the planning cycle; an active preview phase, replete with agency-OMB negotiations; and occasional high-level meetings involving participants in all of the policy streams throughout the summer and autumn in order to reach some understandings on the values of the terms in the identity. Given the limited nature of the Eisenhower domestic and economic policy agenda, however, it is not clear that such a "solution" is feasible in the face of the burdens, aspirations, and policy agenda of current and future presidents. Yet, some degree of orderliness is necessary if individual proposals are to receive careful consideration and if implicit tradeoffs are to be made explicit. The dilemma is not likely to be resolved by adopting Eisenhower's managerial approach entirely. Yet his presidency does provide an example, admittedly extreme, of successful presidential management of the budgetary and fiscal policy processes.

The conflict between discretionary fiscal policy and budgetary resource allocation is most apparent in the need of the budgetary planning process for clear guidelines that remain relatively stable. One means of dealing with this dilemma is through the specification of a range of target totals and thus a range of associated agency budget ceilings.[48] This technique is similar to that employed by President Johnson and earlier by President Truman. However, Johnson did not combine his requests to the agencies for bands of possible reductions and ranges of alternatives with any efforts to coordinate the parallel policy streams at any point in the planning cycle prior to the review phase. In addition, Johnson did not provide any general guidelines that would aid in the decentralization of decision making.

The results of unsuccessful coordination of these policy processes are well documented. The president must be a manager, at least in part; he has no

---

Expenditure: U.S. Domestic Appropriations," *British Journal of Political Science* 4 (October 1974): 419-52. See also Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975); idem *Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975).

[48] For a discussion of this approach, see J.F. Padgett, "Coping with Complexity: Stochastic Models of Budgetary Decision Making in OMB and Domestic Agencies" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choice. In the absence of presidential action in this realm, there is no power that can fill the vacuum.[49] The managerial-coordination function is not inherently difficult to execute, providing a president can decide what to do, can "fix" tentatively the terms of the budgetary identity, and can transmit those tentative positions to the agencies and OMB and then symbolically back OMB. A crucial aspect of presidential management of the budgetary process must be a willingness to delegate policy decisions, impose coordination of the separate policy streams through periodic policy meetings involving all of the senior managerial bureaucracy, and support staff agencies through the articulation of unambiguous policies and goals in such forums as cabinet meetings.

Budgeting is a process that is eminently political, inasmuch as budgetary decisions are distributional ones affecting competing political interests. It also is one requiring some adept high-level management by the president; a collegial style is all very well, but someone at the top must coordinate and build a consensus among the colleagues. The high-level analytic and coordination tasks are presidential ones, and, in this respect, the president's role is similar to that of the head of any large corporation. Presidents are political leaders, but they lead in an organizational context.*

[49] See, for example, Theodore Sorensen, *Decision Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). According to Sorensen, "If I were to name the one quality which characterized most issues likely to be brought to the President, I would say it was conflict—conflict between departments, between the views of various advisors, between the Administration and Congress, between the United States and another nation, or between groups within the country: labor versus management, or race versus race, or state versus nation" (pp. 14–15).

* The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the Ford Foundation (Grant no. 780-0470). The authors also wish to thank the Office of Management and Budget Records Office, the National Archives, and the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidential Libraries for the internal budget data used in this analysis. The data were assembled previously under funding from the National Science Foundation (SOC72-05488 and SOC76-01052).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

An alarm over the Soviet transfer of MiG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba, raised by columnists Evans and Novak in the *Washington Post* on 15 November 1978,[1] subsided after a few weeks—although not all of the questions raised were entirely put to rest. The Carter administration was able, after monitoring closely the situation in Cuba and after consulting the Soviet leadership, to reassure the American public that there was no evidence that a nuclear attack capability was being provided. The president also announced that the Soviet authorities had given assurances that no nuclear capability would be provided and that the 1962 understanding would continue to be adhered to. The matter soon faded as a public issue.

Some who in 1978 most vigorously challenged the compatibility of the transfer of MiG-23s to Cuba with the 1962 understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union did so in order to raise doubts—both over Soviet trustworthiness and intentions, and over the strength and steadfastness of the Carter administration. In particular, some opponents of a SALT II agreement sought to use the issue to brand the Soviets as "hard" and the administration as "soft" on a security question, and thereby to discredit both. Some others wondered whether the Soviets were probing or "testing" the mettle of the United States. Some were merely unsure what the 1962 understanding covered—clearly strategic offensive ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarine

[1] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Cuba's Mig 23s," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1978.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution and author of many works on Soviet political and military affairs. A retired Foreign Service officer and former ambassador, he was serving in 1962 as special assistant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State and in that capacity was involved in American policymaking during the Cuban missile crisis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bases, presumably Soviet strategic bombers; but what about MiG-23 fighter-bombers?

As a participant in the decision-making process during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (and in the clarifications of the application of the 1962 understanding to a possible Soviet nuclear missile submarine base in Cuba in 1970 and in 1972), I can illuminate the question from the historical record. The many accounts and analyses of the original crisis have said very little about aircraft, as opposed to missiles, which were of course the focus of the original crisis.

Bombers and the Soviet Build-up in Cuba

Cuba began to receive Soviet arms in some quantity after the failure of the Bay of Pigs emigré invasion in 1961. An increased scale and variety of arms began to arrive in Cuba in the summer of 1962. By early September, the United States had identified MiG-17 fighters, SA-2 antiaircraft surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and patrol boats with short-range (15 nautical miles) missiles. There also were many unconfirmed rumors, but no clear evidence, of long-range offensive ground-to-ground ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States. Both to clarify the situation for the American public and even more to warn the Soviet leaders, President Kennedy authorized a White House release in his name on 4 September 1962 stating that there was no evidence of "the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability, either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction or guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."[2] On September 13 at a press conference the president referred to his earlier statement and said that the United States would act if "an offensive military base of significant capacity" were to be established.[3]

On October 3 Undersecretary of State Ball testified in an open hearing on Capitol Hill summarizing the situation in some detail, including reference to the existence of fifteen SAM sites, sixteen missile patrol boats, sixty MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters and fighter-bombers, and at least one MiG-21.[4] (Some of the MiG-15s and 17s had been introduced in 1961, others—and now the more advanced MiG-21s—were coming since mid-1962.)

On October 10, some U.S. Navy reconnaissance photos of Soviet ships approaching Cuba—photos actually taken on September 28, but unaccountably only circulated in Washington on October 9—showed topside storage of crates which intelligence analysts quickly identified as probably containing disassembled Ilyushin (IL-28) light bombers.[5] The Ilyushin-28 jet light bomber

[2] Text in Henry Pachter, *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 176. This book contains an appendix of useful documents.

[3] Ibid., p. 167.

[4] Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 176.

[5] Ibid., p. 167.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was already over a dozen years old at that time. Still, it could carry 6000 pounds of bombload 600 nautical miles (or less bombload to 750 nautical miles) operational radius, and it could be a step toward increasing Soviet offensive capabilities. The suspect IL-28 crates, together with unconfirmed reports of offensive missiles and the continuing SAM deployments, led to the scheduling of another U-2 photo reconnaissance mission.

On Sunday, October 14, Kennedy's assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, appeared on ABC's "Issues and Answers." Senator Kenneth Keating and others had charged that the Soviets were installing strategic missiles in Cuba, and the question was posed to Bundy. He expressed doubt that the Soviets and the Cubans would "attempt to install a major offensive capability" in Cuba. He stated flatly that "I *know* there is no present evidence" that they are doing so. He also addressed in some detail the matter of aircraft. "It is true," he said, "that the MiG fighters which have been put in Cuba for more than a year now, and any possible additions in the form of aircraft, might have a certain marginal capability for moving against the United States. But I think we have to bear in mind the relative magnitudes. . . . So far, everything that has been delivered in Cuba falls within the categories of aid which the Soviet Union has provided, for example, to neutral countries like Egypt or Indonesia, and I should not be surprised to see additional military assistance of that sort."[6]

Almost literally at the same time Bundy was speaking, a U-2 reconnaissance plane was returning from a mission over Cuba with photographs which provided the first clear evidence of the construction of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) in Cuba—that is, strategic nuclear offensive arms. It also confirmed that the crates observed arriving in Cuba on September 28 did, indeed, as suspected, contain IL-28 jet light bombers; the bombers were observed being uncrated for assembly at two airfields. Bundy had anticipated the IL-28s and his statement on October 14 clearly signaled that a modest number of these bombers for conventional bomb delivery—such as had been supplied both to Egypt and Indonesia—would not alone be regarded as representing a "major offensive capability." But of course it was not Ilyushins alone—the MRBMs and IRBMs had *not* been expected, and they *did* represent a major offensive capability.

On October 22, President Kennedy electrified the world with his disclosure of the "unmistakable evidence" of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba, despite the president's warnings of September 4 and 13 and Soviet false and deceptive statements of September 11 and October 18. He therefore announced a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment" going to Cuba. After describing the MRBM and IRBM missile sites, he stated: "In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared."[7] The quarantine order

[6] Ibid., p. 180.

[7] Text in Pachter, *Collision Course*, p. 192.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of October 23 included among the offensive arms prohibited from entering Cuba bomber aircraft, not further defined.[8]

During the six days of confrontation, from October 22 to 28, there were no other references to the IL-28s or more generally to aircraft, although President Kennedy did refer in his letter of October 22 to Khrushchev in addition to "long-range missile bases" also to removing "other offensive weapons systems in Cuba" (not specified),[9] and in his letter of October 27 he referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use."[10] Khrushchev, for his part, referred on October 28 vaguely to "the weapons you describe as offensive," in agreeing to their removal.[11]

Meanwhile, assembly of IL-28s had continued at the Cuban air bases at San Julien and Holguin until *and after* October 28, when Khrushchev capitulated on the withdrawal of the MRBMs and IRBMs. In all, forty-two IL-28s had been brought into Cuba, including some trainer models. Eventually seven were assembled—remarkably, despite the crisis, the trainers were assembled first per usual procedure, since student flyers used them first. Also, assembly of forty or so MiG-21 fighters continued (supplementing about sixty older MiG-15s and 17s).

A New Phase in the Crisis

As of October 28, the Soviet leaders had accepted the president's demand that the missile systems be removed, construction work on the sites had ceased, and their dismantling had begun. Washington, Moscow, and the world felt enormous relief as the threatening clouds of nuclear war were dispelled. Negotiations began in New York between senior U.S. and Soviet negotiators on the difficult issues of verification of the dismantling and withdrawal of the missile systems. The one remaining obstacle was the extremely angry and uncooperative stance taken by Fidel Castro, who felt betrayed by the Russians. He had taken a risk in accepting the Soviet missiles and now felt that he was being treated as a pawn by the Soviet leaders, despite the implied American promise not to invade. Castro went so far as to deploy the Cuban Army to surround the four Soviet missile base areas (each of which was guarded by a heavily armed armored Soviet security detachment of several thousand men).

As we turned in Washington to working out the detailed procedures for implementing the agreed removal of missile systems, there remained one large potential gap in the understanding itself: what, if any, weapons in addition to the MRBM and IRBM missile systems were (or should be) covered? It was clear (and soon became even clearer) that the Soviet use of such vague circumlocution

[8] Ibid., p. 199.

[9] Declassified in 1973; text in *Department of State Bulletin* 69, no. 1795, 19 November 1973, p. 636.

[10] Ibid., p. 649.

[11] Ibid., p. 652.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as referring to "the weapons you describe as offensive" had merely been its way to deny that the missiles in fact reflected any offensive intent.

There were divided views among American policymakers and advisers. Some believed it was unwise and imprudent to appear to be pushing our advantage by raising an issue over the IL-28s or any other weapons system. Some wished to press our advantage and demand the removal of all Soviet military forces. Others believed we should seek removal at least of the IL-28 bombers.

Although the administration had been prepared until October 14 to accept some jet light bombers in Cuba, as clearly indicated in McGeorge Bundy's statement on that date, once it was known that the Soviets were introducing long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, it had been considered necessary to draw more tightly the definition of unacceptable offensive arms in Cuba; hence the references to the bombers on October 22 and 23.

On October 28, in the tenth meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), the issue arose. The president stated that offensive weapons "in our view" included the IL-28 bombers, but that "we should not get 'hung up' on the bombers." The president was prepared for the U.S. side to argue to the Soviets that the IL-28s were among the weapons *we* viewed as "offensive" and therefore were covered by the convenient circumlocution used by Khrushchev. But he was not comfortable with the fact that virtually the whole crisis exchange had focused on the missiles; in the record of the meeting the president's words were paraphrased as stating that "he did not want to get into a position where we would appear to be going back on part of the deal. The IL-28 bombers were less important than the strategic missiles."[12] This somewhat equivocal stand was, of course, known only to those most directly involved in the crisis management. And the decision did not specify how far to press the issue, if the Soviets were adamant, before deciding that our efforts were stymied.

Following the ExComm meeting, I was tasked at the State Department with preparing a paper on the subject. I submitted a memorandum, titled "Considerations in Defining Weapons Which Must Be Removed from Cuba," to Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson on October 29, and he in turn cabled it to Acting Secretary Ball in New York. In the memorandum, I noted that "we would like to see the maximum military withdrawal from Cuba, but we must balance against this a reasonable interpretation of what is intolerable to us." For example, the president had clearly indicated on September 4 that the weapons then in Cuba—including the MiG fighters, coastal defense cruise missiles, and missile-armed patrol boats—were not then regarded as "offensive." On the other hand, the quarantine had included the bombers. I

[12] See Barton J. Bernstein, "Bombers, Inspection, and the No Invasion Pledge," *Foreign Service Journal* 56 (July 1979), citing the record "minutes" of the ExComm meeting (p. 9); I have also drawn on my own notes of the meeting. Bernstein's account, drawing on some of the recently declassified records, is virtually the only exception in the literature in addressing the bomber issue. See also Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Lippincott, 1966), pp. 209–13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concluded: "It is clear that the systems which must be removed are the 1,000 n.m. [nautical miles] and 2,200 n.m. surface-to-surface missiles, IL-28 jet light bombers, and the warheads and support equipment for these systems." I also noted that "We cannot reasonably insist that the MiG fighters, surface-to-air missiles, or non-missile ground force weapons should be removed." I suggested that there could be "legitimate difference of opinion" over the short-range coastal defense missiles and missiles on patrol craft, and even the ground-force artillery rockets, but that we should only make a "low-key" effort to secure their removal and if challenged fall back and drop them. But the "bottom line" was the judgment that: "In addition to the MRBMs and IRBMs, the IL-28s should definitely be included [in the demand for removal], but the MiG fighters should not be."[13]

On November 1, the president authorized immediate low-level reconnaissance flights both over the missile sites, to check on dismantling, and over the IL-28 airfields. "The major reason for overflying the IL-28s," as stated in the record of the ExComm meeting, "is to make clear that we consider these planes 'offensive weapons' to be removed by the Russians and, therefore, we must know whether they are being dismantled."[14]

On November 2, reconnaissance photos taken the previous day showed continued assembly of the IL-28s, as well as continued dismantling of the MRBM and IRBM sites.

On November 2, at ExComm Meeting No. 17 the president made his decision: the IL-28s must be removed. The other short-range tactical systems, and Soviet military personnel, were not included. The president on November 3 issued instructions including a "requirement" for removal of "all bombers and their equipment" as well as all offensive missiles and equipment. Lest anyone not favoring this decision treat it as tentative, he stated: "All Americans should stick firmly to this position."[15]

Negotiating Withdrawal of the Bombers

Direct negotiations with the Soviets, apart from the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, were centered in New York where Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and John J. McCloy had begun meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan and Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov on October 29. Following the ExComm meeting on October 28 and the cabling of my memorandum of October 29 to New York, Stevenson was instructed to provide to the Soviets the "list of weapons deemed offensive by the United States," including "bomber aircraft" and "bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles." In

[13] This memorandum, in the author's files, has been declassified but not generally released.

[14] Cited in Bernstein, "Bombers, Inspection, and the No Invasion Pledge," p. 9.

[15] The instructions, in the president's name, were drafted by McGeorge Bundy and cleared by Secretary Rusk; they were dispatched to Stevenson and McCloy in New York in State Department cable to USUN No. 1189, 3 November 1962 (originally Top Secret, Eyes Only; declassified in 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a dinner meeting of Stevenson and McCloy with Mikoyan and Kuznetsov on November 1, dealing with many matters, they *forgot* to give him the list! Stevenson remedied this by sending a letter to Mikoyan the next day, November 2, with a copy to Kuznetsov. Apart from thanking Mikoyan for the dinner, the letter read in full: "One thing that Mr. McCloy and I neglected to discuss with you last night was the list of items that the United States considers in the category of offensive weapons within the meaning of the exchange between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. Such a list is appended to this letter. We trust that the weapons you plan to remove include all those on this list."[16]

Reinforced by the president's firm instructions of November 3, Stevenson specifically raised the issue of the IL-28s with Kuznetsov on that same day, noting the continued assembly of the bombers and stating that they should be removed. On November 5, at our request, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant also raised the issue of the IL-28s with Kuznetsov, who replied that the question of the bombers was "a new issue" and had not been "covered" in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence.[17] On November 6, Kennedy communicated directly to Khrushchev his insistence that the bombers be removed. On November 8 and 13, Stevenson and McCloy met again with Kuznetsov and Soviet U.N. Representative Valerian Zorin and continued the difficult argument over the IL-28s (as well as over the establishment of adequate inspection in Cuba and verification of withdrawal of the missile systems, which had been at issue since the negotiations in New York had begun).

Meanwhile, on November 2 Mikoyan flew to Cuba for talks with Castro. Castro could do nothing but acquiesce in the MRBM and IRBM withdrawal (and withdrew his troops surrounding the Soviet bases). He was, however, adamant on two other issues: he refused to accept any international inspection in Cuba verifying the missile withdrawal, and he refused to agree to the withdrawal of the IL-28s.

The IL-28s posed a special difficulty for the Soviets. Unlike the missile systems, which remained exclusively in Soviet hands at all times and would have continued to do so when operational, the IL-28s were being transferred to the Cubans, as had the MiGs and other arms supplied. The Soviets did not, in fact, regard them as part of their own offensive forces and did not intend to provide them with nuclear delivery capabilities. They did not wish to renege on their provision to Cuba. In the discussions in New York they repeatedly stressed that the aircraft now belonged to Cuba and could not be withdrawn without Cuban authorization (although to allay our concerns, they did state that the bombers were still physically under Soviet control).

[16] Stevenson letter to Kuznetsov of 2 November 1962. This letter was not formally classified, but was so treated until its official approval for release on 2 January 1975. It has not, to the author's knowledge, been referred to in any prior publication.

[17] State Department, USUN Cable No. 1635, Stevenson to the Secretary of State, 5 November 1962; declassified 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This distinction presented something of a problem for the United States, too, although it was not given much weight except in terms of recognizing possible difficulty in marshalling support of world opinion if the Cubans and Soviets were adamant and we continued to press the issue. We considered our position justified. At the same time, as Bundy had mentioned publicly on October 14, IL-28s had been transferred to Egypt and Indonesia, and we had not regarded that as other than normal and acceptable military assistance.

Strong feelings were generated and expressed by various presidential advisers on what to do about the IL-28 bombers, as well as other issues still unresolved, including verification of missile withdrawals.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly supported continued American insistence on withdrawal of the bombers and, preferably, also of all Soviet military personnel, and if necessary bombing the IL-28s. They were supported by Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon.[18] A number of State Department and White House advisers argued for increased pressure through a tightened blockade extended to include petroleum products as well as military goods. Some others in the State Department, and Ambassador Stevenson, believed that we should not press the matter of the IL-28s, that the Soviet withdrawal of the missiles had been the key thing, and that we should not press our luck in forcing Moscow to back down again.

I recall an argument I had with a senior State Department official in early November in which he challenged what the difference *was* between IL-28s in Cuba and, say, in Indonesia. My first reply was that from Cuba they could strike Oak Ridge, which they could not from Java; but that was only a debater's argument. The real point was, as I argued, that the president in his quarantine speech of October 22 had publicly committed us to regard the IL-28s as a part and parcel of a particular dangerous offensive arms build-up in Cuba, and that was why the IL-28s as well as the MRBMs and IRBMs must come out. While the MiG-21s might be just as dangerous in potential, and while both the Ilyushins and MiGs in fact represented no real threat so long as not armed with nuclear weapons, nonetheless we had committed ourselves to regard the Ilyushin "bombers" as dangerous and had not so committed ourselves with respect to MiG fighter-bombers. That difference was crucial.

On November 13 the ExComm again debated this subject, and sentiment was strong for threatening Khrushchev privately with a stiffer blockade (for example, interdicting petroleum) if he would not agree. The Soviet negotiators in New York did finally offer to remove the planes quietly *after* the United States ended the blockade and made its "no-invasion" pledge; presumably Moscow felt that with this much of an American concession they could force Castro's acceptance and save face for the USSR. But the American side insisted on with-

[18] See, Bernstein, "Bombers, Inspection, and the No Invasion Pledge," p. 11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) position is also spelled out in a Talking Paper for the Chairman of the JCS, dated 16 November 1962, declassified and released in "sanitized" form 26 February 1975, National Security Files, Countries: Cuba, General, Vol. VI (b), Box 35, John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Mass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drawal of the bombers prior to an end of the blockade and noted that the no-invasion pledge involved other unsettled issues, mainly on-site verification in Cuba to guarantee that no offensive weapons remained.[19]

On November 18, we issued a veiled ultimatum. McCloy told Kuznetsov that the president was scheduling a press conference for 6:00 P.M. on November 20, and that the Soviets must promise before that time to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. The United States also informed its NATO and Organization of American States (OAS) allies that the Soviets had not yet agreed to remove the bombers and that unspecified "further measures" might be required.[20]

An "IL-28 crisis" threatened to follow hard on the heels of the missile crisis. Personally, from indications at the time, I believe that if the Soviets had said they would not remove the aircraft, President Kennedy *would* have imposed an expanded "quarantine"; I believe that he would *not* have taken the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation in that contingency "to take them [the IL-28s] out by air attack." That, however, remains a speculative judgment; history fortunately took another course.

On November 19, under intensified Soviet pressure, Castro gave in on the Ilyushins (although not on other issues). Early on November 20, Khrushchev informed the president and promised that the IL-28s would be removed within thirty days. That same day, the ExComm met and the president decided to lift the quarantine. All the missiles had by then been withdrawn, and we had been accorded the opportunity to observe them laid out on the decks of Soviet ships as they departed.

In a press conference on November 20 the president announced that the Soviets had agreed to remove the bombers and that the quarantine would be lifted.[21] The Strategic Air Command alert was canceled. On November 21, the USSR and Warsaw Pact special readiness alerts were, in turn, canceled. On December 6, the last of the IL-28s departed in open deck crates to facilitate verification. (Incidentally, U.S. intelligence had until then counted only thirty-seven IL-28s and crates in Cuba; the Soviets had informed U.S. officials that the total was forty-two and they withdrew forty-two. None ever reappeared.) On December 12, Khrushchev informed the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that the missiles and the IL-28s had been withdrawn, in exchange for an American promise not to invade Cuba.[22]

Implications for the Future

What was the understanding as to the *future?* President Kennedy's press conference statement of November 20 spelled it out: "*if* all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future,

[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Text in Pachter, *Collision Course*, pp. 236–37.
[22] N.S. Khrushchev, Speech to the Supreme Soviet, *Pravda*, 13 December 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under adequate verification and safeguards . . . we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere." In this same statement the president made clear that although it had been promised that the IL-28s would be withdrawn, and the missile sites had been dismantled and the missiles withdrawn under our surveillance, "important parts of the understanding of October 27 and 28 remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba."[23]

These conditions were not met. The most authoritative exchange on future commitments in the negotiations resolving the 1962 crisis occurred in a meeting of First Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan with President Kennedy on 29 November 1962. Mikoyan repeatedly pressed for clarification and confirmation that the United States accepted a commitment not to invade Cuba. President Kennedy reassured him that the United States had no intention to invade Cuba, but stressed that the conditions called for in the exchange of letters in late October (international verification in Cuba and safeguards) had not been met. Without making the unequivocal future commitment the Soviets wanted, Kennedy would only state that if the Soviet Union abided by the exchange of correspondence, so would the United States.[24]

Subsequently, seeking to put the best gloss possible on the outcome of the crisis, Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen during his period of rule publicly claimed that there was an American "pledge" not to invade[25]—a claim not supported by any official American statement. There were, however, many American commentaries that overlooked the inconclusive tailing off of negotiations seeking "verification" in Cuba and, not unreasonably, took as an assumption of political realities an understanding that the United States did not intend to invade Cuba.

In the years following "the Cuban missile crisis," as it came to be called ("the Caribbean crisis," in the relatively infrequent Soviet references), it became abundantly clear that the Soviet Union was not disposed to attempt again to deploy elements of its strategic nuclear power in Cuba and that the United States was not disposed to invade or support an invasion of Cuba. It was not, however, until 1970 that it became clear that there *was* a 1962 Soviet-American "understanding" of continuing, or better, reactivated, validity. The United States had never issued any public or official statement of a commitment not to invade Cuba since the highly conditional statement of President Kennedy of 20 November 1962—the conditions of which (on international inspection in Cuba to verify the absence of offensive arms) had not been met.

The matter was, curiously, raised for clarification by the Soviet side in August

[23] Text in Pachter, *Collision Course*, pp. 236–37.

[24] The official record of the Kennedy-Mikoyan meeting has not been released to the public; this account is based on a report of the meeting.

[25] In particular, again see Khrushchev, *Pravda*, 13 December 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1970, shortly *before* the United States became aware of the start of construction of a Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos in Cuba. Chargé Yuly Vorontsov met with Henry Kissinger on 4 August 1970, seeking assurances of American acceptance of the "understanding" of 1962. After reviewing the 1962 record, Kissinger advised the president that an understanding was "never formally buttoned down" in 1962; "It emerged that there was no formal understanding in the sense of an agreement, either oral or in writing." But Nixon and Kissinger, apparently without consulting others (including the secretaries of state and defense), decided that it would be useful to tie Moscow down by taking the opportunity the Soviets had unaccountably proferred to "reaffirm" and thus activate the 1962 understanding. Kissinger assured Vorontsov on August 7 that the United States regarded the understanding as in effect and "noted with satisfaction" that the Soviet Union also regarded it as "still in full force."[26]

The 1962 understanding was thus *consummated* only on 7 August 1970![27] This marked the first unequivocal American acceptance of continuing mutual commitments. The Soviet commitment, in addition to being affirmed in the note delivered by Vorontsov, was soon thereafter publicly reaffirmed in an "authorized" *Tass* statement on 13 October 1970, following resolution of the mini-crisis which had been precipitated over the submarine base. The *Tass* statement declared that the Soviet Union was not doing and would not do anything that would "contradict the understanding reached between the Governments of the USSR and the United States in 1962."[28] And on 13 November 1970 there followed the first public American confirmation of an understanding, when a State Department spokesman noted President Kennedy's statement of 20 November 1962 and the *Tass* statement of 13 October 1970 as the basis for a conclusion that "we are confident that there is an understanding by the two Governments of the respective positions on the limits of their actions with regard to Cuba."[29] Thus, the "understanding" tentatively projected in November 1962 was not really consummated until August 1970 and not confirmed publicly until November 1970. Both governments, however, preferred to gloss over the past uncertainties and differences and to attribute the understanding to their predecessors of 1962.

[26] See Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), pp. 632–35.

[27] The texts of the Soviet note of 4 August and the American reply of 7 August 1970 have not been made public, but as stated in Kissinger's memoir account the United States reiterated the understanding "as prohibiting the emplacement of any offensive weapon of any kind or any offensive delivery system on Cuban territory"—without redefining those terms carried over from 1962 (ibid., p. 634). President Nixon, more loosely, thought there was a 1962 understanding and described the existing understanding as barring the Soviets from putting *nuclear weapons* on Cuban territory; see Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 486.

[28] *Tass*, in *Pravda*, and on Radio Moscow, 13 October 1970.

[29] Robert McCloskey, Department of State Press Briefing, mimeographed, verbatim text, 13 November 1970. Note the unusual character of the statement, indicating the lack of previous confidence in the existence of such an understanding.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conclusion: The 1978 Non-Crisis

Crated MiG-23 fighter-bombers began to arrive in Cuba in late April 1978. The first public reference to their introduction into Cuba was on October 30, and the first real attention was drawn to them by the syndicated article by Evans and Novak of 15 November 1978, which referred to a secret memorandum on the subject sent by Secretary Brown to President Carter on October 23.[30] A considerable brouhaha developed in the press over the next two weeks. At a press conference on November 30, President Carter stated that the Soviet government had provided assurances that no shipments of arms to Cuba had violated or would violate the terms of "the 1962 agreement" and that we had no evidence of nuclear weapons in Cuba.[31] While not silencing all critics, this quieted most concerns. (By December 8, even Evans and Novak had shifted targets and reported that "concern over Soviet shipments of Mig 23 attack aircraft to Cuba now centers not on possible Soviet violations of the 1962 Kennedy agreement so much as on Moscow's future targets for its all-purpose economy-sized Cuban mercenary force.")[32] The matter was laid to rest in a State Department statement on 17 January 1979, concluding that the limited numbers of MiG-23s in Cuba did not constitute a violation of "the 1962 agreement," that they were not configured for nuclear weapons delivery, and that there were not any nuclear weapons in Cuba.[33]

Based on the 1970 activation of the 1962 "understanding," as well as on the record of what occurred in 1962, it is clear that the introduction of MiG-23 fighter-bombers into the Cuban Air Force in 1978 was not inconsistent with or in violation of any understanding between the United States and Soviet governments, so long as these aircraft were limited in number and were not given a substantial offensive capability by being armed with nuclear weapons. Parenthetically, it might also be noted that when in 1979 another "mini-crisis" arose over the belated discovery of the presence of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba, possibly the descendant of one of the four introduced in 1962, a question was again initially raised by some as to whether that presence violated "the 1962 understanding"; it was soon generally acknowledged that it did not, although other concerns and objections remained. In 1962 the Soviets had informed us they would withdraw the military personnel associated with the missile systems, and they did—but they did not promise, nor indeed did we press them, either to remove all Soviet military personnel or not to introduce others in the future.

[30] Evans and Novak, "Cuba's Mig 23s"; Fred Hoffman, Associated Press Release, 30 October 1978. Ironically, the purpose of the memorandum from Secretary Brown was precisely to alert the president to the *political* sensitivity of the new findings about the brigade—a danger activated by the leak about the memorandum itself in the sensationalistic Evans and Novak article.

[31] President Carter's news conference of 30 November 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Statements* 19, no. 45 (30 November 1978): 2101.

[32] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Those Cuban Migs," *Washington Post*, 8 December 1978.

[33] Department of State, "Questions and Answers" (released to the press), 17 January 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are fighter-interceptor and fighter-bomber versions of the MiG-23 aircraft, as of the MiG-21. Both versions of the MiG-21 had been in Cuba; both versions of the successor MiG-23 appeared there sixteen years later. The MiG-21 was specifically not considered by us to be offensive in 1962, and there was no reason to treat the MiG-23 differently in 1978. Thus, there was no "Cuban aircraft crisis" in American-Soviet relations in 1978, but rather a minor tempest in the domestic political scene.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Public Service in Zimbabwe

MICHAEL BRATTON

Real choices and decisions about public policy are made within a structural framework of constraints that are not universal but vary according to historical circumstance. Limitations on choice derive in the first instance from organizational context and, secondly, from the broader socioeconomic context in which organizations are themselves embedded. Only through historical investigation of the emergence of the state and its interaction with the material environment can a full understanding be gained of the determinants of public choice. Zimbabwe's transition to political independence therefore will not wipe the slate clean in terms of the organization, orientation, and style of public-sector activities. Instead, Zimbabwe will inherit a strong state whose identity, unlike the institutions transferred in an earlier era of decolonization, will bear the stamp of the settler colonial experience. If inherited intact, the nature of the state—and, in particular, the public service—may impose severe prohibition on the ability of political leadership to select and implement a new development strategy. If inherited in modified form, as argued here is the case in Zimbabwe, then a margin of opportunity for structural reorganization may be present.

Mainstream development theory now accepts that institutional capacity is a crucial element in development. The experience of two development decades in Africa has demonstrated that the organization of people and the construction of institutions to allocate capital effectively are every bit as important as the availability of capital itself. For this reason, the public service has the potential to be a primary instrument of development in Zimbabwe. At the time of independence it was already a pivotal institution in the management, servicing, and regulation of a sophisticated political economy. The capacity of the Rhodesian public service was such that, virtually throughout the colonial period, it ex-

MICHAEL BRATTON is assistant professor of political science and African studies at Michigan State University. He is the author of *The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party-State in Zambia* and of articles on various aspects of the political economy of Zimbabwe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ecuted the public policies of settler governments effectively and efficiently. Whether existing institutional capacity can be harnessed, reformed, and redirected to new public-policy goals is one of the critical development issues facing the country.

The first part of this article analyzes the distinctive features of the settler colonial state, the inheritance of which is the fundament from which public-service reform in Zimbabwe will have to begin. To argue that public institutions are the product of a historical conjunction of political interests and economic structures is not, however, to imply determinism in public-policy choice. Recent shifts in the primacy of group interests as a result of political conflict have led to institutional fluidity. Rhodesia was governed under three different constitutional orders in 1979 alone, and a fourth—the constitutional proposals of Lancaster House—came into effect with the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980. A fifth has been promised by the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)—the ZANU(PF)—the party that played the largest part in the guerilla war and that acceded to power under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. This institutional fluidity opens leeway for policymakers to undertake reorganization and reform.

By the same token, fluidity has been more marked in terms of legislative institutions than administrative institutions. Both the Internal Settlement of 1978 and the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 whittled away at the number of white parliamentary seats and in the latter case removed the power of the minority to block important constitutional matters. Both agreements were less accommodating, however, on the question of white control of the public, judicial, and armed services. Indeed, in the face of rapid Africanization of parliament, the executive arm of government could well emerge as the main locus for the expression of settler political interests. The potential for the continuity of the public service in the face of regime change was well illustrated by the reliance of the transitional British governor on the settler administrative machinery between December 1979 and April 1980.

The bulk of this article is devoted to a discussion of factors for public-service reform that appear important at the time of Zimbabwean independence. At least three are prominent—size, organization, and personnel—and each is considered in turn. The three factors may be regarded as arrayed in ascending order of susceptibility to manipulation by policymakers. Whereas, for example, conscious planning can do little to reduce the size of a state, it may be decisive in facilitating a program of localization of public-service personnel. The very nature of the settler colonial state—its large size, its centralized organization, and its discriminatory personnel practices—also propels these factors to the attention of the new leaders of Zimbabwe.

The Settler Colonial State

The state in settler colonial societies evolved a particular set of characteristics that set it apart from other varieties of colonial states. It is autonomous,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politicized, centralized, militaristic, and interventionist. Public institutions in colonies without settlers share some of these characteristics, and not all settler states display them to the same degree. Nevertheless a distinctive pattern does prevail from which a genus of colonial state can be discerned that is larger and stronger than the norm.

Most colonies lack political autonomy. The metropolitan power is free to promote, or at least to profess, a policy of "trusteeship" toward African populations and to decolonize smoothly and rapidly. In settler colonies, however, the role of the metropole is limited to the mediation of the conflicting interests of settlers and Africans, and decolonization is rarely achieved without violence. The problem is particularly intractable where settlers enjoy the substantial autonomy of self-government. Here decolonization does not involve the transfer of power from metropole to colony, but a transfer within the colony from one set of interests to another. The metropole may even lack the authority to effect or guarantee the transfer of power because control of the armed forces and public service are vested in settler hands.

Public institutions in settler colonies, moreover, provide undue, sometimes exclusive, representation to a narrow spectrum of political interests. As such, the state and bureaucracy, far from being neutral or impartial, become thoroughly politicized. Self-government permits settlers to win and entrench positions of privilege by using control of the state to their own advantage. Electoral institutions, usually a qualified franchise, are used to limit access to the state; administrative institutions are used to effect a preferential allocation of development resources. Whereas in nonsettler societies, programs to open the public service to Africans are begun well before independence in an effort to ensure a smooth transition, such programs are resisted by settlers. Public-service commissions, where they exist in settler colonies, act less to initiate "affirmative action" for the majority than to preserve privileged access to public-service employment for the minority. In this and other respects the performance of the state contributes to, and becomes an expression of, a structure of institutionalized social inequality based initially upon discrimination according to race.

The third characteristic is the centralization of organization and decision making. The public-policy process in settler colonial societies is a lopsided one: the arena for political competition is severely circumscribed, yet the arena for administrative action knows few limits. From the point of view of the African majority the state is a predominantly administrative entity to which individuals relate as subjects, not as participants. Public policy is set at levels in the state organization remote from the levels where it is ultimately enforced, and consultation among levels on policy matters is uncommon. In the British colonial experience, a form of direct rule was favored in settler societies, as opposed to the classic indirect rule—a more decentralized model—favored in nonsettler societies. Only in the advanced stages of settler colonialism do governments experiment with a devolution of limited powers to lower levels of administration, for example, through promoting "tribal" authorities in schemes for "provincialization" or "separate development." In general, however, settler colo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nialism is a type of rule in which agencies of the state penetrate directly and deeply into local societies and execute administrative measures from above.

As a feature related to direct rule, civilian administration often has a military component. Settler colonial states can be found "in the areas where conquest and domination were particularly heavy";[1] in the case of Rhodesia, conquest has been described as "exceptionally violent."[2] Like all colonial states, law and order is a primary preoccupation of government. Provincial and district administrators form the backbone of the colonial administration and enjoy extensive discretion, for example, to arrest or punish according to security laws or emergency regulations. Administrators are endowed with paramilitary and quasi-judicial powers in order to contain African political activity. State repression, however, tends to convert peaceful political resistance into more militant forms, often culminating in full-fledged wars of national liberation. The experiences of Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia in the 1970s indicate that settler colonialism is vulnerable to peasant-based guerilla insurgency. A semblance of administrative control outside population centers can only be maintained by increasing the "militarization" of civilian administration and, ultimately, by enforcing martial law and accepting retreat.

Finally, the state in settler colonial societies is relatively large and engages in extensive intervention into the economy. In contrast to the assertions of settler ideology, the economies of settler colonies are not exclusively based on the principle of free enterprise. Settlers have historically sought state intervention to ensure for themselves the preferential allocation of land and labor, as well as the social services of the state. The areas where public enterprise are considered most appropriate include the marketing of agricultural produce, usually at guaranteed or subsidized prices; the provision of transport and energy infrastructure, in part to encourage private investment in industry; and the production of capital and intermediate goods in sectors that private investors do not find attractive. The functions of the settler colonial state thus extend well beyond the simple enforcement of law and order and the extraction of taxes; a leading role in capital formation and direct production is quite common. Thus at the time of decolonization the settler colonial state is already large and its posture already "developmental" in the restricted sense that the state has a hand in the stimulation of economic activity. Indeed, settler colonialism is associated with the emergence of a diverse, sophisticated, and, with the exception of African agriculture, integrated form of economic growth. It is no contradiction to say that wide state intervention contributes to the evolution of capitalism, if one understands this to be capitalism of the statist type as much as of the free enterprise type.

[1] Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 4 (1976): 599.

[2] Robin H. Palmer, "War and Land in Rhodesia in the 1890's," in *War and Society in Africa: Ten Studies,* ed. Bethwell A. Ogot (London: Frank Cass, 1972), p. 85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Size

Rhodesia is no exception to the commonplace observation that the impact of the state on society is on the rise. A public service was established earlier in Southern Rhodesia than in territories colonized by the British elsewhere in Africa; it thus had a longer time to grow and to develop special characteristics. The nucleus of the public service was drawn initially from the employees of the British South Africa Company (BSAC), an arrangement favored by the imperial government because it provided low-cost administration. The public service always operated with a good measure of autonomy from the metropole, as, for example, after 1898 when public servants were made directly responsible to the BSAC administrator, and after 1923 with the advent of settler self-government. In 1923, the government seemed small and simple, employing just over 2000 settlers and comprising only six administrative departments. Yet compared with the settler population of 33,620 at that time, or with the 1500 administrators responsible for Nigeria at the peak of British rule, the early administrative presence was relatively substantial.

Over time, the public sector became a major producer of goods and services, and the public service became a major employer of both whites and blacks. The legislative framework of settler colonialism was laid in the 1930s with the apportionment of land by race and the acceptance of state responsibility for energy, transport, and agricultural marketing. By 1941 the number of public employees had doubled and the administrative sector outstripped agriculture and rivaled manufacturing as the largest employer of whites. World War II required special measures to mobilize resources and regulate the economy, many of which became permanent after 1945. Industrial expansion during the Central African Federation in the 1950s called for heavy public investment in energy infrastructure and basic industries. But perhaps the greatest thrust of expansion in the public sector occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s. In response to economic sanctions and civil war the government adopted a more direct role in the management of the economy.[3] The government sought to reduce economic uncertainty, for example, by adopting import and exchange regulations to control manufacturing and by establishing quotas and subsidies to maintain and diversify commercial agriculture.

One conventional indicator of the extension of the public domain is the growth of the government budget. In Rhodesia, the budget grew from R$ 204.7 million (US$ 317 million) in 1969 to R$ 802.5 million (US$ 1245 million) in 1978, an average increase of about 30 percent per year (Table 1). Expenditures on education and health more than tripled during the period of Rhodesian Front rule,

[3] Peter S. Harris, "Regression and Inertia in the Rhodesian Fiscal Structure—A Comment on the 1972 Budget," *Rhodesian Journal of Economics* 6, no. 2 (1972): 13–14; Ian M. Hume, "Economic Management," mimeograph (Salisbury, Zimbabwe: Whitsun Foundation, October 1977), pp. 1, 9, 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
Budget Account of Central Government, 1969–1978
(R$ million)

	1969	1972	1975	1978
Expenditure				
General administration and defense	58.0	73.5	150.0	340.1
Education and health	50.5	69.4	106.1	141.6
Social and recreational services	6.0	6.9	11.7	16.8
Housing and townships	2.9	3.2	5.3	3.4
Economic services	57.2	71.0	115.1	210.3
Contributory pensions	6.3	9.5	14.5	39.4
Public debt transactions	21.3	26.3	32.5	47.2
Other expenditure	2.5	2.6	3.5	3.7
Total Expenditure	204.7	262.3	438.6	802.5
Less: revenue	192.4	252.2	436.3	573.1
Budget account deficit	12.2	10.2	2.3	229.4

Source: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, 1979* (Salisbury: Government Printer, April 1979), p. 18.

but grew at a slower rate—18 percent per year—than the budget as a whole. The largest and fastest growing category of expenditures was "general administration and defense" which increased well over five times between 1969 and 1979; this constituted average annual increases of 49 percent over the whole period and 61 percent for the period after 1972. Apart from inflation, one can assume that these increases were related to the war; the minister of finance described the 1979–80 budget, of which 37 percent was allocated directly to defense, as "unashamedly a war budget."[4] Nevertheless, it is probable that budget growth, particularly in the period before 1972, also reflected the universal tendency for bureaucracies to expand, not only with new programs, but with increased expenditures on overhead and maintenance.[5]

The growth of the government budget should not be seen in isolation from trends in the expansion and contraction of the Rhodesian economy. Between 1964 and 1974 public expenditures remained at a fairly constant 20 to 23 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Between 1974 and 1978, however, when public expenditures mushroomed, the GDP declined approximately 13 percent in real terms. When adjusted to 1965 prices, public administration was one of the only sectors of the economy in which the earlier growth trends were maintained. Over the last four years for which figures are available, the government budget rose as a proportion of GDP from 23 to 38 percent. This rapid jump necessitated unprecedented levels of foreign borrowing and broke the pattern of

[4] *Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series* (Exeter, England) (July–August 1979): 5195.

[5] B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Longman, Inc., 1978), pp. 22–23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
Public Service Employment and Earnings, 1969–1978

	1969	1972	1975	1978
Number in Employment (thousands)				
Public Administration	37.6	40.1	48.9	68.6
Education	30.9	31.9	36.0	34.8
Health	10.2	12.1	13.5	14.7
Total, Public Service	78.7	84.1	98.4	118.1
Total, Economy	835.4	953.8	1054.5	991.6
Earnings (R $ million)				
Public Administration	49.0	65.8	109.1	215.2
Education	31.6	42.7	64.5	85.8
Health	11.1	16.1	24.4	34.7
Total, Public Service	91.7	124.6	198.0	335.7
Total, Economy	514.2	699.4	1050.0	1330.3

Source: Zimbabwe Rhodesia, *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, 1979* (Salisbury: Government Printer, April 1979), p. 21.

balanced or surplus budgeting favored by the government in previous years. The growth in public expenditures in the late 1970s was a response to unusual circumstances; a return to normality would probably find the central government budget readjusted to the more constant proportion of earlier years.

A measurement based on the size of the government budget is likely to underestimate the impact of the public sector as a whole because the budget derives only from the current-account activities of the central government. Once loan-account activities are included, plus the expenditures of public enterprises and local governments, the impact of the public sector can be seen to be even larger. Calculations made in 1972 put the central government current- and loan-account expenditures at 31 percent of GDP, public enterprises at 12 percent, and local government at 6 percent.[6] A conservative estimate, based on these figures and discounted for possible double counting, thus held the public sector responsible for at least 40 percent of the total expenditures in the economy. There is therefore little doubt that the state in Rhodesia is large by any standards. Although governments in the developed world commonly control upward of 30 percent of GDP, those in the underdeveloped world rarely control more than 16 percent.[7]

There are other meaningful measures of size and growth relevant here: the absolute numbers of government employees, government employees as a proportion of the total work force, and the government wage bill as a proportion of the total wage bill for the economy. These statistics can be used to examine the

[6] Duncan G. Clarke, "The Growth and Economic Impact of the Public Service of Rhodesia," *Rhodesian Journal of Economics* 6, no. 3 (1972): 50–52.

[7] Alexander Radian, "Resource Mobilization in Poor Countries: Implementing Tax Policies" (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, 1977), p. iv.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

characteristics of the public service as distinct from the public sector as a whole. In 1964 the public service—defined here as public administration, health, and education—employed just over 40,000 people. According to official figures, public-service employment almost doubled to 78,000 by 1969 and almost tripled to 118,000 by 1978 (Table 2). This level of employment made for a public-service wage bill of R$ 335.7 million (US$ 520 million) in 1978, which constituted almost exactly one-quarter of the total earnings in the Rhodesian economy. It should be noted that public-service earnings in 1978 included make-up pay for civilians on military duty, an expense that will presumably be reduced with the advent of political independence. Nonetheless, the new Zimbabwean government will inherit a sizable public service comprising more than twenty ministries, almost forty specialized departments, and well over 100,000 employees. The government is the largest single institutional employer in the country, providing work to one out of eight wage earners.

For the most part, the size and growth of the state are matters that fall beyond the purview of policymakers. Inherited structures and growth trends will surely prescribe the range and impact of public choice. Most initiatives to manipulate the size of the public sector or public service for policy purposes will thus be at the margin. Whether state intervention is maintained, reduced, or expanded from present levels will depend on the interplay of two factors: the ideology and development strategy of the new Zimbabwean government; and the capacity of the government to mobilize resources for development.

The new government will face pressing demands for employment opportunities and social services from groups excluded under settler colonialism. In the absence of other institutions for the representation of popular interests, the onus for redressing uneven distributions of wealth will fall mainly on the state. The trend in other independent African countries has been for the state to take on more, not fewer, responsibilities, and this trend is likely to be duplicated in Zimbabwe. The precise number and kind of new tasks, however, will in part be defined according to a priori ideological preferences. Of greatest importance, ideology will influence whether redistribution of wealth is effected out of the fruits of future growth or out of a reallocation of existing assets. The central questions for the political economy of Zimbabwe pertain to the ownership and control of productive resources, notably land and industry. Ideology is also likely to influence development planning with regard to questions of the distribution of social services. A range of choice is available, for example, in the content of health programs or educational curricula, as well as in the location of such services vis-à-vis population centers or outlying areas, or vis-à-vis different target groups in society. The answers that policymakers find to these questions will fix the size of the Zimbabwean state for some time to come.

Whatever regime of ideas ultimately prevails, the long-term development prospects of Zimbabwe will hinge upon whether productivity in agriculture and industry can be maintained and increased at the same time as redistribution is undertaken. If production remains in private hands the government will have to design tax and price policies, as well as other regulations and incentives, to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

encourage production of surpluses but limit their consumption or export. If the state intervenes to operate all or part of the "commanding heights of the economy," then the challenge facing policymakers will be to design work arrangements that are simultaneously nonexploitative and productive. All other things being equal, the output of the Zimbabwe economy will have to grow at a minimum of 3.8 percent per annum in real terms, simply to keep pace with population growth and to maintain living standards and social services at present levels.

Development performance in Zimbabwe will thus rest on the capacity of the state not only to set goals but to mobilize economic resources. Revenue for public capital investment and recurrent expenditure can be drawn from four sources: the foreign private sector (for example, investment by multinational enterprises, loans from commercial banks); the foreign public sector (for example, loans or grants from development assistance agencies, bilateral and multilateral); the domestic private sector (for example, investment by settler and African entrepreneurs); and the domestic public sector (for example, taxation, profits from public enterprises). Almost all development strategies are mixed strategies in which some combination of these four sources can be found. The size of the state depends upon the proportion of development resources mobilized by the domestic public sector and the relationships in which this sector stands to other sectors.

Zimbabwe may be in the fortunate position of having the opportunity to benefit from substantial flows from all four directions. Foreign private investment and foreign development assistance are likely to be forthcoming in the wake of international diplomatic recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions. The availability of private investment will demand a quick and clearly formulated policy response; if the government wishes to attract venture capital, it will have to provide not only political stability but clear signals to investors. As for foreign aid, the proven institutional and productive capacity of Zimbabwe may well provide attractive incentives to donors. The decisive factor here is less likely to be domestic policy decisions than the foreign policy adopted by the new government in the Southern African region and the wider world. On the other hand, Zimbabwe's relative prosperity compared with her poorer neighbors might inhibit aid flows from donors who profess a basic human needs philosophy.[8] The two areas in which development assistance can be expected are refugee relief in the immediate term and rural development including agricultural resettlement in the longer term. The new government will not be bound to finance high levels of defense spending out of foreign borrowing from South Africa, although general budgetary support from that source may prove difficult to replace. At minimum, too, it should be possible after independence to eliminate the cutbacks in social-service expenditures necessitated by the military effort.

[8] United States Agency for International Development, *Development Needs and Opportunities for Cooperation in Southern Africa: Zimbabwe* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1979), p. 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this will enhance the availability to the state of funding for development. On the negative side, domestic public revenues may be reduced in a number of ways. If foreign exchange controls are not retained, Zimbabwe may well experience a flight of capital pent up by controls over the past fifteen years. The government will probably forego some proportion of revenue from income tax—now 44 percent of public revenues and paid primarily by white settlers—depending on the number of jobs vacated by emigration that go unfilled. Sales tax on consumer goods—which rose from 9 to 24 percent of revenues in the last decade—falls disproportionately in low-income families and is likely to be slashed by a new government. Whether reductions in tax revenues can be offset by increases in corporate tax rates will depend on broader policy choices concerning the provision of incentives or disincentives to private investment. Zimbabwe will also inherit a number of unprofitable public corporations (Rhodesia Railways, agricultural-marketing boards) which will absorb substantial government subsidies for the foreseeable future.[9] Evidence also suggests that the gross operating profits of the successful public enterprises have declined over the last four years, though profits may recover once growth is restored to the economy.[10] The new government will also be asked to bear responsibility for servicing international debts incurred after the unilateral declaration of independence and during the post-1974 period of deficit financing.

On balance, and mainly because of accessibility to new sources of foreign exchange, the Zimbabwean government will probably be slightly better placed than either its predecessors or other new African governments to mobilize resources for development. As such there will be few material constraints on the continued growth of the public sector and the public service in the 1980s. Popular demands for social services will probably be met with higher levels of public spending. Employment opportunities will also be required, not least within the public service itself. Because foreign exchange as a proportion of total public revenues will probably rise, however, the self-sufficiency of the Rhodesian economy may be reduced and the capacity of the state to design and manage an independent development strategy will be tested. From the outset, government policy options will be constrained by the need to maintain and increase productivity at home and by the need to avoid indebtedness and dependence abroad.

Organization

No systematic investigation has been made of the public-policy process in Rhodesia; that is, about the ways in which government decisions were made and implemented in the past. It can be assumed with certainty, however, that the

[9] Zimbabwe Rhodesia, *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, 1978* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1979), p. 12.

[10] Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, *Proposals for a Five Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1979), p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

process was centralized, for such was the organizational context for the legislation and administration of policy. Settler politics gave rise to a party system in which a single party was dominant: the United Federal party (UFP) in the 1950s and the Rhodesian Front (RF) in the 1960s and 1970s. Policymaking in the UFP was "almost dictatorial," being limited to prime minister and cabinet, whereas backbenchers from the party caucus were more influential in the RF.[11] In the absence of an opposition capable of forming a viable government, however, policy choice under both regimes was circumscribed by the narrow parameters of conflict within the ruling party. This meant that the "debate" over public policy focused only on alternative means to a given end, namely, the preservation of the structures of settler colonialism.

Within the apparatus of the public service, decision making and policy implementation followed a similar pattern. Central control long took precedence over client participation as the main principle of administrative organization. Because of its vast territory and large African population, however, administrative control in Zimbabwe proved difficult to maintain without the decentralization of at least some authority. For the most part, though, this took the form of a deconcentration of decision making to field agents within the central government bureaucracy; only limited and tentative devolution of decision making to elected local institutions was ever permitted. In recent times, decentralization was circumscribed by the RF caucus determination that "all local governments, whether European or African, are and will remain subservient to central government."[12]

The centralized manner in which public institutions operated can be illustrated with reference to past policies for rural development and urban settlement. In the rural areas, elected African Councils chaired by salaried chiefs were supposed to assume responsibility for development tasks such as primary education, preventive health care, and feeder roads. In practice, chiefs and councils were regularly bypassed by the principal field agents of the state, the district commissioners (D.C.s) whose task was defined as the coordination of government functions in the locality.[13] D.C.s had the final say over most council business: the validation of decisions of chiefs, the flow of financial resources from the center, and the inculcation of "a proper understanding of the disciplinary and penalizing influences of government."[14] Moreover, by the early 1970s, the membership of new councils was determined not by election but by appointment after consultation between chiefs and D.C.s. In practice, too, African Councils were able to take over few functions. Many national projects

[11] Larry Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 91–109.

[12] Rhodesian Front, "Provincialization," mimeograph (Salisbury, 1974), p. 1.

[13] Michael Bratton, *Beyond Community Development: The Political Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978), pp. 25–34.

[14] Rhodesia, Prime Minister's Office, *Local Government and Community Development: The Role of Ministries and Coordination* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 8–11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for rural development—irrigation schemes, rural industries, and main and branch roads—remained beyond their purview. Between 1962 and 1973 fewer than half the primary schools slated for transfer actually came under the control of local authorities. Thus the prefectoral system of administration which vested extensive powers in the hands of central appointees was not effectively altered by decentralization reforms.

In the urban areas, despite the presence of a large and permanent African population, the transfer of government functions and decision-making powers to the locality was even more limited. Urban African residential areas were regarded, according to a former minister, as "minors, as it were, under a guardian who arranges their affairs."[15] Only in selected, small, and outlying African residential areas was decision making devolved to elected township boards in the 1970s. In the large African townships of Salisbury and Bulawayo, an older system was retained in which advisory boards were permitted to offer advice to white municipalities but could make no decisions of their own. Even the new township boards enjoyed only limited powers because municipalities continued to withhold functions in which large capital sums were involved, such as the provision of housing, water, and lighting services.[16] Until the end of 1979, changes to the prevailing distribution of government powers and functions were blocked by entrenched clauses in the Internal Settlement constitution. Thereafter, an official intention was announced to unify urban local government and to open the way for direct majority representation and control of municipal councils, a policy direction that the new government will also pursue.[17]

In sum, authority was distributed by the settler colonial state in Rhodesia according to a clear formula: central government retained the prerogative for economic development and state security, whereas local governments were permitted to take on limited responsibility for social welfare. Because economic development was concentrated in the towns and on the farmland where settlers lived, this arrangement was not likely to bring development to Africans. The Trust Lands and the African urban townships served as labor "reserves" or "dormitories" to the parts of the economy controlled by whites. Each had rapidly growing populations and increasing demands for social-welfare services. Yet neither area enjoyed the concentrated local economic activity that could provide an adequate surplus for private investment or an adequate tax base for effective local government. Indeed, the distribution of government functions in Rhodesia had the appearance of being an abdication by central government of responsibility for the welfare of the majority of its population. In addition, the question arises as to whether a redistribution of government functions alone, in the absence of a development strategy aimed at economic transformation, would have any appreciable effect on rural and urban poverty.

[15] Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates*, 11 August 1970, col. 1461.

[16] Eric Gargett, *The Administration of Transition: African Urban Settlement in Rhodesia* (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1977), pp. 83–102.

[17] *The Herald* (Salisbury, Zimbabwe), 7 December 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Within the context of settler colonialism, the Rhodesian public service had the capacity to mobilize resources for the purpose of reaching policy goals with dispatch. Effectiveness can be surmised from the fact that, until the mid-1970s, the state enjoyed the capacity to enforce policies in the face of widespread popular resistance. For example, the establishment of African Councils was not a universally accepted policy among the rural population, yet the then Ministry of Internal Affairs was able to triple the number of councils between 1962 and 1972. The "protected villages" policy was among the most resented actions of the settler state, yet at its peak in 1978 it effected the resettlement of 750,000 people. Similarly, the organization of the April 1979 election bespoke a state with substantial residual capacity to project civil and military authority in support of a limited objective.

The authority of the settler state has always been hollow, however, in the sense that it rested on central control rather than on organized popular support. No amount of raw effectiveness could implement such policies as the Land Husbandry Act, abandoned in the late 1950s in the face of peasant resistance to the consolidation of land-holdings under individual tenure. With the inception of the guerilla war in 1972, the central authorities faced mounting difficulty in penetrating and maintaining an administrative presence in the rural periphery. As new African Councils were formed, for example, so others were shut down by guerillas. By August 1979, ninety-one councils and 1500 rural schools—in each case more than one-third of the total—were out of commission. Health, veterinary, and agricultural extension services were interrupted on a wide scale in the Trust Lands, as were private commerce and transport. Over 70 of the 250 protected villages were dismantled and their occupants returned to the superintendence of the guerillas. The response of the state to the breakdown of administration in rural areas was to shift policy away from attempts at decentralization to the reassertion of direct rule from the center. This occurred in two phases. The first, between 1972 and 1978, involved the extension of the paramilitary and quasi-judicial powers of field administrators, for example, to impose collective fines, to inflict corporal punishment, and to carry and use firearms. The Ministry of Home Affairs effectively became part of the Security Forces. The second phase began in September 1978 when martial law was declared. At this time, and with the subsequent extension of martial law to 95 percent of the country, the government acknowledged that regular civil administration had collapsed.

As a result of the breakdown of rural administration, the apparatus of the settler colonial state will not be inherited intact in Zimbabwe. The organizational connection between a centralized public service and the peasant population has been served. By contrast, the infrastructure of government at the center has not been a casualty of war. The new political leaders of Zimbabwe came to power with a truncated administrative organization at their disposal. Opportunities and constraints regarding reorganization or reform therefore are unlikely to be uniform between center and locality. The general problem will be that of reintegrating central government with government at the district level and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

below. One important issue here will be the extent to which guerilla political organization has been, and can be, institutionalized as an alternative administrative apparatus in the rural areas. The other important issue is the extent to which the policymaking process in the new Zimbabwe will complement or conflict with existing organizational arrangements. In general, there would appear to be greater opportunities for organizational innovation in the locality than at the center.

Contradictory forces for centralization and for decentralization are at work in shaping the morphology of the new state. On one hand, the ideologies of the liberation movements emphasize popular participation and decentralized decisions.[18] The limited evidence to date suggests that guerillas have been successful at mobilizing peasant support for political purposes, but less so for economic and administrative purposes. The terrain of Zimbabwe and the tactics of the Rhodesian military seem to have inhibited the establishment of a wide and permanent network of self-help structures in the countryside that could serve as a nucleus for state building. Nonetheless, the ZANU(PF) government may well grasp the reconstruction of rural amenities after independence as a chance to apply revolutionary perspectives to development tasks. It is probable that the government will choose to organize agricultural resettlement and rural public works along lines of collective ownership and institutionalized participation. There will be pressures, especially from the middle ranks of the liberation movements, to include in Zimbabwe's development strategy the experience gained in executing the war and administering refugee and training camps. While practice may be less participatory and decentralized than ideology asserts, emphasis can still be expected to be given to mass mobilization. An organization based on the guerilla experience is likely to be promoted as a model for public-service reform that is particularly relevant to local administration and rural development.

At the center, however, the advantages of retaining a strong state will weigh heavily against such preferences. A centralized public service and policy process may well survive the transition to independence. The new government will be preoccupied at the outset with the consolidation of political power. Zimbabwe became independent in the face of fragmentation of political allegiances and with rivalries among groups inflamed by violent conflict. Under these conditions the new government will be concerned above all to ensure its own survival. The decentralization of decision making could well be perceived as adding fuel to the flame of political fragmentation and, as such, could well be deferred or even dropped. Had the first Zimbabwean government been a loose coalition of diverse political groups, political leaders would probably have devoted primary attention to maneuvering for legislative advantage. This not only would have permitted the public service to act relatively independently but also would have reduced the probability of structural reforms in the economy and administration. Since the first government is headed by a single party with an absolute

[18] Patriotic Front, "British Proposals for a Settlement," mimeograph (Maputo, Mozambique, September 1977), clause 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legislative majority, the likelihood is increased that political leaders could move quickly to consolidate power at the center by declaring a one-party state. Such a move would facilitate greater, though not absolute, central control over the bureaucracy and perhaps even permit structural reforms. A one-party government will seek popular acclaim for its policies; whether broad and meaningful participation can be institutionalized, however, is the great challenge.

There is thus no guarantee that the public-policy process in Zimbabwe will depart markedly from precedents established by a dominant party and centralized bureaucracy during the settler colonial period. Single-party states in Africa take various forms, depending on the relationship between party and state and on the distribution of authority within those institutions. There is every reason to think that ZANU(PF) will prove not only to be more than a transitory electoral phenomenon but also to have considerably more organizational effectiveness than the now defunct United African National Council of Bishop Muzorewa. Within the party, however, major policy decisions appear to be made by a relatively select group in, or on the fringes of, the ZANU(PF) Central Committee. Furthermore, the amount of political competition permitted will depend upon whether the dominant party can penetrate, organize, and draw support from all regions of the country. At present, although ZANU(PF) has a wide electoral mandate, all political parties in Zimbabwe have core regional identities. The politicization of the public service will depend on whether its benefits are seen to outweigh its costs. Efforts to balance new norms of public-service neutrality might be appropriate in a situation of political fragmentation, but this will have to be weighed against the need for clear political direction. As for the distribution of government functions, African states have rarely succeeded in launching active and self-sufficient local government institutions. Instead, variations of the colonial prefectoral system have usually been adopted, and authority remains within strong public institutions centered in the capital city.[19]

The test for Zimbabwe will be whether a settler colonial state can be reorganized so as to balance centralization with decentralization. Experience elsewhere seems to suggest that development performance does not result from public administration that is either exclusively top-down or exclusively bottom-up, but from a network of strong and popular institutions that are linked together.[20] Insofar as the strength of the center derives from the weakness of the locality, the state will remain an instrument of control but not of development.

Personnel

For a long time Rhodesia experienced shortages of skilled personnel in the public and private sectors. In part this was a function of the level of develop-

[19] Louis A. Picard, "District Councils in Botswana—A Remnant of Local Autonomy," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 2 (1979): 285–86.

[20] Norman Uphoff and Milton Esman, *Local Organization for Rural Development: Analysis of Asian Experience* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, 1974), p. xii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment in the economy but, more importantly, was the artificial outcome of imposed political constraints. One of the contradictions of settler colonialism is that a large pool of skilled personnel is foregone by adherence to a division of labor along racial lines.

Although the Public Services Act was couched in nonracial terms, recruits to decision-making and supervisory posts were in the past drawn mainly from settler and immigrant communities. Restrictions on training and employment opportunities for Africans in Rhodesia were severe in the private sector, but severer still in the public sector. The shortage of skilled personnel was one result; posts in the public service were never fully subscribed.[21] Over the last two decades vacancies fluctuated between 5 and 10 percent of the establishment and were greatest in administrative and technical grades. The higher wage and salary rates offered in the private sector also contributed to the shortage of skilled personnel and to rapid turnover of staff. Six to seven years was the average career of an establishment officer.[22]

The public service in 1978 provided jobs to about one in eight of the wage and salary earners in Rhodesia, making it in aggregate terms an important employer. This importance is magnified once skill levels are considered. All established positions in the administrative, executive, and technical groups—together comprising 16,186 positions or 16 percent of total public-service employment in 1975[23]—require personnel with high- and middle-level skills. Two indicators can be used to depict the concentration of skilled personnel in the public service. First, public servants earn a higher proportion of total wages and salaries than their numbers alone would suggest. In the period up to 1972, that is, before military make-up pay began to distort the size of public-service earnings, public servants constituted 9 percent of the workforce but took home 18 percent of wages and salaries (Table 2). Moreover, according to one estimate, in the late 1960s the government employed about 33 percent of the total number of individuals who paid income tax.[24] On the assumption that tax payment reflects expertise, the conclusion can be drawn that the public service absorbs about one in three of the high- and middle-level skills in Rhodesia.

The fact that the public service in Rhodesia is a preserve of white settlers is not immediately apparent from aggregate personnel statistics. At present, blacks outnumber whites in the public service by almost three to one. Of total employees in public administration, education, and health in 1977, 74 percent were African and 26 percent were non-African (Table 3). Moreover, this seemingly high level of Africanization has prevailed over the last fifteen years: the

[21] Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 62–71; Rhodesia, *Annual Report of the Public Services Board* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1972), pp. 6–8; Rhodesia, Ministry of Internal Affairs, *Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1973), p. 12.

[22] G.B. Thorpe, "An Aspect of the Competition for Scarce Labour Between the Public and Private Sectors," *Rhodesian Journal of Economics* 5, no. 1 (1971): 27, 30.

[23] Rhodesia, *Detailed Establishment Tables* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1975), pp. ii–iii.

[24] Clarke, "The Growth and Economic Impact," p. 53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
Public Service Employment by Race, 1965-1977
(percent)

	African				European, Asian and "Coloured"			
	1965	1970	1974	1977	1965	1970	1974	1977
Public Administration	67.9	70.5	70.7	71.5	32.1	29.5	29.3	28.5
Education	79.7	78.7	79.2	80.6	20.3	21.3	20.8	19.4
Health	69.2	71.4	67.7	70.3	30.8	28.6	32.3	29.7
Total, Public Service	73.5	73.6	73.5	74.3	26.5	26.4	26.5	25.7
Public Service Employment (thousands)	50.1	59.4	67.0	83.0	18.0	21.3	24.1	28.7

Source: Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, *Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics* (Salisbury: Government Printer, April 1978).

proportion for 1963 was almost identical. Two qualifications, however, are required. First, Africanization in the public service is lower than that in the economy as a whole, where Africans constitute 88 percent of all employees. Second, Africans in the public service, reflecting the general pattern that holds in other sectors, are concentrated in jobs of low rank, salary, and skill.

In the absence of comprehensive official statistics on the racial composition of the public service, all that can be offered is a review and comparison of estimates. In 1974 Africans were thought to occupy fewer than 300 established posts—less than 5 percent of the total—none of which was "at the senior levels in any group."[25] An alternate calculation suggested that of the 10,000 tenured positions in 1972, only 829 (8 percent) were held by Africans and "only three of these could be considered of senior rank."[26] The most generous estimate implied African advancement into higher grades by 1978, at which time 11 percent of established posts and 14 percent of nonestablished posts were thought to have black occupants.[27] But in 1978 the co-minister of the public service stated that there were 1400 African officers in established posts and some 1300 in the most senior group of nontenured employees.[28] On the assumption that the establishment stood by then at over 16,000, one can only conclude that at that time Africans still occupied fewer than 10 percent of senior ranks.

Whichever data are used, it is evident that Africans have been systematically excluded from the upper and middle levels of the public service. The distribu-

[25] Ashley J. Dixon, "No Room for Complacency: The Public Service in Rhodesia," *Rhodesian Journal of Economics* 8, no. 3 (1974): 124.

[26] African-American Scholars Council, *Zimbabwe-Namibia: Anticipation of Economic and Humanitarian Needs* (Washington, D.C.: African-American Scholars Council Final Report, March 1977), pp. 54-55.

[27] Anthony Hawkins cited in Colin Stoneman, *Skilled Labour and Future Needs* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978), p. 20.

[28] Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates*, 31 August 1978, col. 910.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of personnel by race varies, however, within the public service from department to department. The general rule is that ministries which serve a black clientele have been more fully Africanized and at higher levels. There are more Africans at higher levels in education, and to a lesser extent in health, than elsewhere. Some senior posts—hospital medical officer, senior nursing sister, provincial education officer, teacher training college principal—are occupied by a handful of blacks. For many years the only occupation readily open to African graduates from the University of Rhodesia was teaching; this was the destination of between one-third and one-half of African graduates between 1968 and 1974. A career elsewhere in the public service has been for the most part inaccessible: whereas 16 percent of white graduates secured careers in public administration, the figure for blacks was 4 percent. A 1973 manpower survey found that only seven African graduates were employed in extension work in the Ministry of Agriculture and that the annual output of four or five new black graduates was unlikely to be absorbed.[29] Since that time the Ministry of Agriculture has recruited more blacks, particularly for extension work among the small number of progressive farmers in the former African Purchase Areas. Parastatal agencies may be even more racially exclusive than the mainstream of the public service. If Rhodesia Railways and Road Motor Services are accurate guides, then the parastatal sector is without African personnel at the management and specialist levels.[30]

In recent years, notably since the March 1978 Internal Settlement, discrimination against African public servants was reduced. For example, some African teachers were given security of tenure in 1975, and minimum salaries for all primary school teachers were equalized in mid-1978. Recruitment of Africans for posts previously held exclusively by whites was stepped up, for example, with the first intake of blacks for training as district officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The 1972 Rhodesian Front policy to recruit white married females to established posts was apparently deemphasized and Africans were called upon to substitute for settler personnel on military duty. Advancement by this means was probably more typical of the private sector than the public sector and reflected the economic imperative of shortages of skilled personnel rather than a political commitment to black advancement. Nonetheless, the steady "leakage of management skills and personnel" due to white emigration opened up opportunities for qualified Africans at all levels of administration.[31] In August 1979 the secretary of the Public Service Commission announced a 50 percent rise in the number of Africans employed in established public-service posts over the preceding year-and-a-half.[32] If so, the estimate of the proportion of blacks in

[29] J.P. Danckwerts, "Graduate Manpower Survey 1971–73," mimeograph (Salisbury: University of Rhodesia, 1973), p. 10.

[30] Thorpe, "An Aspect of the Competition," p. 29.

[31] Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, *Proposals for a Five year Programme*, 1979, p. 2; *The Herald* (Salisbury, Zimbabwe), 21 September 1978.

[32] *The Herald* (Salisbury, Zimbabwe), 19 August 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such positions at the time of Zimbabwean independence may have to be revised upward to about 15 percent.

Public personnel administration has been such a contentious issue in Rhodesia that incremental reform of the type introduced under the Internal Settlement was likely to fall short of a lasting solution. The terms and intensity of the dispute over public-service hiring and promotion did not change during the period from March 1978 to December 1979. White parliamentarians still advocated "the maintenance of standards" and insisted that merit was the only criterion for advancement; black parliamentarians replied, as before, that qualified Africans were barred from appointment and promotion to senior posts.[33] So politicized was the issue that it became entangled in the negotiations over an independence constitution for Zimbabwe. The Internal Settlement constitution, which came into effect in June 1979, provided for the creation of an "independent" Public Service Commission (PSC) to regulate organization and personnel.[34] The majority of the PSC membership was to be drawn from public servants with at least five years of experience at the level of ministerial undersecretary or higher, a provision that effectively eliminated blacks. The PSC was required to appoint only the "most efficient and suitable" candidates to vacant posts. The Hove affair of April 1978, in which a government co-minister was dismissed for advocating a program of "affirmative action" in the public service and police force, indicated the limitations that the Internal Settlement placed on social change. A similar example was the failure of Bishop Muzorewa in June 1979 to secure the appointment of his own candidate for secretary to the cabinet in face of opposition from the Public Service Commission.

The Zimbabwe independence constitution offers a loosening of restrictions on public-service recruitment. Although a PSC is retained, blacks chosen for their "experience in administration or their professional qualifications or their suitability otherwise" can now constitute a controlling majority.[35] Merit remains as the main criterion for recruitment and promotion but the PSC must "take account of any general policy . . . designed to achieve a suitable representation of all groups."[36] In terms of guaranteeing the right to remit public-service pensions outside the country without taxes or deductions, however, a measure that would benefit settlers almost exclusively, the two constitutions were effectively identical. While continuing to safeguard minority interests, the independence constitution did for the first time adjust the principles of personnel administration to permit at least the possibility of extensive Africanization. Much depends on how the government, the PSC, and the courts interpret the latitude for black advancement that remains constitutionally allowable.

[33] Rhodesia, *Parliamentary Debates*, 31 August 1978, cols. 897-912.

[34] Rhodesia, *Proposals for a New Constitution for Rhodesia* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1979), p. 6.

[35] Zimbabwe Rhodesia, *Proposals for Independence* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1979), pp. 11-12.

[36] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whether, when, and how extensive Africanization will occur also depends on the general approach that the new government of Zimbabwe takes to manpower planning in the economy. Like Kenya, the government might choose to preserve the existing structure of skills, and, in order to replace departing whites and meet projected demands for existing high- and middle-level expertise, emphasize the expansion of secondary and higher education. Alternatively, like Tanzania, the government might aim to match skills to the fulfillment of basic needs of rural dwellers, including employment, and therefore give more emphasis to primary and technical education. The recruitment, training, and style of public servants in Zimbabwe will be influenced by the type of general policy choices made.

On the positive side, the fact that Zimbabwe is to be decolonized twenty years later than most African countries means that relatively large numbers of Zimbabweans have gained education and work experience outside the country. The British Commonwealth Office estimates that 7000 Zimbabwean exiles hold college-level degrees. Even if all do not return, Zimbabwe will not be as desperately short of skills as were, for example, Zambia, Zaire, or Botswana. On the negative side, the experiences of Angola and Mozambique attest to the fact that armed struggle and the accession to power of liberation movements can result in a rapid exodus of whites which can have the effect of seriously disrupting production and essential services. This leaves a government with few options for development other than mass mobilization by means of an ideology of radical transformation of state and economy.

A few random observations can be offered with regard to these issues. It is clear that existing services in Zimbabwe could not be maintained in the event of an exodus of 90 percent of the settler community as occurred in Mozambique or Algeria. Nevertheless, a lower level of emigration—possibly as much as 20 percent—would cause strains and inefficiencies but would not cause complete administrative and economic collapse.[37] Zimbabweans from the exile community and from "the hidden reservoir of skills" within the country are capable of filling many generalist positions at the administrative and executive levels of the public service.[38] Moreover, the positions of certain categories of public-service personnel may be given priority for Africanization: white males of retirement age who are represented in the public service in disproportionate numbers; whites with employed spouses; nonspecialists recruited from abroad, usually from South Africa or Commonwealth countries. The long-standing shortage of technical skills, however, is unlikely to be ameliorated easily and probably will worsen. Posts requiring engineers, lawyers, accountants, physical planners, scientists, and artisans will be difficult to fill; the railways, for example, are

[37] Patriotic Front, *Zimbabwe Manpower Survey* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Patriotic Front, November 1978), vol. 2, p. 45 and vol. 3, p. 25.

[38] Great Britain, Commonwealth Secretariat, *The Immediate Manpower and Training Needs of an Independent Zimbabwe* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, June 1979), p. 31; Stoneman, *Skilled Labour*, pp. 11–12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

likely to be severely hit by continued shortages of engineers. Attention will also have to be paid to the maintenance of probity and professionalism among occupants of posts in financial administration in central and local governments. Past experience in Rhodesia and neighboring countries further suggests that personnel shortages can be expected in the areas where development needs are greatest, that is, in district administration, agricultural extension, and community development. Almost inevitably, and despite high costs in foreign exchange and domestic employment foregone, the new government will have to rely on expatriates on short-term contracts to fill some essential positions.

As for directions in manpower planning and training, ZANU(PF) has defined the provision of "technical skills and managerial knowledge" as a top planning priority.[39] The liberation movements provided training for cadres in lower-level administrative skills, for example, in the fields of health, agriculture, and customs and excise, but the need for further "crash training programs" is acknowledged. International agencies concur that manpower training is "the most critical development need"[40] and that Zimbabwe's large reservoir of educated people still lacks "the necessary training or practical experience in many key areas in the economy and public service."[41] By contrast, the first legislative program of the Muzorewa government nowhere mentioned the Africanization of the public service.[42] A Manpower Development and Training Authority was established in 1979 but had little visible impact in its first year of operation. The five-year development program inherited by the Muzorewa government from the Smith government pointed out that shortages of skilled personnel constitute "a critical bottleneck" but placed top priority for public investment on large-scale transport and energy infrastructure.[43]

Whether the public service in Zimbabwe becomes a representative institution is as much a political question as an administrative one. Further conflict can be expected over the recruitment and promotion of public personnel. White settlers have shown themselves willing to abdicate control of the legislative aspect of public policy, but may well balk at the transfer of administrative power. The bureaucracy, already politicized as a minority power base, may prove difficult to penetrate and reform, particularly if the new government seeks to retain white skills. That the public service will automatically perform as an instrument of development cannot be taken for granted. The test will come with the allocation of decision-making positions by the Public Service Commission. The rapidity with which the upper levels of the public service are staffed with personnel sympathetic to the new government will determine whether development policies can be put into effect. The new government is likely to find little reason to delay in the replacement of permanent secretaries, particularly in the "eco-

[39] Patriotic Front, *Zimbabwe Manpower Survey*, vol. 1, p. 8.
[40] USAID, *Development Needs*, pp. 73–77.
[41] Commonwealth Secretariat, *The Immediate Manpower*, p. v.
[42] *The Herald* (Salisbury, Zimbabwe), "The President's Speech," 27 June 1979.
[43] Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, *Proposals for a Five Year Programme*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic" ministries. By the same token, measures to guarantee adherence to new political goals, such as immediate and wholesale Africanization at middle levels of administration, would be self-defeating if they resulted in a dramatic decline in public-service efficiency.

Finally, the politics of personnel recruitment will not end with Africanization. If and when the principle of equity of representation by race is secured, Zimbabwean leaders may well be confronted with demands to represent other interests, for example, of ethnicity, class, or party affiliation. Undoubtedly there will be pressure on government to strike a regional balance in senior public-service appointments. In addition, the inheritance of a public service and parastatal salary structure geared to settler living standards could well be a bone of contention for the unemployed and other less fortunate social strata. This will be particularly true if the new public service is staffed and led by exiles with work experience abroad. Much will depend on whether Africanization is conceived to be a short-term measure to replace whites in existing positions or as a long-term measure to reconstruct the public service around a new organizational model. In any event, the challenge will be to devise procedures for public-service recruitment and promotion that balance appropriate formal qualifications with opportunity for advancement for all groups in Zimbabwe's plural society.

Conclusion

The type of public service useful for the preservation of settler colonial rule is likely to prove inadequate for the rapid social and economic development of a predominantly rural population. A hierarchical, skill-intensive, and authoritarian public service has proven in other postcolonial African situations to be an inappropriate instrument for the provision of basic human needs. Due to late decolonization, the familiar features of a colonial state will be inherited in intensified form in Zimbabwe. In addition, features peculiar to the settler colonial form will make themselves felt. It is within this unique and complex matrix of historical constraints that the new leadership will have to identify and create opportunities for change.

The transition to political independence in Zimbabwe is likely to preserve certain aspects of institutional inheritance and dissolve others. It takes no great insight to observe that policymakers will probably change what they can change and compromise on matters that remain.

The *size* of the state seems least subject to manipulation. It will almost certainly grow in relation to the rest of the economy. While the new leaders may move cautiously with regard to the nationalization of industry, for example, they will nonetheless acquire a battery of existing controls that already permit the government to exercise economic direction. A high level of interventionism will also impinge on the question of whether Zimbabwe will retain a position of relative autonomy in the global political economy. Government decisions will be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formative, for example, in influencing the extent of financial flows from the outside world and the conditions under which they occur.

The *organization* of the state will be more susceptible to reform in the locality than at the center and this is the level at which most urgent reconstruction, representation, and development are required. In the aftermath of war, the new government will probably move to expunge military components from civilian administration and use demobilized military units for rural reconstruction, as part of a general policy to centralize and consolidate power. The tendency to centralize, however, could come into conflict with commitments to broad popular participation. The possibility of introducing a bottom-up organizational perspective to balance the existing top-down approach will depend in large part on the rapidity with which military security and political stability can be attained. Peace in the rural areas and urban townships is a precondition for ZANU(PF) to take full advantage of opportunities won during the war and to realize its own version of development.

The *personnel* of the state will undergo the most dramatic change. Africanization is already under way and the future is only uncertain in terms of the precise proportions and strategic locations of African public servants. The temptation will be to make Africanization the "be all and end all" of public-service reform. There will be strong political pressures, domestic and international, to ensure the maintenance of institutional capacity along present lines. Settlers and their African allies will use the Public Service Commission to emphasize formal standards of recruitment, and international agencies will offer assistance for high-level manpower training, primarily to fill gaps in the existing structure of skills. There is little doubt too that public-service recruitment and activities will continue to be highly politicized. Now, however, the beneficiaries of patronage and public expenditures will include those who played a part in the struggle for political independence.

One Zimbabwean administrator has written: "A transfer of power that comes peacefully would definitely change most of the personnel, but hardly the socio-economic system; a transfer that occurs after significant guerrilla activity would have an even chance of doing a lot of questioning, but the extent to which the system actually changes would depend on the internal alignment of forces and, very likely, what happens during the transition period."[44] Structural reform—of the organization *of* the state, and of the organization of economic production *by* the state—will involve further political conflict. Whether Zimbabweans are ready for this depends upon whether the message of the liberation movements is adhered to by the leadership and has been widely and fully internalized by followers. In any event, structural reform will be difficult. Many observers of contemporary African politics have noted that the colonial

[44] J. Kombo Moyana "The Political Economy of Sanctions and Implications for Future Economic Policy," *Journal of Southern African Affairs* 2, no. 4 (1977): 515.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state has survived as an instrument of public administration. If this happened in nonsettler situations, how much more likely is it in the presence of the larger and stronger state of the settler colonial type?*

* An earlier version of this article was presented at a conference on "Zimbabwe's Economic Prospects" cosponsored by the Research Institute on International Change, Columbia University, and the Seven Springs Center in February 1980. The author wishes to acknowledge that helpful comments from Robin Dorff, Callisto Madavo, Dominic Mulaisho, and Terence Ranger were considered when writing the present version.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Targeting in Community Development

PAUL R. DOMMEL

In 1974 Congress enacted the Housing and Community Development Act establishing a block-grant program which consolidated seven discretionary grant programs for urban areas into a single program with the bulk of the funds distributed through a formula system. This community development block grant (CDBG) program was authorized for three years and subsequently extended for three years; the program is again up for renewal in 1980. Since the beginning of the program, the Brookings Institution has been monitoring the process and programmatic effects of the block grant in sixty-one jurisdictions. The findings of the first year of the program were reported in an earlier article.[1] A second article analyzed federal-local relations over a two-year period.[2] This article examines the distribution of program benefits to lower-income groups over the first four years of the program.

One of the most controversial issues of the CDBG program concerns social targeting, that is, the distribution of program benefits among income groups. Social-targeting provisions appear in two portions of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act. Section 104(b)(2) requires that participating jurisdictions give "maximum feasible priority to activities which will benefit low- and moderate-income families or aid in the prevention of slums and blight." Section 101(c) mandates that projects benefit "principally persons of

[1] Richard P. Nathan et al., "Monitoring the Block Grant Program for Community Development," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Summer 1977): 219.

[2] Richard P. Nathan and Paul R. Dommel, "Federal-Local Relations under Block Grants," *Political Science Quarterly* 93 (Fall 1978): 421.

PAUL R. DOMMEL is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution and director of its monitoring study of community development block grants. He is the author of *The Politics of Revenue Sharing* and has contributed to a number of books.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

low and moderate income." Although the act provided the legislative basis for social targeting, it did not establish a comprehensive legislative definition, leaving it to program administrators to give operational meaning to the terms.

When the program started, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) did not seek to define quantitatively the meaning of "maximum feasible priority" or "principally benefits." Consequently, there was neither a quantified floor or ceiling to guide a community nor any stated objective measure against which to evaluate the results of a community's social targeting. Thus, at the federal level, how much or how little social targeting was acceptable to or desired by the national administration was a matter of the policy preference of those administering the program. This issue became a source of considerable tension between HUD and the House of Representatives in 1977 when HUD Secretary Patricia R. Harris sought to direct a greater share of CDBG benefits to lower-income groups by specifying a level of such benefits that were to be included in a community's program. To the secretary it was a matter of giving priority to the social-targeting provisions already in the CDBG law. To the House the issue was twofold: none of the multiple objectives of the program should receive priority over coequal objectives; and establishing a fixed percentage of lower-income benefits was contrary to congressional intent and ran counter to another legislative goal, decentralized decision making.

Just one month after the inauguration of President Carter, Harris went before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development and stressed that she intended to administer the law to give more emphasis to the social-targeting provisions: "We will expect communities to direct development and housing programs toward low and moderate income citizens. I do not consider this to be just an objective of the block grant program—it is the highest priority of the program and we in the federal government must see to it that the thrust of the program serves that objective."[3] In October 1977 HUD proposed regulations requiring that "*all* community development funds are to be used for projects or activities which principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons."[4] However, HUD went on to propose that there could be exceptions for up to 25 percent of a community's grant for certain programs to prevent slums and blight and for projects designed to meet needs having a particular urgency. The proposed regulation, subject to public comment and final adoption by HUD, became known as the "75-25 rule." Generally, the proposal was supported by various public interest groups, neighborhood organizations, and civil rights groups. The principal resistance came from the House. One important opponent was House subcommittee Chairman Thomas Ashley (D-Ohio) who wrote two strong dissenting letters to Secretary Harris objecting to the 75 percent requirement which he said ran counter to legislative intent.

In his first letter, cosigned by Representative Garry Brown (R-Mich.), the

[3] U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, *Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Hearings*, Part 1, 95th Cong., 1st sess., February 1977, p. 9.

[4] *Federal Register*, vol. 42, no. 205, 25 October 1977, p. 56466 (emphasis added).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ranking minority member of the subcommittee, Ashley stated that "we do not concur in the requirement for a set percentage of funds at a minimum, to be spent for the single purpose of benefiting low- and moderate-income persons. . . . The placement of one purpose as more primary than another is neither consistent with the language of the statute nor with the legislative history."[5] In the second letter, signed only by Ashley, the language was stronger.

> It appears to me that the 75/25 regulation violates the basic concept of the program. It would move us back to a categorical approach we all recognize is undesirable. . . .
>
> . . . the conferees on at least three separate occasions reaffirmed the equality of the three purposes of the grants. With this overwhelming evidence I can only conclude from the Department's insistence on the 75/25 regulaton that it believes it can legislate on its own. This is a very grave situation and one that I and many of my colleagues on the Subcommittee will feel forced to explore with you.[6]

On 1 March 1978, HUD issued its final regulations: "Our intention is to carry out the statutory objective of benefiting low- and moderate-income persons in a strong and committed fashion. At the same time, we intend to be practical and flexible regarding documentation."[7] The final regulations required that "all projects and activities must *either* principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons, *or* aid in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight, *or* meet other community development needs having a particular urgency."[8] The regulations thus came to reflect the legislative language that had been insisted upon by the House—that social targeting was only one among several coequal national objectives.

Although the final regulations were less rigorous in their social-targeting requirements than were the proposed regulations, through directives to its field staff and through the process of developing the regulations, HUD signaled to recipient communities its clear intention that social targeting was to be a major thrust of the program. Even though HUD may not have got all that it wanted on the benefits issue, recipient communities could not readily ignore HUD's preferred policy on social targeting. The language of the legislation and the regulatory and application processes still made it possible for HUD to structure the program in a way that would give high priority to low- and moderate-income benefits.

Measuring Benefits

To analysts of social targeting the policy issue is only a part of the problem. Even if there were agreement on how much and what kind of social targeting

[5] Representatives Thomas L. Ashley and Garry Brown to HUD Secretary Patricia R. Harris, 4 November 1977, p. 1 (Ashley files).

[6] Representative Thomas L. Ashley to HUD Secretary Patricia R. Harris, 16 December 1977, p. 2 (Ashley files).

[7] *Federal Register*, vol. 43, no. 41, 1 March 1978, p. 8451.

[8] Ibid., p. 8461 (emphasis added).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were desirable, there remains the very difficult problem of measuring the result. Thus, even though the specific findings of research on the distribution of CDBG benefits are useful in illuminating issues, general patterns and trends, and some selective results, the problem of measurement is so complex that the findings should be treated cautiously. For this reason, this measurement approach is viewed as an estimation technique. Basically, the technique used established certain decision rules on the proportion of funds to be allocated as lower-income benefits. The proportions vary by the type of activity funded and the income characteristics of the area in which the project is located. On the basis of their informed judgments, however, the field researchers may alter the proportionality decision rules for any of the activities in the community's program.[9]

It must also be emphasized that the data are estimates of *intended*, not actual, allocations and benefits. The data are derived from grant applications approved by HUD and are not measures of expenditure results. The application largely reflects the distributional result of the local decision process. Thus, any shifts of funds that may have resulted because of HUD decisions after the initial approval, locally initiated changes, or problems in program implementation are not included in the analysis. The analysis covers forty-one jurisdictions (twenty-nine central cities and twelve suburban cities with over 50,000 populations).

Analytic Categories

For this analysis four income groups were established following the HUD method of using as the benchmark the 1970 median family income of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in which a jurisdiction is located. Using the SMSA median instead of the median of the recipient jurisdiction increases the number of eligible census tracts in communities below the SMSA median and decreases the number of eligible tracts in better-off jurisdictions. HUD adopted the SMSA standard at the outset to constrain the spreading of activities in better-off jurisdictions. The four income groups are as follows: low income—less than 50 percent of the SMSA median income; moderate income—51 to 81 percent of the SMSA median income; middle income—81 to 121 percent of the SMSA median income; and high income—121 percent or more of the SMSA median income. Two additional categories are included for allocating benefits: community-wide—activities in this category yield knowable direct benefits to the community as a whole but the benefits are nonincome specific (for example, allocations for testing the community water or widening of a downtown arterial street); and nonallocable—neither the programmatic nature nor the income group benefiting are known.

Because the income groups are relative to the SMSA in which they are

[9] For a full discussion of the methodology, see the appendix at the end of the article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

located, there is no single set of actual dollar ranges for the different groups. In an SMSA with a median annual family income of $10,000, the low-income group is below $5,000; in an SMSA with a median income of $12,000, the low-income group is below $6,000.

In the subsequent presentation of data the low- and moderate-income groups are put into a single "low-moderate" category and the middle and high groups are consolidated into a "middle-high" category. Given the methodological difficulties involved in benefits analysis, the number of categories was reduced.

The benefits measured are those received *directly when the project is completed* and do not include secondary or tertiary benefits. For example, in allocating income-group benefits of a housing rehabilitation project, the field associates considered only the income group of the prospective occupants; income groups not directly receiving benefits—for example, persons doing the repair work and the bank making the rehabilitation loan—were not included.

Impact on Income Groups

For the forty-one jurisdictions analyzed, the targeting of benefits to low- and moderate-income groups increased each year for the first four program years. The intended benefits to the two lower-income groups increased from an unweighted mean of 54 percent of allocable benefits in the first year to 62 percent in the fourth program year.[10] In dollar terms, low-moderate benefits increased from $174.5 million to $259 million, increasing the share of estimated lower-income benefits from 59 to 64 percent of the sample dollars that could be allocated to income groups in the forty-one jurisdictions. The benefits to the two upper-income groups (middle and high) remained relatively constant, ranging between an unweighted mean of 34 to 38 percent over the four years. Overall, the increase to the lower-income groups resulted primarily from a decline in allocations to activities that benefited the community as a whole.

These findings were based on the allocations field associates were able to distribute among the income groups or city-wide. In each of the four years approximately one-fourth of the grant funds could not be allocated among these categories. When the income-group benefits were measured against the total grant (and not just the allocable portion), the level of lower-income benefits in the

[10] In this analysis the unweighted mean is the preferred measure of trends because it measures local decisions rather than dollars. As a weighted mean the intended benefits to the two lower-income groups increased from 59 percent in the first year to 64 percent in the fourth year. The weighted mean is based on the percentage of dollars allocated and tends to be skewed by the large grants going to the larger jurisdictions. To illustrate: a small city may allocate 80 percent of a $5 million grant for activities benefiting low- and moderate-income groups, a total of $4 million for social-targeting purposes. A large city, on the other hand, may allocate only 40 percent of an $80 million grant for social targeting, a total of $32 million. Combining the dollars of the two cities, 42 percent of their funds are allocated for low- and moderate-income benefits, reflecting the strong downward influence of the large city grant. If an unweighted mean is used to average the two cities, the social-targeting allocation is 60 percent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first year was 41 percent, increasing to 48 percent in the fourth year. In this analysis the unweighted mean of 62 percent of allocable benefits in the fourth program year was more appropriate for discussing the level of benefits than was the 48 percent of the total grant which seemed to understate low-moderate benefits because it assumed that none of the nonallocable benefits would go to lower-income groups. It is more reasonable to assume that the nonallocable benefits would be distributed in the same proportion as the allocable benefits; that is, 62 percent of the nonallocable funds would also benefit lower-income groups. This could vary substantially in either direction in individual communities, depending on the specific activities for which the benefits could not be determined. About half of the nonallocable funds were for general planning and administration, however, and a reasonable rule of thumb for distributing the benefits from these activities would be that the lower-income groups benefit in the same proportion as their benefits from the allocable funds.

Central and suburban cities. The general trend toward more social targeting was largely accounted for by the increasing levels of low-moderate benefits in the suburban cities. The level of social targeting in the twelve suburban cities increased from an unweighted mean of 46 percent in the first year to 63 percent in the fourth program year, a net increase of 17 percentage points. The single largest increase in these jurisdictions came in the fourth program year with an increase of 9 percentage points over the third year. As a result, in the fourth program year, the level of social targeting among the sample suburban cities was 1 percentage point higher than that of the central cities. A similar pattern was found in the dollar allocations of the suburban cities with the amount increasing from $7 million to $12.7 million over the four years; the share of dollars increased from a low of 49 percent in the second year to 61 percent in the fourth year, the greatest increase (7 percentage points) coming between the third and fourth years.

Among the central cities the level of lower-income benefits also increased over the first four years of the program, but at a slower rate than among the suburban cities, from an unweighted mean of 57 percent in the first year to 62 percent in the fourth year, a net change of 5 percentage points. In dollar terms the increase was from $166.7 million in the first year to $245.7 million in the fourth year, an increase from 59 to 64 percent.

Coincident with the increase in allocable benefits to the two lower-income groups was a decline in the number of sample jurisdictions allocating less than half of their program benefits to these groups. In the first year, fifteen of the forty-one sample jurisdictions had low-moderate benefits under 50 percent; in the second year this increased to sixteen; in the third year the number of such jurisdictions dropped to nine, further declining to only four in the fourth program year. The decline was most evident among the suburban cities. In the first year, seven of twelve suburban cities in the sample allocated less than half of their funds for low-moderate benefits; in the fourth program year only one was below the 50 percent level. Among the twenty-nine central cities in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social-targeting sample, eight were below the 50 percent level in the first year; in the fourth year this declined to three cities.

Although the absolute percentages are useful, the more significant meaning of the data is the trend, both overall and between the two types of jurisdictions. The overall change in the unweighted mean over four years may be viewed by some as incremental change unrelated to any specific policy emphasis. And, to some extent, the large percentage point increase among the suburban cities between the first and fourth years may be attributable to the fact that there were only twelve such jurisdictions in the sample. The reversal of a slight upward trend of the first two years and the sharp decline in the number of both central and suburban cities below the 50 percent level in the third and fourth years, however, indicate that there was an important, broad shift upward in benefit levels among these cities. This indicates the impact of the social-targeting policy which was actively implemented in the third and fourth years.

Urban conditions. The data showed that the overall increase in social targeting was primarily attributable to significantly increased benefit levels among the suburban cities collectively. Using the urban-conditions index developed at Brookings as a measure of distress, the data further indicated that among the suburban cities the most significant increases in the lower-income benefits were in the better-off cities.[11] The eight suburban cities below the index mean (and thus better-off) raised their level of lower-income benefits from an unweighted mean of 40 percent in the first year to 63 percent in the fourth year, an increase of 23 percentage points. The two largest increases occurred between the first and second year and between the third and fourth year. Except for the second program year, the distressed suburban cities had a higher level of social targeting each program year, with an overall increase of 7 percentage points between the first and fourth years. As a result of this pattern of change among the distressed and better-off suburban cities, in the fourth program year there was only 1 percentage point difference between the two groups. Because of the small number of satellite cities in each category, however, a large change in one jurisdiction can greatly influence the unweighted mean of the group.

For central cities the urban-conditions data show that neither the better-off nor the distressed cities as groups significantly changed their benefit patterns

[11] The index is derived by combining the factors of age of housing, poverty, and population change. The index is computed as follows:

$$\frac{\dfrac{\text{Percent poverty}}{\text{Mean percent poverty}} \qquad \dfrac{\text{Percent pre-1940 housing}}{\text{Mean percent pre-1940 housing}}}{\dfrac{100 + \text{percent of population change}}{100 + \text{median percent of population change}}}$$

This version of the index is used to show interrelationships between an individual city and all entitlement cities. For algebraic simplicity the denominators for all factors can be dropped (because they are constants) without changing the ranking of cities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over the four years. Both distressed and better-off central cities had social-targeting levels above an unweighted mean of 50 percent over the four years of the program and showed only relatively small increases between the first and fourth year. For distressed central cities, the increase was from 57 to 63 percent; for better-off central cities the increase was from 57 to 61 percent.

Whether one distinguishes by the type of jurisdiction (central or suburban city), the level of distress, or both, the data showed an increasing convergence in the level of social targeting being achieved among the sample jurisdictions. This convergence was evident in the coefficient of variation which decreased from .38 in the first year to .17 in the fourth year, showing that the sample jurisdictions tended to cluster more closely around the mean which in the fourth year was 62 percent.

Implications

The increase in social targeting over the four years appeared to be the result of greater emphasis by HUD on this goal. The field reports and data showed that in a few communities the increase of lower-income benefits started as early as the second program year with HUD pressure to undertake activities yielding more benefits to lower-income groups. The broader impact of HUD came during the third and fourth years of the program, however, as the Harris-Robert C. Embry (assistant secretary for community planning and development) emphasis on social targeting began to have some effect, and the number of communities with lower-income benefits below the 50 percent level decreased substantially. Analysis of the field monitoring reports showed that social targeting was the most pervasive intergovernmental policy issue between HUD and the sample cities during the third and fourth years. Further, this emphasis on targeting was felt particularly in the better-off suburban jurisdictions where the greatest increases in low-moderate benefit levels occurred during the third and fourth years.[12]

While the decision-making processes, both intergovernmental and local, are too complex to link HUD directly with the program decisions made across the sample, the field reports suggested strongly that both HUD area office officials and local decision makers were increasingly sensitized to the social-targeting issue in a way that increased lower-income benefits.

Complexity may account for the difference in the rate of change over four years between types of jurisdictions. The larger central cities, particularly the distressed ones, and some distressed suburban cities tended to have more complex CDBG programs, including housing, neighborhood conservation, social services, economic development, and the continuation of urban renewal projects. This mix reflects the range of problems generally found in the more

[12] For a full discussion of the intergovernmental impact of HUD targeting policies on recipient communities, see Paul R. Dommel et al., *Targeting Community Development* (chap. 3), Department of Housing and Urban Development, January 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distressed jurisdictions and frequently means that the program allocations submitted in the application to HUD are the product of a bargaining process to satisfy the demands of various participants, both governmental and nongovernmental. The mix may also reflect commitments to continue or complete programs started under the categorical grants. Therefore, even where efforts are made by HUD or local participants to redirect program goals, such redirection may take a longer time and change is likely to be incremental.

The opposite conditions tended to prevail in the better-off, suburban jurisdictions, where there were fewer problems and less complex programs, with funds concentrated in a few program categories. Initially, the concentration tended to be in general improvements or housing and neighborhood conservation activities. In some cases, direct HUD pressure led to a quick and early shift from general development to housing and neighborhood conservation activities in lower-income areas and a consequent rise in low and moderate benefits. In other cases, the program and benefit changes may have resulted from a local awareness of the direction in which HUD was moving the program, and local decision makers altered their program thrust without direct HUD intervention.

Programs and benefits. Regardless of the type of jurisdiction or level of distress, there appeared to be a relationship between the program categories funded and the income-group benefits (Table 1). Social services, social service facilities, and housing programs (rehabilitation, counseling, and deconcentration projects) in the sample jurisdictions generally yielded a higher level of low-moderate benefits. General development, urban renewal continuation, and economic development activities generally had low-moderate benefit levels below 50 percent. In the public services and facilities category the low-moderate benefits across the sample were below the 50 percent level in the earlier years but by the fourth year were above 50 percent. Thus, while specific activities in individual communities may result in varying benefit levels, the general mix of program categories and the proportion of funds allocated to the categories influenced the estimated benefit outcome.

The benefit level of some program categories is partially explained by the kind of benefit that results from a particular activity. Social service and housing activities generally yield *personal* benefits that can be more readily directed to individuals and families in the target income groups. For example, the income eligibility level for rehabilitation loans and grants can be set so that the greatest share of the assistance will go to lower-income recipients. Neighborhood conservation and general public improvements, on the other hand, generally yield *service area* or *locational* benefits. Those residents living in the neighborhood or area in which the improvements are made may derive the benefits of the activities, regardless of income level; for example, a park development project serving a mixed-income area of a city. Locational benefits and the proportionality methodology for allocating them may explain the difference between central and satellite cities in benefits from neighborhood conservation and general improvement activities (Table 1). Although there are some exceptions, central cities tend to have higher concentrations of lower-income residents than do sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Percentages of Income-Group Benefits by Program Categories (Unweighted Mean)

	Central cities			Suburban cities			Total		
Program Category	Low-moderate	Middle-high	City-wide	Low-moderate	Middle-high	City-wide	Low-moderate	Middle-high	City-wide
Housing									
Year 1	61	33	6	56	44	0	59	36	5
Year 2	64	35	1	58	34	8	62	35	3
Year 3	68	31	1	60	34	6	66	32	2
Year 4	68	32	0	69	28	3	68	30	1
Neighborhood Conservation									
Year 1	56	42	2	41	54	5	53	45	2
Year 2	55	44	1	41	59	0	51	48	1
Year 3	57	41	2	44	52	4	53	44	3
Year 4	57	42	1	48	52	0	54	45	1
General Development									
Year 1	38	33	29	23	43	34	35	36	29
Year 2	43	36	21	37	62	0	42	42	16
Year 3	49	33	18	30	50	20	43	36	19
Year 4	40	32	28	41	46	13	40	35	25
Urban Renewal Continuation									
Year 1	48	49	3	64	36	0	50	47	3
Year 2	43	49	7	55	45	0	45	48	6
Year 3	45	43	12	45	55	0	45	45	10
Year 4	47	43	10	45	55	0	47	44	9
Economic Development									
Year 1	42	51	7	45	55	0	42	51	4
Year 2	37	52	11	34	66	0	37	53	7
Year 3	48	48	4	30	51	19	42	49	10
Year 4	46	47	7	61	39	0	49	45	9
Social Services									
Year 1	89	1	10	60	7	33	84	2	14
Year 2	92	3	5	88	2	10	91	3	6
Year 3	97	3	0	97	2	1	97	2	1
Year 4	97	2	1	98	2	0	97	2	1
Social Service Facilities									
Year 1	94	4	2	70	10	20	89	5	6
Year 2	88	3	9	90	10	0	89	5	6
Year 3	82	9	9	85	12	3	83	10	7
Year 4	96	4	0	94	6	0	95	4	1
Public Services/Facilities									
Year 1	48	42	10	38	28	34	46	38	16
Year 2	49	42	9	15	21	64	41	37	22
Year 3	48	43	9	55	12	33	50	37	13
Year 4	56	43	1	61	39	0	57	42	1

Source: Field research data.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

urban cities. Therefore, activities yielding locational benefits in central cities tend to give more benefits to lower-income groups than in better-off suburban jurisdictions where concentrations of lower-income residents are generally less.

This is where the monitoring approach and the informed judgments of the field associates become important.[13] If the decision rules were applied without the opportunity for modifications, in any one year the proportionality rules of the estimating methodology would favor the central cities that would benefit from the higher concentrations of lower-income groups. It would also mean that between years the benefit level for any jurisdiction would change *only* if the program mix and geographic locations changed, since the underlying census characteristics are unaltered between years. But, this "fixed" outcome is altered by the ability and willingness of the field associates to differ with the decision rules. In the first year, there were 1,106 separate CDBG activities in the forty-one sample cities of the targeting analysis; of these, the field associates rejected the decision rules in 259 instances, or nearly 25 percent of the time. In the fourth year, when there were 1,602 activities in the applications, they rejected 469 of them, nearly 30 percent. In dollar terms, over the four years they rejected activities involving about 20 percent of the money each year. In the first year the greatest number of exceptions were taken to the rules for general development (28 percent of the 259 exceptions), housing (21 percent), and social services (15 percent). In the fourth year the greatest number of exceptions were with social services (26 percent), housing (23 percent), and neighborhood conservation (12 percent).

The trend in the choice of programs of the sample cities appears to favor increased low-moderate benefits. There was a significant decline in the share of funds and the number of sample jurisdictions allocating funds to the two program categories yielding the lowest level of lower-income benefits—general development and urban renewal continuation. Allocations to general development among the sample jurisdictions having such activities declined steadily from an unweighted mean of 18 percent in the first year to 6 percent in the fourth year. At the same time the number of communities making such allocations dropped from twenty-eight to twenty-four. Urban renewal continuation shows a similar pattern, with the share of allocations declining from 24 to 14 percent and the number of communities making such allocations declining from twenty-three to sixteen.

The program area running counter to this trend was economic development which also tends to yield a lower level of benefits to low- and moderate-income groups. In this category the share of allocations of jurisdictions with such programs increased from an unweighted mean of 6 percent in the first year to 9 percent in the fourth year; a high of 10 percent was reached in the third program

[13] See the methodology appendix for definitions of the program categories and field associates role in decision making.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

year. The number of sample cities allocating funds to economic development activities increased from sixteen to twenty-one over the four years.

Concomitant with this pattern of an overall decline in the share of funds going to those program areas with lower benefit levels to low- and moderate-income groups, activities yielding a higher benefit level to these groups either increased or remained relatively constant. The share of social service allocations held relatively steady at an unweighted mean of 10 to 11 percent; allocations for housing programs in the fourth year increased by 7 percentage points over years two and three, with the number of jurisdictions increasing from thirty-seven to forty. Neighborhood conservation programs in the fourth year showed an increase over years one and two; the number of jurisdictions increased from thirty-one to thirty-nine. The share of allocations to social service facilities increased between years three and four, but the fourth year remained below the allocation level for years one and two.

Viewed overall, for those individuals or groups seeking to increase further the level of social targeting, the best prospects may lie with further shifts in the share of funds going into program categories yielding higher benefits to the lower-income groups. As urban renewal programs are completed, the number of communities allocating funds to such activities will decrease with the possibility of diverting these funds to activities with greater social-targeting impact. Because of the declining amount of funds allocated to old urban renewal projects, however, the share of funds being freed up is diminishing. Also, the small but growing trend toward economic development projects could offset some of the program shifts favoring more benefits for lower-income groups, depending upon the type of economic development projects involved. In sum, further substantial increases in benefits to low- and moderate-income groups may be possible, but this would probably require a major change in the mix of activities being undertaken by communities. To the extent that the program mix becomes institutionalized by communities with only marginal changes being made each year, benefit changes may also be marginal.

Conclusion

The trend has been toward a higher level of benefits to lower-income groups. It is not clear, however, whether this trend will continue or whether the level of social targeting has reached a plateau with most jurisdictions tending to cluster around an average of 60 to 65 percent. It may be difficult to increase substantially this level across the sample, although this may not be the case with individual communities. Those sample jurisdictions that tended to have the lowest benefit levels in the earlier years have now reached or are approaching the sample average. Two factors appear to be important determinants of the future level of lower-income benefits: program choices of the communities; and policy preferences of the federal government.

Certain types of activities tend to result in a higher level of benefits to low-and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moderate-income groups. What is not yet clear is what the "final" program mix will be among the sample communities. Secretary Harris's emphasis on social targeting was an important variable in the broad, upward shift of lower-income benefits. This approach to implementation with fixed percentages, however, was not well received by some important members of the House and required some softening of the final regulations while retaining the policy direction. Change among top officials within HUD itself could bring about a policy preference less oriented toward the social-targeting goal; conversely, the preference could be for more targeting. To the extent that particular activities become the basic program structure of the local recipients, however, the same incrementalism that may limit large increases in the future may also limit large decreases, regardless of the direction of federal policy preference and regulations.

Methodological Appendix

The method of estimating benefits to an income group is based on a combination of income characteristics derived from census data and informed judgments by the field associates about the benefits from individual CDBG activities. It is a three-step process.

—Each field associate working from the application initially approved by HUD first disaggregates the community's program into individual activities and assigns each activity to a program category.

—The associate then considers the analytical decision rules, or assumptions, about the distribution of benefits from activities in each program category. The decision rules are based on the income characteristics of census tracts or the community as a whole.

1. Housing
   Definition: Housing allocations include activities such as rehabilitation loans and grants, code enforcement, and modernization of public housing.
   Decision rule: Benefits are distributed among the four income groups on a proportional basis, based on the percentage of families in each income group *within each census tract*.
2. Neighborhood Conservation
   Definition: Programs to stabilize and/or conserve *residential* neighborhoods that have been undergoing decline, with a *package* of public improvements that might include activities such as street and sidewalk repair, storm and sanitary drains, parks.
   Decision rule: Same as housing.
3. General Public Improvements and Services
   Definition: This category consists of general physical improvements aimed at upgrading the local infrastructure and a variety of public services. These are *single activities* not specifically oriented toward an economic development objective or targeted to specific residential neighborhoods as part of a multiactivity neighborhood conservation program.
   Decision rule: Same as housing.
4. Social Services and Facilities
   Definition: Programs for health, education, child care, senior citizens; and allocations for construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation of facilities necessary for provision of social services.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Decision rule: Benefits flow solely to low- and moderate-income families and individuals.

5. Economic Development
   Definition: Industrial and commercial development projects designed to enhance the local tax base and/or generate jobs.
   Decision rule: Project benefits the entire community and the benefits are thus distributed on a proportional basis, based on the percentage of families in the four income groups *within the jurisdiction*.
6. Urban Renewal Continuation
   Definition: Continuation or completion of urban renewal activities begun during the categorical period.
   Decision rule: Same as economic development.
7. Planning and Administration
   Definition: Planning, management, and administration of the CDBG program.
   Decision rule: Benefits are nonallocable.

The decision rules are designed to assure that each field associate is judging his/her benefits decision against a uniform standard; they are not rules based on prior empirical research nor are they hypotheses to be proved or disproved.

—The third step requires that for each activity the field associates must state explicitly whether he or she agrees or disagrees with the assumption about the benefit distribution. If the associate disagrees, he or she assigns a different benefit allocation and states the reason for doing so. For example, an urban renewal project in a community may be a neighborhood project focused on housing and infrastructure improvements. In this case the associate may disagree with the assumption and base the benefits analysis on the proportionate numbers within the census tracts of the renewal area, rather than the total jurisdiction.

The associate at this point may also decide that the benefits of a particular project cannot be allocated among income groups or community-wide and hence classify the benefits of that project as "nonallocable." Funds for planning and administration automatically are in this category. There are also some kinds of projects which may result in nonallocable benefits.*

* For a full discussion of the methodology, see Paul R. Dommel et al., *Targeting Community Development* (chap. 6), Department of Housing and Urban Development, January 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Regulation of Health And Safety

K. ROBERT KEISER

Regulation has been used to serve numerous ends: health and safety, consumer information, fair prices and wages, product quality, economic stability, and environmental protection. The construction of any empirically based general theory of regulation depends upon the creation of more knowledge about the regulatory process and its results for each of these ends. Health and safety regulation, for example, may be an area in which governmental controls are both more politically possible and more effective. Although the federal government has long sought to protect the health and safety of consumers and workers in certain sectors of the economy, such as the food and drug industries, the airlines, and the mining industry, a new wave of legislation was passed in the 1960s and 1970s to protect the public from injury and disease. In this article, evidence concerning the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is used to elucidate how policy has been formulated and implemented in the regulation of health and safety. This analysis focuses on those factors that either promote or impede regulatory activism; little is said about the outcomes of regulation.

Capture and Immobilization of Regulatory Agencies

The theory that regulated industries capture the agencies established to regulate them has long dominated thinking about regulation. Although the theory was originally devised to describe the behavior of independent regulatory commis-

K. ROBERT KEISER is assistant professor of political science at San Diego State University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions, similar tendencies have been observed in other types of regulators. What is important about the capture theory is not that it concludes that regulation is biased in favor of industry, but that it delineates a process that leads to such a policy result. The agency, possessing ambiguous statutory authority, isolated from executive and legislative leadership, and receiving little constituency support, tends to succumb to a dependent relationship with the industry.[1] While this dependent relationship is quite subtle, some obvious indicators point to its existence, such as when the agency heavily relies upon the regulated industries to supply its staff.

The Food and Drug Administration, the oldest of the regulators in the area of health and safety, reveals some of the behavioral patterns that are part of the process of capture. Consider the following exchange between Senator Thomas Eagleton and Richard A. Merrill, the chief counsel for the Food and Drug Administration:

> Mr. MERRILL. That is right. I was in the private practice of law for four years.
> Senator EAGLETON. What firm was that with?
> Mr. MERRILL. Covington and Burling.
> Senator EAGLETON. Who was your predecessor Chief Counsel?
> Mr. MERRILL. Peter Hutt.
> Senator EAGLETON. Where was he from when he came to the Food and Drug and where did he go when he left?
> Mr. MERRILL. He came from Covington and Burling and has since returned to that firm. . . .
> Senator EAGLETON. What were the larger companies they [Covington and Burling] represented in 1969 while you were there?
> Mr. MERRILL. They did work for Parke-Davis Co. They did work for Abbott Laboratories. They did work for Ames, that is, Miles Laboratories.[2]

The use of advisory committees provide another opportunity for linkages between the agency and the industry. In order to draw from the limited supply of expertise in the field, the agency has accepted the advice of chemists, pharmacologists, and physiologists who also are employed as consultants to the industry.[3] Although some observers asserted that these outside advisers were tougher on the industry than were the agency's own people, other reports contended that abuses had occurred. When the FDA staff determined some drugs to be unsafe, the agency delayed taking any action and waited for outside recommendations.[4]

[1] Marver Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 74–90. Detailed investigations by political scientists have cast doubt on the capture theory. See Alan Stone, *Economic Regulation and the Public Interest* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 56–64, and Erwin J. Krasnow and Lawrence D. Longley, *The Politics of Broadcast Regulation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 27–90.

[2] U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978*, Part 3, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, pp. 1285–86.

[3] Milton Silverman and Philip R. Lee, *Pills, Profits, and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 241–42.

[4] Morton Mintz, "FDA Hit on Use of Medical Advisory Committees," *Washington Post*, 26 January 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Furthermore, employees who behaved in a more adversary manner toward the industry were subjected to systematic discipline involving involuntary transfers.[5]

The impetus toward capture remains incomplete, however, because it is somewhat checked by other institutional and political forces. The FDA's statutory authority is specific and firm enough to provide the justification for substantial regulation. The 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the drug laws compel manufacturers to demonstrate that new drugs are both safe and effective. Although this requirement can be challenged on the grounds that no drug is safe under every circumstance, the double imperative that must be satisfied through "well-controlled investigations . . . by experts qualified by scientific training and experience" does provide a handle for stringent regulation.[6] Some critics, in fact, have argued that the regulation has been so tight it has served to hinder the development of new drugs.[7] A key point at issue in this public debate is whether or not the agency has failed to approve new drugs of therapeutic importance. What the evidence most clearly reveals is that the FDA has hardly behaved as a captured agency.

An increase in constituent support for more regulation has acted as another deterrent to industry domination. Even when no organized interest group of significance exists to mobilize support for health and safety measures, a political entrepreneur capable of monitoring bureaucratic activity and acting as a spokesman for a constituency can bolster an agency's regulatory efforts.[8] Sidney Wolfe, head of Ralph Nader's Health Research Group, Morton Mintz, journalist for the *Washington Post*, and a few members of Congress, including Senators Edward Kennedy and Gaylord Nelson and Representatives Paul Rogers and L. H. Fountain, have played this role in relation to the FDA.

The other health and safety agencies—the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission—have been even less subject to capture than has the FDA. While the major safety initiatives of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration have been opposed by the automobile companies, the agency has gained some support from the insurance companies. Both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Consumer Product Safety Commission were designed with certain institutional safeguards against capture: OSHA was placed within a supportive organizational environment, the Department of Labor with its ties to the trade unions; and the CPSC was established as a horizontal agency regulating several industries, which should make it less susceptible to the formation of a symbiotic relationship with the industries it regulates.

[5] U. S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, *Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 17.

[6] *Weinberger* v. *Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning*, 412 U.S. 609 (1973).

[7] Henry G. Grabowski, *Drug Regulation and Innovation* (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), pp. 17-37.

[8] Paul Sabatier, "Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies," *Policy Sciences* 6 (Fall 1975): 318-20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet these agencies have not been any more aggressive at regulation than the FDA, and most observers would agree that OSHA and the CPSC have been less effective. Although tendencies toward capture continue to exist, and thus can hamper regulation, the principal threat to health and safety regulation is immobilization, a phenomenon which does not render the agency completely motionless, but which constrains its freedom of action and reduces its pace of operation to a form of protracted incrementalism. An agency can be immobilized by a number of conditions, including insufficient authority, the failure to obtain adequate resources, the veto actions in other parts of the government, adverse publicity that seriously damages the agency's reputation, and the goal orientations of the agency leadership.

The reverses in National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's efforts to issue an air bag standard vividly illustrates how an agency can be frustrated by veto action. The chairman of the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford II, visited the White House to complain that the cumulative impact of emissions and safety standards would double the price of its new subcompacts. In response, the White House ordered that the introduction of a passive restraint system be postponed in favor of an interlock system that attempted to compel drivers to fasten the seat belts.[9] OSHA and the CPSC, on the other hand, have even found it difficult to initiate major regulatory efforts. During its early years OSHA lacked not only technical and professional manpower but also a strong orientation toward the problems of occupational disease. It also suffered much adverse publicity because it attempted to enforce what many considered to be trivial rules concerning safety. The CPSC has been both resource-poor and burdened with standard-setting procedures conducive to delays; it initially appeared more determined to be an open agency than to be an effective one.

Protracted Incrementalism and the Need for Change

Health and safety regulation has been neither comprehensive nor large scale, but rather mostly a series of marginal adjustments to an expanding number of threatening situations. An incrementalist strategy is not necessarily a conservative approach to problem solving; as Braybrooke and Lindblom point out, "the strategy specifies nothing about the speed with which change is to be carried on."[10] While conservatives may use an incrementalist strategy to move slowly, progressives may quicken the pace and advance toward their own objectives. Yet since the health and safety agencies have adopted a strategy of small steps as a result of immobilization, the incrementalist pattern they have followed has been more protracted than progressive.

Whatever the virtues of incrementalism, it is not equally suited to all public

[9] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 187–88.

[10] David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policies, and certain problems in health and safety are less amenable to incrementalist tinkering. Some health problems, for one thing, are more likely to involve long-term consequences.[11] A trial-and-error approach can be too late in the detection of error; applied to toxic substances with long latency periods and sleeper effects, it can lead to disaster. There is also the problem of irreversible effects. Incrementalist strategy assumes that marginal measures will avoid a devastating mistake that cannot be repaired. In matters of health and safety, however, irreversible effects are more likely to be produced by too little rather than too much governmental action. When piecemeal measures fail to safeguard public health, curative medicine has been unable to treat the malignant damage that carcinogens and mutagens cause.

The incrementalist tactics that the health and safety agencies have used include remediality, seriality, and bottleneck breaking.[12] OSHA's standard-setting process, responding to tragedies that have resulted from the use of such toxic substances as asbestos, vinyl chloride, bischloromethyl, and kepone, has concentrated on remedial efforts to ameliorate obvious wrongs rather than developing a more comprehensive program to promote occupational health. OSHA also has focused on the training of more health compliance officers to try to break a significant bottleneck in health protection. The FDA has altered its previously lax policy toward food and additives and has proceeded step by step against cyclamates, red dye #2, and saccharin. The pace of this sequence of actions has hardly been rapid; the ban on red dye #2 finally was decreed after some fifteen extensions that allowed for provisional use of the substance.[13]

On other occasions the regulators have neglected to seize the opportunity to employ incrementalist tactics. One example is remediality. The FDA, caught in some confusion about statutory interpretation, has been reluctant to rely on its "imminent hazard" authority to remove unsafe drugs from the marketplace once those drugs have been approved.[14] After fifteen fatalities were reported at the Bridesburg, Pennsylvania, plant of Rohm and Hass Company, OSHA followed up on the matter but failed to investigate the deaths or assign a team to inspect the plant.[15] OSHA also missed an opportunity to employ another incrementalist tactic—that is, the revision of marginal reforms in response to feedback—when it maintained its asbestos standard despite the fact that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reported new information revealing that the level of allowable exposure was excessive.[16]

[11] Robert Goodwin and Ilmar Waldmer, "Thinking Big, Thinking Small, and Not Thinking At All," *Public Policy* 27 (Winter 1975): 1–24.

[12] For a discussion of incrementalist tactics, see Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy Making Process* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 24–27.

[13] P. M. Boffey, "Death of a Dye," *New York Times Magazine*, 29 February 1976, p. 48.

[14] House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform*, pp. 292–94.

[15] William S. Randall and Stephen D. Solomon, *Building 6* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), pp. 202–7.

[16] Samuel S. Epstein, *The Politics of Cancer* (San Francisco, Calif.: Sierra Club Books, 1978), pp. 91–92.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two alternatives to incremental politics are technical decision making, which is marked by high understanding and small change, and wars, revolutions, crises, and "grand opportunities," which are characterized by low understanding and large change.[17] Technical decision making is more likely to occur at the lower levels of the bureaucracy and is delegated to a specialized group such as engineers, economists, or physicians. The decisions that instigate large change are sometimes induced by extenuating circumstances and on other occasions are risk-taking ventures in the face of limited understanding. Since many wars, much of the decision making in response to economic instability and human disasters, and some revolutions are reactions to threatening situations, it is more likely that such attempts to leap forward are "grand defensives" rather than "grand opportunities." For health and safety regulation to become a less protracted process, it must take on some of the aspects of both technical decision making and "grand defensive" politics. Such matters as the protection of occupational health and the construction of safer automobiles require the advancement of knowledge and the use of scientific and professional expertise. But the enlargement of technical understanding and the resolution of conflict among values and interests would necessitate some risk-taking behavior on behalf of greater health and safety. These alterations in policymaking depend upon an increase in the professionalization of reform and an acceleration in the public demand for increased regulatory activism.

The Professionalization of Reform

An increasingly professionalized society, it has been suggested, should lead to a society more oriented toward reform.[18] An enlargement of the knowledge sector strengthens the societal capacity to perform the function of problem identification. In turn, the government, better guided by technical expertise, can more effectively respond to the problems that are discovered and defined. In addition, an increase in the number of relatively autonomous and economically secure occupational roles provides the opportunity for greater commitment to reform. And the rise of philanthropic foundations has provided financial support for the work of the professionals.

To some extent, the advancement of health and safety regulation has resulted from the professionalization of reform. The promotion of automobile safety, for example, was not the product of a mass movement, but rather began with the efforts of a few specialists who conducted crash tests at Cornell University and the University of California at Los Angeles.[19] Harvey Wiley, chief of the Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture, crusaded for the original food and drug law, and Francis Kelsey's persistent resistance to an

[17] Braybrooke and Lindblom, *Strategy of Decision*, pp. 66–71.

[18] Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 21–36.

[19] Charles McCarry, *Citizen Nader* (New York: Signet, 1972), pp. 63–74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

application to market thalidomide contributed to more reform. Irving Selikoff, head of the Division of Environmental Medicine at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine of the City University of New York, persevered without cooperation from the asbestos industry and without support from the Public Health Service to demonstrate that occupational exposure to asbestos was related to cancer and to press for protective measures.[20]

Nevertheless, several constraining factors have attenuated the relationship between professionalism and regulatory activism. The rudimentary level of health and safety knowledge, the deficiencies in education and training, the blockages in the occupational communications network, the sources of financial support, the biases in the sense of professional mission, and the lack of institutional support have hindered the professionalization of reform. More than anything else, the large degree of uncertainty and ignorance diminishes the amount of influence health and safety professionals can exert on public policy. For example, an insufficient data base generated from experiments on animals exists for estimating the extent of the risk of carcinogens on humans.[21] Little is also known about such potential problems as the effects of occupational noise on levels of stress.[22] And it is difficult to determine whether stricter safety regulations or changes in the levels of income, in the ratio of younger to older drivers, and in accident costs have caused a decline in highway fatality rates.[23] Visits to hospital emergency rooms have yielded quantitative information that reveals which consumer products are more often associated with accidents, but data analysis has been less certain about how products can be improved to prevent injury.[24]

Even when more knowledge has been gained, it has not always spread to many members of the professional community. Occupational diseases have been diagnosed as bronchitis or emphysema and attributed to cigarette smoking. Physicians have not been well trained to handle such cases because the subject of occupational health has been crowded out of the medical school curriculum.[25] The professional communications network used to disseminate innovations has also been insensitive to precautionary measures. A closed-circuit

[20] Paul Brodeur, *Expendable Americans* (New York: Viking Press, 1974), pp. 7–17.

[21] U. S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Cancer Testing Technology and Saccharin* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 23–24.

[22] U. S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, *Criteria for a Recommended Standard . . . Occupational Exposure to Noise* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. IV, pp. 10–11.

[23] Sam Peltzman, "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," *Journal of Political Economy* 83 (August 1975): 677–725; and U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies, *Appropriations for the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies, 1977*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 369–82.

[24] Paul Bosch, "A Review and Critical Evaluation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission," *Journal of Marketing* 40 (October 1976): 48.

[25] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety, *Oversight Hearings on the Occupational Safety and Health Act*, Part 2, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 370–72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

television symposium, accredited by the American Medical Association but paid for by a pharmaceutical company, was criticized for neglecting to emphasize the cardiovascular effects of oral diabetic pills.[26]

Financial support from industry for scientific research and professional activities is also related to the lack of professional endorsement of regulatory activism. The National Academy of Science's food protection committee has received much of its budget from the food industry, and it has not shown much enthusiasm for strict regulation of food additives.[27] Whatever the effects of material incentives, the normative orientations of the professional community have not always been conducive to activities beneficial to health and safety protection. The biomedical scientists' preference for basic research and the medical profession's partiality for curative medicine have had negative consequences for research related to preventative health measures. Although the National Cancer Institute has been heavily subsidized, only a small portion of those funds has been directed toward research on chemical carcinogenesis and methods of cancer prevention.[28]

The efforts of professionals to improve regulatory action on behalf of health and safety depend upon some kind of institutional support. Selikoff received the cooperation of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers so that he could proceed with his research on the hazards of exposure to asbestos. Wilhelm Hueper, a pioneer in the study of carcinogenesis who served as chief of the Environmental Cancer Section of the National Cancer Institute, was labeled a "troublemaker" and instructed to discontinue his epidemiological research.[29]

Public Demands for Increased Activism

Anthony Downs has asserted that all bureaucracies are subject to a law of increasing conservatism. As an agency grows older, it is likely to become dominated by conservers who are chiefly interested in convenience and security rather than by climbers who seek more power and status or by advocates and zealots who are motivated to pursue policy goals.[30] Older agencies also develop more elaborate rule systems that contribute to bureaucratic inertia. If the principal threat to health and safety regulation is immobilization, Downs's hypothesis suggests that the agencies' capacity for resistance will only diminish with the passage of time. On the other hand, while certain processes inside bureaucracy might bring about more conservatism, other dynamics, especially changing con-

[26] Morton Mintz, "Drug Makers' Influence on Doctors Is Criticized," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1976.

[27] Boffey, "Death of a Dye," p. 49.

[28] Richard A. Rettig, *Cancer Crusade* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 305–6.

[29] Larry Agran, *The Cancer Connection* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1977), pp. 27–28.

[30] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 18–21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ditions outside bureaucracy, can foster more activism. Even Downs states that aging will not be associated with conservatism when an agency experiences rapid growth. The FDA, the oldest of the health and safety regulators, had its budget augmented from $3 million in 1945 to $66 million in 1968. During the same period, the number of its personnel increased from 850 to 6,200.[31] If the younger agencies experience similar growth in the future, they should be subject to less rather than more immobilization.

Budgeting tends to be incremental, a phenomenon which limits an agency's capacity for action during its early years. In its formative years, a relatively young agency such as OSHA thus possesses too little resources to make much headway in either standards development or rule enforcement. After five years of operation, for example, the agency employed less than ten health professionals in its Office of Standards Development and had introduced very few health standards.[32] It was able to employ only about one-third of the number of compliance officers envisaged in its ultimate staffing model.[33] One estimate calculated it would take the agency more than fifty years to inspect every workplace under its jurisdiction.[34] In addition, the quality of inspections suffered. Even after the situation improved, OSHA could only slowly cross-train safety inspectors in industrial hygiene and far too little equipment existed for the laboratory analysis of worksite samples.[35]

Agencies must not only accumulate resources; they must also learn from experience what tactics make for more effective policy. This repertoire of techniques includes both general prescripts useful to all agencies and specific tactics applicable to the agency's particular task. Numerous clearance points within the decision-making process can delay and obstruct any agency's efforts to implement policy.[36] OSHA, for example, has developed joint priority listings with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to try to quicken the pace of the process of standards development. In a matter more peculiar to the agency's responsibilities, OSHA discovered after it had issued a strict regulation concerning vinyl chloride that the chemical industry, despite its predictions to the contrary, was able to comply with the directive without severe economic hardship.[37] Although this example demonstrates that a technology-forcing tac-

[31] Morton Mintz, "FDA—Protection Without a Sword," *Washington Post*, 3 July 1976.

[32] U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976*, Part 1, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 330.

[33] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, *Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1976*, Part 5, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 615.

[34] Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman, *Taming the Giant Corporation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 147.

[35] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare, *Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1979*, Part 1, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 627–34.

[36] Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 143–46.

[37] Steven Rattner, "Did Industry Cry Wolf?" *New York Times*, 28 December 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tic can produce results, some observers have advised that it would not work so successfully if it were applied to a less technologically advanced and economically viable industry.[38] It will take time and experience for the agency to learn what tactics work in which situations.

It has already been stated that an increase in constituent support for the health and safety regulators has helped to deter their capture by industry. The passage of new legislation and the creation of new agencies have been symbolic events, but rather than lulling members of the public into quiescence, they have contributed to an arousal of more interest in the protection of health and safety. The creation of OSHA has stimulated more labor union activity on behalf of health and safety. The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Worker's Union has conducted a series of conferences to enhance awareness concerning the problems of occupational disease, and the number of unions insisting on more protection for their members has increased.[39] The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, directed by the former head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and Allstate Insurance Company have strongly supported the agency in its attempt to introduce mandatory air bags for automobiles.[40] Political entrepreneurs, especially in the Congress, have been another source of constituency support for activism. Although it has been frequently asserted that Congress lacks the resources to conduct oversight, the monitoring of the bureaucracy does occur when legislators are motivated.[41] In 1973 FDA officials appeared before thirty-three committee hearings, a number which has become the norm for that agency.[42]

Although the political support for health and safety regulation is relatively weak in intensity and organization, it is periodically activated in response to recurrent calamitous events and threats of calamity. After oral contraceptives were found to have caused thromboembolism, Senator Gaylord Nelson held committee hearings concerning the problem. The FDA, in turn, ordered mandatory "patient package inserts" warning women about the risks they might incur, a decision which departed from the standard procedures for dispensing prescription drugs.[43] Subsequently, "patient package inserts" were required for other drugs. The discovery that Aldactazide, a medication G. C. Searle introduced for the treatment of high blood pressure, increased the risks of breast cancer led to inquiries concerning the validity and reliability of the testing for the approval of

[38] Herbert R. Northrup, Richard L. Rowan, and Charles R. Perry, *The Impact of OSHA* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1978), pp. 417–18.

[39] Samuel S. Epstein, *Politics of Cancer*, pp. 405–11 and Nicholas A. Ashford, *Crisis in the Workplace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), pp. 199–200.

[40] Morton Mintz, "3 Stunt Drivers Cite Air Bag Safety, Call Delay on Air Bags 'Criminal,' " *Washington Post*, 3 August 1976.

[41] Morris S. Ogul, *Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 181–86.

[42] Rita Ricardo Campbell, *Drug Lag* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), p. 32.

[43] Silverman and Lee, *Pills, Profits, and Politics*, pp. 101–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new drugs.[44] Senator Edward Kennedy accordingly conducted hearings, and the FDA established a bioresearch monitoring program to improve testing procedures.[45] An investigation of the Hopewell, Virginia, disaster, in which the workers at a kepone manufacturing plant suffered severe damage to their central nervous systems, revealed that a former employee had filed a complaint to OSHA ten months before the tragedy was discovered.[46] OSHA has since revised its policy to require that any worker complaint that may constitute an imminent hazard must be investigated within twenty-four hours, and any complaint about a serious hazard must be followed up within three working days.[47]

These governmental responses to calamitous events have been more than mere symbolic acts of reassurance: a political breakthrough regarding entitlements to life and health occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s. Federal regulation was significantly expanded; the Kefauver-Harris amendments strengthened the drug laws in 1962, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration was created in 1966, OSHA in 1970, and the CPSC in 1972. Coming during and after the civil rights movement, the political climate of this period was particularly sensitive to issues of human rights. Protective regulations were not the only actions taken on behalf of life and health. Medicare and Medicaid were enacted, and greater action was focused on the reduction in infant mortalities.[48]

Conclusion

Important matters of disagreement remain to be more fully resolved in the aftermath of this political breakthrough. One dispute concerns the degree to which the protection of health and safety should be an individual responsibility or a societal responsibility. An OSHA official can still place the blame for health hazards on workers who "like their chewing tobacco" and fail to wear their respirators.[49] Part of the underlying philosophy of health and safety regulation, however, is that collective measures are more apt to save lives than are methods

[44] Morton Mintz, "FDA Evaluates Link Between Cancer, Drug," *Washington Post*, 12 July 1975.

[45] U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Human Resources, Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, *Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1977*, Part IV, 95th Cong., 1st. sess., 1977, pp. 26–51.

[46] House Subcommittee on Manpower, Compensation, and Health and Safety, *Oversight Hearings on the Occupational Safety and Health Act*, Part 2, pp.135–48.

[47] U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Human Resources, Subcommittee on Labor, *Oversight on the Administration of the Occupational Safety and Health Act*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, p. 37. This calamity-and-response behavior is more serial and less volatile than the "issue attention cycle" Downs has outlined. Health and safety regulation never rose as high as environmental protection on the public agenda nor did it experience a similar dropoff in support. See Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology—the 'Issue Attention Cycle'," *Public Interest* 28 (Summer 1972): 38–50.

[48] Karen Davis and Cathy Schoen, *Health and the War on Poverty* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), pp. 148–53.

[49] Brodeur, *Expendable Americans*, p. 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that require repeated individual decisions. As one public health advocate pointedly remarked, "Pasteurization is more simple than each person boiling his own milk."[50] The first chairman of the CPSC believed he was even obligated to protect the public from "some foolishness" because the commission's enabling legislation called for it to review the "reasonably foreseeable misuse" of products when it developed safety standards.[51]

The monetary cost of regulations is another issue of contention. Although the Congress instructed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to include economic factors in its decision-making process, the House of Representatives rejected an amendment that would have mandated that costs and benefits be equivalent. The Senate report for the legislation stipulated that safety should be the "overriding consideration."[52] The only legislative instructions to OSHA related to costs required that regulations be "feasible." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared that an entire industry could not be severely dislocated in the interests of health and safety, but profit margins could be reduced and laggard companies could be put out of business.[53]

Nothing like a "revolution in rising entitlements" has taken place;[54] what has occurred is a satisficing breakthrough committing the government to the reduction of injuries and fatalities to a more tolerable level. The availability of alternative sets of cognitive assumptions regarding the causes of accidents and injuries allow for ambivalent and contradictory public responses to regulatory issues.[55] More regulation is supported, but the ideology of individual responsibility remains embedded enough in public rhetoric to evoke protests against certain regulatory initiatives. And the greater commitment to life and health tends to waver when economic analysis projects the costs of regulations.

Immobilization, not capture, poses a major threat to health and safety regulation. To some extent, immobilization will be overcome as the numbers and expertise of the health and safety professionals are enhanced. Nevertheless, the professional community is not likely to provide the primary impetus for regulatory activism. Numerous constraints impede the professionalization of reform. Even when the levels of knowledge have increased, what will result is

[50] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, *Installation of Passive Restraints in Automobiles*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 139.

[51] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies, *Department of Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1977*, Part 1, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 37.

[52] House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform*, p. 175.

[53] *Industrial Union Department* v. *Hodgson*, 499 F. 2nd. 467, 478 (1974).

[54] See Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 232-35.

[55] For a discussion of alternative cognitive assumptions, see Murray Edelman, *Political Language* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 5-12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the transformation of ignorance into uncertainty. This uncertainty will partially undermine any attempt on the part of the professionals to become spokesmen for reform, and it will encourage opposition from groups that would be adversely affected by more regulation. Furthermore, historical studies have indicated that the main thrust of organized professionals has been the pursuit of monopolization on behalf of their own interests rather than the alleviation of mass suffering or injustice.[56]

Political entrepreneurs and organized interest groups have mobilized more constituency support for regulatory activism, and a satisficing breakthrough in protective entitlements has been achieved. The scope and intensity of these public demands could be escalated because the American public, as well as the rest of the world population, places great value on good health as a personal aspiration.[57] Any increase in the recurrence of calamitous events or in perceptions of threats of calamity would contribute to the escalation of these public demands. On the other hand, the public also hopes for an improved standard of living, and any regulatory efforts that appeared to jeopardize these economic aspirations would encounter much opposition. In short, while regulatory activism has been increasing, there is little evidence to forecast a full-scale "grand defensive" against injuries and fatalities.

[56] Jeffrey Lionel Berlant, *Profession and Monopoly* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Gerald S. Auerbach, *Unequal Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

[57] Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 34–36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s *edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980. 563 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $8.95.*

This series on national priorities started in 1970 as a review of federal budget priorities; this year's edition is a longer-run review of broad issues organized by major national policy topics. Reflecting today's preoccupation with energy, defense, foreign policy, and the economy, ten chapters are devoted to these issue areas. One chapter each is devoted to health, safety, and environmental regulations; medical care; education and training; and intergovernmental fiscal relations. The initial chapter is an introduction and summary, and the final chapter deals with declining governmental competence.

Considering the turmoil at the time the eighteen authors and editor Joseph Pechman did the writing, the discussion of the economy, defense issues, and foreign affairs remains timely reading. Escalating inflation, roller-coaster interest rates, the Iranian crisis, OPEC price increases, the Afghanistan invasion—all these recent events are either incorporated into the policy reviews or can easily be related to them.

There are two chapters on economics—one on overall policy, and the other on international economic interdependence. More governmental attention to supply issues and less variation in demand-management policies are urged. An economic policy drift is alleged to have occurred recently while painless solutions to difficult economic adjustments have been sought. Focusing public debate on the most equitable way to make such adjustments is advocated. However, the range of American economic policy alternatives will be increasingly limited by the growing interdependence of the U.S. economy with those of other nations.

The chapter on energy provides an excellent review of a wide range of policy options. Long-run U.S. energy independence is considered feasible, but no satisfactory short-run alternatives to reliance on oil imports is foreseen. Increased use of coal is discounted as a major factor over the next few years. The tremendous benefits that have already been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realized from energy conservation are emphasized, along with the potential for even greater conservation.

The chapter on health, safety, and environmental regulations is an interesting review of developments in this field and the difficulties of intelligent policymaking. A chapter on medical care offers a well-organized discussion of choices in health-care financing and implications for medical resources and delivery systems. The chapter on education and training offers insights into the choices facing different sectors of the education system as the size of the student-age population dwindles. The chapter on intergovernmental fiscal assistance provides little new information to anyone familiar with how federal aid to states and localities developed.

Seven chapters are devoted to defense and foreign affairs and constitute a thorough assessment of the complex situations the United States faces. Individual chapters are devoted to defense policy, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, Western Europe, and the relationship between the advanced industrial nations and the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The chapter on governmental competence closes the volume pessimistically. Citing evidence of declining public confidence in government, it links this trend to the disintegration of political parties, the political elite's loss of control over presidential nominations, congressional rejection of presidential leadership, the limits on leadership in Congress, and the deterioration of managerial personnel in government. Little hope is seen that quick solutions will be realized.

This book has three major deficiencies. First, the major problems posed by social security and pension systems in need of reform at a time when the population is aging should have been analyzed. Second, the different impacts of economic and energy policy options on income distribution are not dealt with systematically. Third, the growing preoccupation with ways to balance the budget or otherwise curb public spending and taxation should have received special attention.

JAMES R. STOREY
The Urban Institute

The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age *by James David Barber. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1980. 342 pp. $14.95.*

It never struck me how completely presidential politics had been transformed by the media until I heard a thirty-second campaign jingle in the 1976 Ford campaign which sounded like a combination airline–soft-drink advertisement. It was entitled "I'm Feelin' Good about America," but I must confess it did not convince me to fly or drink the product.

We are fortunate in this campaign season to be given analysis by a leading political scientist, James David Barber, whose track record for forecasting political developments is unmatched in his field.

In previous work Barber predicted that in the event of a major crisis, Nixon would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"rigidify" and lead the nation into a disaster. Barber based his work on a study of Nixon's character completed before the Watergate debacle. Following his lead, other political scientists have subjected presidents and would-be presidents to intense scrutiny; one might have expected Barber to capitalize on his prior success in this election, but instead he has chosen to develop a major new theory of presidential elections.

In *The Pulse of Politics* Barber develops an election typology: conflict, conscience, and conciliation. A conflict election involves the battle for political power and the image of a fighting, battling contender in a dogfight with the opposition. The conscience election is a reaction to mere partisan politics. It emphasizes the return of constitutional principles or extraconstitutional values and a candidate as moralizing missionary, as preacher to the American congregation. The conciliation election offers solace, tranquility, and unity to the people. Barber contends that there is a pulse to election politics: an election involving conflict leads to a reaction and to an election in which conscience is paramount, followed by an election in which the theme stressed is conciliation. Over and over the cycle is played out without end. In chapters dealing with twelve elections since 1900, Barber develops his theme with a fast-paced narrative style and an interesting collection of campaign stories.

The most interesting feature of these narratives is the interaction between the candidates and the media. The journalists have set themselves up as kingmakers, but the candidates use the media to tell their stories and present their dramas. In part, these dramas are based on the "character" of the campaigner (with war heroes, for example, favoring conflict elections), but in part they are based on calculations about the mood of the electorate. Barber contends that the characteristics of specific media affect the candidates and their campaigns. He provides as evidence marvelous portraits of men such as Colonel Harvey, Henry Luce, Walter Cronkite, Edward R. Murrow, Theodore White, George Lorimer, and analyses of institutions such as the Chautauqua Lecture, the *Saturday Evening Post*, the muckraking magazines, the *New York Times*, and network newscasts. For a sample, consider Barber on the *Times* editorial board: "Above all, the Puritans of the *Times* believed in reason, and thus in the overriding importance of maintaining rational political discourse. The essence of politics was the great conversation, forever threatening to degenerate into the bark and howl of passion. The *Times* might be dull; it was determined to be rational and to keep politics sane, and sanity *was* a little dull" (pp. 174–75).

Barber is a brilliant and inventive thinker, but his conclusions are controversial. His characterization of elections at times seems forced: was the 1952 election the crusade he thinks it was, or was it an election of conciliation, as epitomized by "I like Ike" buttons? Was 1968 an election of conciliation, as Barber suggests, or was it a hard-fought contest for political power? The "pulse" of politics may not involve one kind of election following another in the precise order Barber suggests: if 1976 was a moral crusade, then 1980 is supposed to be a conciliation election. But the national mood does not at the moment involve an era of good feelings or a relaxation of tension—at least not in the primary period. Instead, whatever unification seems to be called for involves a White House emphasis on foreign threats and the use of the symbolism of commander in chief. That seems a far cry from the Warren G. Harding, "normalcy" model that Barber offers as the prototypical conciliation election.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Barber concludes with some shrewd suggestions to broadcast and print journalists which, if adopted, would certainly improve the breed. At present the campaign stories do not make connections between running for president and running the country. Barber suggests that journalists cultivate new perspectives that deemphasize the horse-race and parchesi approaches to evaluating candidates and instead focus on the worldview of candidates and their understanding of the facts of the national condition. Barber urges that journalists research the character of candidates, especially their past record of accomplishments, which can be gleaned from the public record. Compare their image with the real character, and then make judgments. When candidates wish to speak in God's name, in an election crusade, the media can force the discussion back onto the realistic problems of governance. Find out from contenders how they plan on governing, and with whom.

Barber's best recommendation is so small and simple it should be adopted forthwith—retire the "gaffe" story from campaign journalism. Bad enough is how we make our presidents, but how we unmake potential presidents on the campaign trail is a national disgrace. Every second-rate rat in the pack is ready to pounce on a slip of the tongue, create an issue, stir up trouble for the contender, and then score him on how well he responds under pressure in what Barber calls the Great Campaign Stress Test. Issues can get lost for days or weeks while a candidate tries to get the pack off his back.

Barber tells us that his typology is only a tendency, not a complete characterization of any campaign. Used with restraint, it helps illuminate the calculations behind media campaigns, and gives us an understanding about how presidential campaigns sometimes mirror and sometimes transform the national mood.

We are consumers of politics these days rather than committed partisan supporters. Barber shows how the successful candidates have oriented their campaigns toward the national mood and how they have used the characteristics of the dominant media of their times to bring their messages to the consuming audience. To the extent that the politicians who tell us the stories are feeding us a bill of goods, we tend to withhold some trust, some commitment, some support from them and from the governmental institutions. If election rhetoric raises expectations, subsequent performance dashes them, contributing to the national mood. But who can say that the situation was any better when the office was brokered by party leaders in the good old days? At least now we have high expectations, and one always retains the hope that a good product, and honest salesman, and a consumer warranty will restore respect for the office and its occupant in the future.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

The Road to the White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections *by Stephen J. Wayne. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980. 269 pp. $10.95.*

The Presidential Contest *by Richard A. Watson. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1980. 159 pp. $4.95.*

For thirty years prior to the 1960s there were few significant changes in the rules and procedures under which presidential nominations and elections were contested. Since the late

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1960s, however, there have been fundamental changes in the process of selecting presidents. Indeed, the pace and scope of change have been so constant that chronicling the changes from one presidential election to another has become a growth industry. In this atmosphere of fundamental change, it is highly appropriate for Stephen J. Wayne and Richard A. Watson to have written books briefly explaining how the presidential process operates.

Neither book seeks to present a highly theoretical framework for analyzing national elections. Rather, these guidebooks are designed to provide the reader with, as Wayne describes his study, a "straightforward 'nuts and bolts' discussion . . . that summarizes the state of the art and science of presidential electoral politics" (p. vii).

As election-year guides, each book provides a broad outline of factual information concerning how presidential nominations and general elections are conducted. Both authors describe the operation of the electoral college, the nomination process, the general-election campaign, voting behavior, and various proposed reforms of the electoral college. Wayne's *The Road to the White House* is substantially longer than Watson's volume and provides greater depth of coverage of these topics. For example, in discussing the general-election campaign, Wayne deals more extensively with the role of the media and includes excellent illustrative materials from the 1976 campaign of President Gerald Ford developed by the political consulting firm, Bailey and Deardourff.

Wayne's consideration of the impact of the electoral college and the consequences of various proposals to change the system are more thoroughly analyzed than in Watson's *The Presidential Contest*. In his discussion of the various reform proposals, Wayne has made effective use of statistical background information (as he does in other sections of the book) that provides the reader with a data-based perspective on how the nomination and election processes operate.

A fundamental question for political scientists and voters concerns the ultimate meaning and role of presidential elections in the American political process. Wayne's concluding chapter effectively aids the reader in interpreting the results of a presidential election and the implications of the election for public policy and governance.

There is, however, a significant gap in these books in their respective presentations of the environment for presidential electoral politics. Neither author adequately explores the impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) in terms of how this legislation has altered the quest for presidential office. Watson virtually ignores the act as it pertains to the presidential nominating process. Wayne provides more information on the FECA than Watson, but he too fails to account fully for the impact of such important features of the FECA as national and state expenditure limits for candidates accepting federal matching funds during the nomination stage of the process. It would also have been helpful if the authors had put greater emphasis on the strategic consequences of other aspects of the electoral process such as voting patterns of social groups, the electoral college, and nomination rules. This is much less of a problem in Wayne's book than in Watson's.

For persons seeking a quick reference guide and explanation of the various facets of presidential elections, *The Road to the White House* will be an extremely useful guide. It also provides a listing of references for persons seeking additional information. For readers familiar with the quadrennial volumes, *Presidential Elections*, by Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, these two shorter books may, however, be something of a disap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointment. Watson's *The Presidential Contest*, and to a lesser extent Wayne's book, lack some of the rich historical and illustrative examples found in the Polsby and Wildavsky volumes. Nor is there the constant attention to the strategic implications of the political environment or the spirited discussion of the consequences of changes in presidential selection processes for the functioning of basic American political institutions such as political parties and the presidency.

JOHN F. BIBBY
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Policy *by Robert A. Katzmann. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980. 223 pp. $17.50.*

The making of antitrust policy has come under increasingly close scrutiny in recent years. First, penetrating questions have been raised about its economic foundations and whether, for example, attacks on vertical integration and concentrated industry structures improve or impair economic efficiency. A striking shift in Supreme Court decisions since 1974 attests to the power of these arguments. More recently, the process by which antitrust policy is made has been examined, and these findings may force a similar reconsideration of the structure by which antitrust policy is developed and enforced.

Several approaches have been taken in this examination of the determinants of antitrust policy. One group, drawing on organizational theory for an evaluation of incentives influencing regulatory judgments, suggested that the Antitrust Division (of the Justice Department) will outperform the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because the division is not a creature of Congress or closely supervised by it. Others sought to relate antitrust case selection to economic variables or to organizational and individual self-interest. Still others pursued the idea of industry capture. Aside from their narrowness and self-contradiction, these theories often strayed from the supporting evidence or ignored obvious rejoinders. Similarly, the argument that FTC's often inconsistent performance can be explained by the tension between competition and stability in the agency's statutory mandate failed to fit the underlying data.

These simplified efforts to understand the enforcement actions of antitrust agencies are now giving way to broader institutional studies of the operation of government bureaus. As part of an MIT Press series on American politics and public policy, Katzmann studied the structure of the agency and the incentives of those involved in the FTC's antitrust case-selection process. He found that the initial—and often decisive—work is undertaken by inexperienced attorneys in the FTC's competition bureau who are charged with investigating and prosecuting cases. Seeking trial experience to further their careers, they favor simple conduct cases picked from the commission's mailbag instead of planned, complex structural cases for which they lack economic training or commitment. However, the trial staff's pressure for "reactive" rather than "proactive" cases is checked by several forces: an evaluation committee staffed by both supervisory lawyers and an economist who often pursue other goals; the bureau director who must propose and defend the case before the commission; and finally by the commission itself. The commission is also advised by the bureau

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of economics which acts like an academic unit whose future is determined by professional esteem rather than litigation victories. Into this mix, Katzmann notes, one must also account for the commissioners' concern for congressional approval, their view of the public interest, and their desire for success at trial and on judicial review.

The strength of Katzmann's analysis lies in his sensitivity to the many forces which come into play in the FTC's case decisions and for how these forces interact with each other in the final decision process. He shows that people and organizational structures make a difference, that bureaucracies are affected (if not controlled) by their leaders. His explanation would have been more persuasive and his thesis more powerful had he provided greater documentation buttressed by specific case illustrations. But the book's primary weakness is its antique, bipolar view of antitrust; antitrust case selection involves more than an easy choice between simple conduct or complex structural matters. Nor does the author adequately account for the affect of particular policy views or FTC procedure on the case-selection process. He does not consider, for example, whether the FTC's total reliance on adjudication rather than rulemaking for its antitrust enforcement contributes to the relative authority of staff attorneys (over staff economists). However, these criticisms are themselves minor when compared to how Katzmann has enriched us with a broadened perspective of the forces that affect a significant antitrust agency.

ERNEST GELLHORN
University of Virginia

The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class *by Alvin W. Gouldner. New York, Seabury Press, 1979. 121 pp. $8.95.*

This slim volume, the second part of a trilogy that Gouldner calls "The Dark Side of the Dialectic," is a brilliant piece of work. In just ninety-three pages of text, Gouldner achieves a splendid ordering of the much-muddied concept of "new class," an insightful charting of the sociopolitical role of this class, and a formidably final burial of aspects of Marxist theory that bear on the class structure of contemporary social systems. This volume can be read easily in a single sitting, and it should be read by social scientists in need of conceptual guidance—and that includes a lot of us—as they examine the distinguishing social cleavages of advanced industrial societies.

The basic idea of a new class originates in a set of absolutely unambiguous social developments. With the rise of industrialism and the concomitant collapse of subsistence-dominated, ascriptive class societies, there emerged social orders with divisions centering on what James Madison—with greater insight than Karl Marx—called "the *various* and *unequal* distribution of property." While it was almost never simply *middle class* (capitalists, bourgeoisie) versus *working class* (workers, the proletariat), such a split was surely present and frequently distinguishing. Then with the general evolution of the industrial system—and especially with the elaboration of science and advanced technology, and the massive increases in formal education—there took place a major growth of both intellectuals (the creators of new knowledge, ideas, culture) and the intelligentsia (the users and appliers of science, technology, ideas). These latter groups, growing steadily in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social influence, seemed to have the properties of a class that was new—new especially in that it was at once composed of "haves" (rather than "have-nots") and challenging and demanding change as it confronted the old middle classes. But beyond its recognition of these basic developments, the literature on the new class has typically been disturbingly imprecise.

Alvin Gouldner's most important contribution in the present volume comes with a very precise conceptual ordering. Central to his argument is the position that the new class does indeed have concrete and coherent class interests. It is, Gouldner writes, "a new *cultural* bourgeoisie whose capital is not its money but its control over valuable cultures" (p. 21). Gouldner sketches "a general theory of capital" in which moneyed capital is seen as only part of the whole and, in advanced industrial societies, a part which is declining in importance compared to cultural capital.

The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class is sound, unusually well argued, and persuasive.

EVERETT CARLL LADD
University of Connecticut

Democracy and Welfare Economics *by Hans van den Doel. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979. 174 pp. Cloth, $24.50; paper, $8.50.*

Van den Doel, an economist and former member of the Dutch Parliament, has written an intelligent and ingenious book, applying the tools of welfare economics to different forms of decision making and implementation common to democratic institutions. In doing so, he analyzes the potential of these institutions for arriving at "socially optimal" decisions.

Welfare economics is that part of the dismal science that deals with the effects of economic activity on social well-being. Its most widely known prescription, generally associated with the Italian social scientist Villifredo Pareto, is that a competitive economy will allocate goods, services, and factors of production, and distribute rewards, in a socially optimal way. "Optimality" is defined as a state in which no one can be made better off except to another's detriment. The common rebuttal to this view is that such a criterion justifies the historical distribution of wealth and power. Moreover, these results obtain only in a competitive environment, a condition rarely, if ever, met. Van den Doel, however, gives these rebuttals sufficient respect and avoids reliance on comparably unrealistic assumptions.

By avoiding this "all's well with the world" tone to which welfare economists often fall prey, van den Doel presents a believable analysis of four political forms: public participation, majority voting, representation, and bureaucracy. Each of these analyses contains some imagination and insight.

Using work on collective transitivity contributed by Arrow and others, van den Doel describes the necessary conditions under which a stable majority can be found on an issue for which a variety of positions are held. These amount to the following: some dimension

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the positions held must exist such that every voter's ranking of the positions is concave with respect to that dimension (single-peaked).

A good example of this theorem is the congressional deliberation of the decontrol of domestic crude oil and the accompanying "windfall profits" tax. The dimension of that issue that ordered positions correctly (from the point of view of the stability criterion) was the retention of the revenues generated from decontrol by the industry. If we sequence the alternatives that were under consideration—continued controls, decontrol with the tax, and outright decontrol—from left to right along an axis measuring increasing industry retention, then all the preferences reflected in the debate were sufficiently concave. "Consumer" preferences fell to the right. "Industry" preferences fell to the left. The president's preferences reached a maximum at the center (the tax), but fell faster to the left (controls) than to the right (decontrol). A "liberal" group also had its optimum at the center, but preferred the left to the right.

Given these preferences, the tax became a stable equilibrium. This equilibrium could have been destabilized by the insertion of a group that saw the tax as a least-preferred alternative. This would have made collective preferences intransitive and might have led to serial majorities. Such a position would have arose if a ranking were developed using a "conservative" preference and the dimension of "government interference" that saw decontrol as best (since laissez-faire minimizes the role of government), continued controls as second best (since if a subsidy is to exist, households should receive it directly), and the tax as last (since it gives the government a quarter-trillion dollars to deploy). Such a group could have prevented a majority from coalescing. Students of political process will gain insights from this type of application of van den Doel's work.

Van den Doel also offers ideas concerning bureaucracy and the size of the public sector. Politicians have the tendency to overproduce public goods, it might be argued, because their monopoly power in the public sector allows them to shift the costs of public goods to the economy at large—for example, deficit spending. Bureaucracies ratify this tendency in their quest to maximize budgets, yet simple "gold plating" leads to congressional audit and private-sector substitutes. Thus, the bureaucratic quest becomes a tendency to overproduce public goods.

Van den Doel has an interesting solution to this problem: self management. Syndicalist or self-managed enterprises are thought by economists to curtail employment in an effort to maximize output per worker. In many instances in government, worker self-management would not only curtail inefficiency, but assist in creating a more humane and desirable workplace, easing the tensions associated with government reorganizations.

Much of the debate concerning the expansion of the public sector is gratuitous, and more is the bleating of oxen yet ungored. As van den Doel recognizes, large private-sector actors may distort optimal outcomes through monopoly, inefficiency, and the creation of tastes and preferences. Is this a preferred alternative to a public sector that is prone to overdoing it? Van den Doel's response to the issue—an attempt to develop a theory by which democratic institutions can be improved—is far better than tossing the federal baby with the bathwater.

EVERETT M. EHRLICH
Congressional Budget Office

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New Economic View of American History *by Susan Previant Lee and Peter Passell. New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1979. 410 pp. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $9.95.*

This book satisfies a major need, though perhaps not the need it is being marketed to fill. Lee and Passell's new textbook serves as a convenient, comprehensive, clearly written, up-to-date survey of the literature of the new economic history. It is the place to look to find out the latest word on *Time on the Cross*, to learn how scholars have received Ransom and Sutch's new study of the postbellum South, to assess whether the Navigation Acts were a boon or burden to American commerce, or whether Federal Reserve policies worsened the depression of 1929. Lee and Passell have sorted out the works of innumerable authors, summarized their respective contributions, indicated which of their findings have withstood critical attack, and isolated the issues that remain to be resolved. They have performed a valuable service by reducing an unwieldy body of literature to manageable form.

This said, the reader should be warned that the book's strengths are also its limitations—limitations that impair its usefulness as a textbook, as opposed to merely a survey of the literature. Because Lee and Passell restrict their attention to the contributions of new economic historians, they are forced to explicate arguments involving highly technical applications of economic theory. As a result, despite the authors' extraordinary efforts to convey the analysis in clear, simple prosé (they even include appendices explaining essential economic concepts), much of the book is inaccessible to those without training in economics.

A more important drawback is the book's incomplete coverage of the subject matter of history. The broad, inclusive titles that head the sixteen chapters are very misleading. Despite the heading "Economic Growth and Institutional Change after the Civil War," chapter 13 deals almost exclusively with the issue of the indispensability of American railroads. Similarly, chapter 14 on "Government Intervention" contains a discussion of post-Civil War land policy rather than the expected treatment of the changing role of the federal government in the economy. Aside from a chapter on the Great Depression and a few pages in chapter 13 on Populist discontent, the only other material on the economy in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries is part of a chapter on the changing distribution of wealth. The bulk of the book is devoted to the antebellum economy, especially to the South. But even here the coverage is uneven. The institutional context of antebellum development is completely missing—the changes in the role of economic elites and in the legal and political system that were conducive to economic growth.

These gaps in coverage, of course, follow directly from the authors' decision to restrict their attention to works of new economic historians. All the topics addressed by "cliometricians" are more than adequately covered in the text; the problem is that these historians have only written on a narrow range of subjects. One of the major disappointments of this book is that Lee and Passell never acknowledge that this is a problem. They are so enamored of the new economic history that they fail to step back and assess the overall contribution of this group of scholars—fail to point out the limitations as well as the strengths of their work. But I think that these limitations are important because they stem from fundamental differences between the disciplines of economics and history. Unlike

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history, research in economics is governed by what Thomas S. Kuhn has called a paradigm, a central behavioral model that directs the research efforts of individual scholars and unites their seemingly narrow and fragmentary studies into a meaningful whole. Problems arise, however, when the techniques of such a discipline are applied in a field where its paradigm does not rule. In such cases, the research effort may not coalesce into a unified whole, as the choice of topics will be determined by other considerations such as the tractability of the problem to the methods of the scientific discipline or the mere fact that a well-known scholar previously worked on a problem. Thus new economic historians have been attracted to the study of the antebellum South in part because the stability of its economic system made it easy to analyze. Similarly, Robert Fogel's attention-grabbing work on the indispensability of railroads generated a voluminous literature on that subject.

What is missing in Lee and Passell's book and in the new economic history in general is a sensitivity to the research concerns of the adopted discipline. Rather than a paradigm, research in history is governed by a sense of the past, not as a series of discrete topics that can be analyzed without regard for time, but as a continuous stream of events, each intimately related with what occurred before and after. Unless this sense of the past is developed, the new economic view of American history will remain narrow and fragmented.

NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX
Brown University

Class Structure and Income Determination *by Erik Olin Wright. New York, Academic Press, 1979. 271 pp. $21.00.*

Contrary to one common understanding of Thomas Kuhn's theory of the structure of scientific revolutions, not all great scientific theories are created or change all at once, as if by an instantaneous "gestalt-switch," to use Kuhn's metaphor. We now more usefully conceive of scientific theories changing through both evolutionary and revolutionary processes. Indeed, what we need to work toward is some conceptualization and measurement of scientific change (and, indeed, of all social and cultural change) in terms of microscopically and specifically measurable rates and scopes and consequences, some of which we may want to classify macroscopically as revolution, others as evolution.

This view of scientific change is supported by some recent comments on sociobiology by the philosopher-sociologist David Hull, in which he suggests that sociobiology, like the theories of phrenology and Darwinism in the nineteenth century, is only in its first stage of creation or development. It may, he says, evolve in complex ways into a successful and usable theory, as Darwinism did, or it may, like phrenology, which seemed equally plausible at its birth, fail to evolve into a viable paradigm or theory.

This view of change in scientific theories does not apply only to great theories in natural science. Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander has recently argued the case for evolution of great social-science theories through what he calls "revisionism," and the detailed and complex case he takes to illustrate his argument is "Parsonianism" or "functionalism" in contemporary social science. Alexander's argument is the more powerful for being de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rived from a systematic analysis of the logic of theory. Alexander shows that all great theories are necessarily made up of different constituents—epistemological, ideological, methodological, and propositional—that are not tightly integrated with one another because each has some degree of autonomy. Because of the complexity and relative autonomy of the different constituents of great scientific theories, their development is more likely to be uneven and piecemeal.

How does such evolutionary change occur? "Great theories are, in almost every case," says Alexander, "fundamentally ambiguous." The serious opposition which such theories generate is precisely in regard to the contradictions that these ambiguities create. Opponents are championing some part of social reality that a great theory has ignored or downplayed. Attending to these criticisms, supporters of the theory revise it in order to save it, thus restoring a more adequate emphasis to elements that were slighted in the original version of the theory. Thus, the theory is broadened, and supporters argue that this broadening is consistent with the founder's basic intention. It is up to intellectual history to decide whether this is actually the case. At the present time, for example, intellectual historians are still debating this matter in connection with the original statement and subsequent development of Mendelian theory.

I submit that this account of how change occurs in great scientific theories illuminates a great deal of the history of Marxism during the last 100 years. And it contributes significantly to understanding the excellent Marxist interpretation on class structure and income determination by Erik Olin Wright. Although he never says so explicitly, but very well recognizes implicitly, Wright is engaging in an outstanding piece of Marxist revisionism, not just an empirical testing of Marxism, as some have said. His is not at all primarily philosophical and nonempirical like that of the German Marxist revisionist, Habermas; nor is it like some of the French or Italian Marxist revisionists, for example, Poulantzas.

A product of Berkeley and Wisconsin, with an acknowledged large debt to the structural sociologist, Arthur Stinchcombe, Wright is very much bringing Marxism into adjustment with some, but not all, of the central features of American sociology. His sophistication in the nature of theory, in the logic of methodology and measurement, in the logic of causation, and in the uses of large-scale quantitative data-sets are as American as can be. Marxists have always proudly called themselves "scientific." Wright is thoroughly modern and scientific in his willingness to speak of the need for conceptual reform (not of certain central theoretical elements, however), to point to the "crudeness" of his data and his measures (see, for example, his discussion of control on p. 229), to modify hypotheses under the empirical test, and generally to insist upon his scientific rather than ideological purpose. He is also a modern American sociologist in allowing for social and cultural factors other than class in accounting for the determination of income. I recall his mentioning ideology, personality, occupations, socialization processes, the state, racism, gender, social mobility, and the structure of formal organizations as somehow codetermining variables along with his very precise, lucid, and theoretically sophisticated class variable. He shows empirically that this variable is an important, though not exclusive, direct determinant of income. And he "saves" his theory by arguing that the codeterminant variables are "mediated" by the class variable, thus making class "fundamental" (p. 163) and the codeterminant variables merely "important" (p. 226).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite its revisionist contribution, this exceptionally interesting book has not solved all the problems of Marxist theory to every social scientist's satisfaction. Indeed, some basic difficulties remain. Is the conceptual revision truly multivariate, with a set of social and cultural variables that are *in principle equally* "important" or determinative of income and other dependent social variables? Or is "fundamental" and "important" just another way of stating the older Marxist doctrine of all other variables but class being epiphenomenal? If the revision holds to the latter and not the former view, many of us will not be satisfied. Nor will we be satisfied with a theory that seems committed to leave out altogether the variable of values and norms as one (*and only one*) of the set of essential social and cultural variables necessary for empirical analysis and determination of dependent social variables. Here, too, Wright's revision is ambiguous, because although he does not mention values, he does speak of "ideological" factors (also called "myths") and "legitimating" process, both of which make sense only in terms of some set of values as a determining variable.

There are other difficulties, which there is no space to discuss here, but I do not want to focus too much on difficulties. This is a valuable book, full of contributions and difficulties, and both of these should be enormously stimulating to any social scientist who cares about social theory.

BERNARD BARBER
Barnard College
Columbia University

Financing the 1976 Election *by Herbert E. Alexander. Washington, D. C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1979. 871 pp. $35.00.*

This volume joins its four predecessors as a standard reference work on presidential campaign financing. Following previous research, it estimates total political expenditures, details spending by presidential candidates, surveys fund sources, and describes the campaign activities of labor and business. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) failure to provide detailed rosters of contributors has prevented Alexander from extending his prior analysis of contributions by leading families, presidential appointees, officers and directors of defense contractors and large corporations, and members of leading trade groups. In new lines of analysis, Alexander considers the establishment and operation of the FEC, the recent controversies about ethics in the executive and legislative branches, and the extensive maneuvering that has accompanied political-reform legislation.

Total 1976 campaign expenditures in nomination and election races for local, state, and national offices are estimated at $540 million—27 percent more than the 1972 estimate of $425 million, but short of the consumer price index's 33 percent upward surge. General-election expenditures by presidential and national party committees dropped from $103.7 million in 1972 to $88.7 million in 1976, due largely to the expenditure limits that accompanied public financing of presidential campaigns. Nomination expenditures soared by contrast: thirty Democratic contenders (thirteen qualifying for public grants) spent $46.3 million, while the Ford and Reagan campaigns cost $26.7 million. In congres-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sional campaigns and among party committees, incumbents and Republicans maintained long-standing financial advantages, although perhaps by diminished margins.

Strict disclosure laws, statutory contribution limits, and public suspicion following Watergate prompted dramatic changes in funding sources. The role of big givers declined sharply: in 1972, 1,254 individuals made gifts of $10,000 or more, aggregating $51.3 million; in 1976 there were only 288 such givers, contributing $17.8 million. Nonetheless, more than 53,000 donors gave $500 or more, totaling $17.8 million (27 percent of individual gifts), to campaigns for federal office and to national party committees. Small by earlier standards, these contributions are still well beyond the means of most citizens. The decline in large givers was accompanied by a less pleasing drop in the percentage of Americans making campaign contributions: the 1976 participation rate of 9 percent was as low as that in any presidential year since 1952.

Total public grants of $72 million were the most important new source of political funds: they were more than 50 percent of all presidential campaign expenditures, 35 percent in the nomination stage and 95 percent in the general election. On the other hand, one shares Alexander's alarm at the emerging financial role of corporate political action committees, ideological constituencies, mass mail fund-raising specialists, rock stars, and certain well-connected fund raisers who successfully solicit the committee gifts of $5,000 and the individual donations of $1,000 allowed by law. Alexander's prediction that independent expenditures, relatively unimportant in 1976, would become more common is already being confirmed in 1980.

The 1976 campaign was marked by sharp discontinuities. The Supreme Court did not announce the unconstitutionality of numerous provisions of the 1974 Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) amendments until January 1976. Congress took months longer to cure these defects. The FEC was thus burdened not only with the usual staffing, organizational, and operating problems of a new agency, but it faced the extraordinary deadlines of an imminent election in a context of steadily changing statutory and constitutional rules. Alexander's narrative about these short-term problems tends to undue pessimism. On the other hand, he raises genuinely troubling issues about the tendency for Congress to use its budget and oversight powers, the legislative veto (or threat of it), its influence over appointments, and repeated legislation to badger an agency with responsibility for regulating congressional campaigns.

Alexander's most telling point, however, is the FECA's potential deterrence of political activity in presidential campaigns. Inadequate general-election subsidies and the ban on all private contributions, the centralization of campaign spending in the candidates' national headquarters, and the fearsome burdens of regulation and reporting combine to minimize the availability of traditional campaign materials (buttons, bumper stickers, lawn signs, brochures) and to discourage the grass-roots citizen committees that spring up in presidential campaigns. FEC regulations and recent legislation may give new license for small-scale activities by citizen and party committees. But a serious rethinking of existing rules is needed to assure that the losers in political reform are not the citizen activists who constitute an enduring base of support for democratic politics.

DAVID ADAMANY
University of Maryland

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Urban Policy Making *edited by Dale Rogers Marshall. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1979. 283 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $9.95.*

Anyone interested in the state-of-the-art of the study of urban politics should consult this edited collection of essays. Marshall has assembled nine papers on urban politics presented at the 1978 meetings of the American Political Science Association. Like most of the essays in the six earlier volumes in the Sage Politics and Public Policy series, the essays in Marshall's volume are well written and carefully thought out. It is therefore at once both a watershed collection of empirical research for scholars interested in urban politics and a potentially interesting supplementary text for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses.

Urban Policy Making is divided into five parts, including the editor's fine introductory essay. Part I includes essays by Douglas Yates and Demetrios Caraley on the determinants of public policy. Part II contains articles by Susan Welch and Albert K. Karnig and by Peter K. Eisinger on minorities and policy. Part III has essays about the impact of the urban fiscal crisis on local politics and policy by Paul E. Peterson, by Stephen M. David and Paul Kantor, and by Louis H. Masotti. The concluding section includes essays by Richard C. Rich and Sara L. Silbiger examining the distribution of benefits in urban service delivery. Together these essays cover most of the major topics that have dominated research on urban politics for the past fifteen years.

Although individual readers will no doubt prefer those articles closest to their research interests, I found the essays by Welch and Karnig and by David and Kantor to be especially intriguing. These articles are excellent extensions of research programs the authors have been working on for some time. In both cases, the authors come to important resolutions of some complex theoretical, methodological, and policy issues.

Welch and Karnig tackle a difficult methodological problem: what difference have black elected officials made on their city's revenues and expenditures? Their essay, "The Impact of Black Elected Officials on Urban Expenditures and Intergovernmental Revenues," uses measures of black representation on city councils and in the mayoralty in a sample of 139 cities with over 50,000 population. Welch and Karnig test five hypotheses about the relationship between black representation and expenditures for social welfare, amenities, physical facilities, protective services (especially fire), and intergovernmental revenue (especially federal aid) during the years 1968–1975. In general, they found that the presence of black mayors led to expenditures growing faster in social services, but more slowly in amenities, protective services, and physical facilities than in cities without black mayors. Representation on the city council had a lesser impact on expenditures mainly because in most of the sample cities (84 percent), blacks constituted less than 20 percent of the membership of the council, hardly enough to dominate policymaking.

Welch and Karnig have contributed an important piece of scholarship that provides answers to some of the nagging questions originally posed ten years ago when Richard Hatcher and Carl Stokes were first elected to office in Gary, Indiana, and Cleveland, Ohio. But their research, as it is presented in the Marshall volume, is limited in three significant ways, none of which is the fault of the authors. First, they admit that their data do not allow them to trace the intracity distribution of services and jobs that might

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flow from increased black representation. Without distributive data they cannot analyze changes within expenditure categories. Second, by using only local representation, they overlook the important role of black representation in state legislatures in shaping direct and indirect state aid to localities. Finally, by cutting off their data base in 1975, they are unable to analyze the impact of austerity on local expenditures and on black political influence. If the impact of fiscal stress results in a diminution of public programs of all kinds, then the fruits of black representation may prove to be less substantive and more symbolic than even the most severe critics of mainline politics for blacks have charged.

It is the linking of fiscal stress with political theory that distinguishes the strongest and most innovative essay in this volume, David and Kantor's "Political Theory and Transformation in Urban Budgetary Arenas: The Case of New York City." At last two scholars have stepped into the theoretical vacuum that followed New York City's fiscal crisis of the 1970s with a theory-based, empirically grounded explanation for the politics of the period. Unlike the Marxist explanations which proliferated after the crisis, David and Kantor neither blame the bankers for the crisis nor point to the internal contradictions of late capitalist economies for New York City's troubles. Instead, they trace its shifting coalitional alignments and its changing budgetary politics to the declining economic fortunes of the city.

To underscore their contention that politics follows resources, David and Kantor use the budgetary history of New York City since 1945 to develop an elaborate typology of environmental factors, decisional patterns, and budgetary outputs. During the period, budgetary politics shifted from an accommodative incremental pattern (1945–1962) to a pluralist pattern of increased competition for budget allocations (1963–1974) and then to a pattern of elite budgetary politics (1975–1978) where the city's economic decline precipitated a takeover of the budgetary system by business-dominated institutions like the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) and the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB). The full policy significance of their argument is illustrated in the final typology where the authors pose the grave problem of governing a politically conflictual community undergoing economic decline. Under these conditions, the possibility that a political system might evolve into a period of political instability "leaves few other options than the use of more coercive techniques for obtaining social control over a hostile citizenry" (p. 215).

The significance of this observation is typical of the issues posed in the contributions to this excellent collection. The articles by Welch and Karnig and by David and Kantor are merely illustrative of the general high quality of essays Marshall has assembled. They are also illustrative of the many serious problems facing urban policymakers as we enter the austere decade of the 1980s.

CHARLES H. LEVINE
University of Maryland

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hon. Politician: Mike Mansfield of Montana *by Louis Baldwin. Missoula, Montana, Mountain Press Publishing Company, 1979. 362 pp. $14.95.*

This book, regrettably, is a "biographical anthology," not a biography. In the first thirty pages, Mr. Baldwin, a free-lance writer and former college teacher of English, contributes a sensitive portrait of Senate Majority Leader Mansfield's thirty-four-year congressional career and life style. The balance of the book consists of excerpts from Mansfield's most important statements and speeches in the *Congressional Record.* A few are based on House experiences (1943–52); the vast majority treat of his Senate career (1953–76), especially statements made during his last sixteen years as majority leader. The excerpts were chosen "primarily because of their relevance to memorable events and to Mansfield's personality, professional conduct, and political philosophy" (p. 31).

Still, this is a valuable collection for several reasons. First, although Mansfield served longer in the Senate majority leadership than anyone in history—sixteen years—he remains a somewhat enigmatic figure. Less is known about his background and accomplishments than many a senator, in part, because this quiet, laconic leader was less ambitious than most of his colleagues and more considerate of others, especially junior members. Second, Mr. Baldwin has made excellent choices, prefacing each speech with short, sympathetic introductions.

As would be expected, many excerpts treat Mansfield's role in foreign policy, particularly his opposition to the Vietnam War and his attempts to redress policy in the Far East. When still a youth, Mansfield had enlisted, consecutively, in three different branches of the armed services. Part of his time with the U.S. Navy was spent in the Far East where he developed a love of the people and their customs. Both in the House and the Senate he was preoccupied with foreign policy, initially as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and later as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and in his capacity as majority leader.

Perhaps no one has put Senator Mansfield's career in clearer perspective than his own statement announcing his retirement from the Senate on 4 March 1976. His congressional years, he pointed out, encompass "one-sixth of the nation's history since independence, the administrations of seven Presidents, the assassination of a President and other extreme outrages against human decency, able political leadership and seamy politics and chicanery, the dawn of the nuclear age and men on the moon, a great war and a prelude to two more wars and an uneasy peace, and a dim perception of world order and an uncertain hope for international peace" (p. 340).

Mike Mansfield deserves far more than a collection of his speeches, however—at a minimum, a full-length biography. It would begin with his Irish immigrant ancestry and encompass the paradox of a "Marlboro man" from Montana born in the Hell's Kitchen section of Manhattan Island. And it should not end with Congress, or perhaps, even with his contemporary service as ambassador to Japan. If one is looking for integrity, complemented by years of experience in foreign and domestic policy, why not a "draft Mansfield" movement for the presidency?

ROBERT L. PEABODY
Johns Hopkins University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy *by James H. Noyes. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1979. 144 pp. $6.95.*

There have been major political convulsions in the countries in and near the Persian Gulf during the past few years. The Shah of Iran has been replaced by a militant Islamic republic. A succession of Marxist regimes ruled Afghanistan leading up to the invasion and occupation by the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia faced a variety of domestic and external threats.

These crises have had a particularly devastating effect on U.S. alliance structures and the politics of the region. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), conceived as a quarantine line between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, collapsed. Pakistan and Iran became nonaligned. Afghanistan, previously nonaligned, became part of the Soviet satellite empire. American ground stations in Iran, which monitored Soviet activities, have been closed. Iran's armed forces, once one of the largest and best equipped in the world, have disintegrated. Not only has Iran's regional role—checking the expansion of "radical and pro-Soviet" forces in the region—collapsed, but the country has embarked on an enthusiastically anti-American course. Iraq, which in the past has followed a policy of neutrality with a pro-Soviet tilt, has become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Iranian oil exports have decreased by more than 3 million barrels a day, and increased pressure for substantial increases in the prices of oil is threatening the economics of the consuming nations, especially the least fortunate ones. While U.S. dependence on the area has increased, its ability to influence developments there has decreased. In the light of these reversals, it seems necessary to subject past U.S. foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf region to a hard, critical review. The cumulation of problems points to mistakes, misperceptions, and crucial oversights in U.S. foreign policy toward the countries in and near the Persian Gulf.

James Noyes, who was deputy secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian affairs from 1970 to 1976, has undertaken the unenviable task of attempting to vindicate U.S. policies on the Persian Gulf. He tries hard to justify the "Nixon Doctrine," a policy of relying on regional influentials, especially Iran, for the security of the area and protection of Western interests, and dismisses those who argue about the likelihood of political instability and revolutionary changes in the area. Noyes considers the substantial sale of arms to the countries of the region to be mutually beneficial and considers U.S. policy, unlike that of the USSR, successful because it did not make the mistake of "trying to found its position on the narrowly defined military strength rather than strong political relationships" (p. 56).

One of the main features of the book is Noyes's sympathy for regional arrangements to deal with security problems in the Persian Gulf. Under the "Nixon Doctrine" the United States encouraged the Shah to seek a regional security pact. Although the fall of the Shah was a severe blow to that doctrine, a regional security pact continues to figure prominently in discussions about Persian Gulf security. Such proposals do not present a sufficiently differentiated picture of the situation in the region. While there are some common characteristics shared by the countries in the area, there are vital differences which make a credible joint defense arrangement unlikely. Although, for example, all countries in the region are Islamic, they are divided among shiites and sunnis. The shiite government in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iran is inciting the shiites in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Religious disagreements go along with more secular and symbolic disputes in the Gulf area, where the political groupings range from radical Left to "clannish absolutists." A number of borders in the region remain either partially or completely undefined, and even those resolved are challenged by powerful political forces in some countries. Besides, the region is subjected to conflicting external pressures.

Noyes's book is of great utility because it clearly states the assumption of and the thinking behind U.S. policies toward the Persian Gulf during the Nixon and Ford administrations, even though subsequent events have demonstrated that they were gravely mistaken.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD
Columbia University

Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World *edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber. New York, Longman, Inc., 1979. 365 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $6.95.*

Essentially a scorecard on the first two years of Carter administration foreign policy, this collection of essays exudes disillusionment with Carter's performance even as it attempts to salvage the philosophical respectability of his "world order" approach. What results is an ambivalent apology, the tenor of which is conveyed by these words from Kenneth Oye's nonetheless professional keynote essay: "The foreign policy of the Carter administration can be evaluated as a necessarily imperfect solution to this dual problem [of power diffusion and greater complexity in the international system]. Numerous critics of the administration frequently characterize its foreign policy as unfocused, inconsistent, unstable, and ineffective. This chapter argues that the essence of the problem is structural. The lack of focus [is due to] the multiplication of issues affecting national interests . . . inconsistency [to] tradeoffs across those interests . . . fluctuations [to] the instability of these tradeoffs . . . ineffectiveness [to] the confluence of contracting power, expanding interests, and increasing complexity. This does not imply that Carter administration foreign policy is beyond criticism, but rather that a simple change in tactics, or in Presidents, cannot alleviate frustration that is rooted in the setting of American foreign policy" (p. 4). Read in the heat of the 1980 campaign, the point merits reflection.

Profiting from conference interplay, the circulation of manuscripts, and other collaboration, the compilers have successfully elicited a measure of common thematic perspective among essays which are otherwise diverse in style and less than uniform in quality. Two overview chapters on the external and internal settings of foreign policy are followed by four contributions on functional problems and six on regional issues. The functional category includes two chapters on foreign economic policy—one devoted to coordination of economic policies among advanced market economy countries, and the other to North-South issues—along with essays on the policies of nuclear proliferation and human rights that became trademarks of the Carter administration. Part three contains regional studies of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, China, Latin America, and Africa and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two relatively issue-specific studies of U.S. policies toward Eurocommunism and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Mandelbaum and Schneider's overview may be the most imaginative of the essays—an analysis of public opinion, ideational tendencies, and related political obstacles to foreign policy consensus after Vietnam. Robert Keohane's treatment of U.S. economic growth, trade, and energy policies, and the problems they pose for policy coordination in the industrialized world, is cogent and businesslike, as is Michael Nacht's survey of nonproliferation policy dilemmas. Ernst Haas's analysis of human rights is both rigorous and instructive on the follies of failing to temper principles in application.

In the regional section, Abraham Lowenthal's essay on Latin America is a model of readability: insightful, comprehensive, and yet admirably brief. Banning Garrett's chapter on China and the strategic triangle is refreshingly sober and informative, while Donald Rothchild's piece on Africa is substantive but congested. Caldwell and Dallin are skillfully revisionist in interpreting U.S.-Soviet relations but have been noticeably overtaken by the recent events in Afghanistan. Steven Spiegel's critique of Camp David diplomacy expresses a common anxiety that Israel's security is being sold out for oil.

This book may be useful for a year or two as a supplementary textbook in courses on U.S. foreign relations and is a modest scholarly contribution to the literature on presidential performance. It is bound to be quickly outdated, however, by studies that take a more thorough measure of the first four years of the Carter administration, that are free of campaign fashions and ritual criticisms (such as the obsession with Kissinger's style), that give sober coverage to the issues of military power and strategic arms control, and that treat regional issues less selectively. A balanced analysis of the Carter period, even if that period terminates in 1980, will undoubtedly pay far more attention to energy policy, where the cumulative results of incremental initiatives are likely to appear more impressive in retrospect.

RODNEY W. JONES
Columbia University

The SALT Experience *by Thomas W. Wolfe. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1979. 405 pp. $18.50.*

Thomas Wolfe, a Rand analyst who is a leading expert on Soviet military strategy and behavior, has provided a useful summary of Soviet and American military policy over the past decade. Although he concentrates on each side's SALT policies, he realizes that they cannot be considered outside of the broader military and political context. Thus, instead of presenting a blow-by-blow description of the negotiations of the SALT I and II treaties, he integrates this analysis with a discussion of the general evolution of Soviet and American arms postures. The footnotes are particularly full and provide an excellent guide to both secondary sources and government documents.

Although he does not provide the details that can be found in John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn*, Strobe Talbott's *Endgame*, and the first volume of Kissinger's memoirs (the latter two books appeared after Wolfe's), there are advantages as well as costs in Wolfe's ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proach. There is less danger of the reader, especially one who is not an expert in national security policy, getting lost in the specific proposals and counterproposals made by each side. Although such information is fascinating, emersion in it may detract from a consideration of the more general questions of what each side was doing, why it was doing it, and the probable impact of its behavior. The detailed bargaining actually may have been relatively unimportant. It is interesting to note, as Wolfe does on the first page of his study, that as early as 1964 President Johnson "proposed that Washington and Moscow explore 'a verified freeze' on strategic offensive and defensive arms." By and large, this is what the SALT treaties did. Wolfe also compensates for the lack of detail by giving alternative explanations for each side's behavior and giving the best arguments for and against various American policies. In an arena as charged with policy questions as this one, most authors allow their own preferences to affect strongly their analysis. Wolfe does not. A third strength of the book lies in the treatment of Soviet policy and the structure of Soviet organization for dealing with SALT-related issues. Here is the area of Wolfe's greatest expertise, and here he provides information not obtainable elsewhere.

Has SALT made a difference? And if so, has this been in the American interest? As Wolfe indicates, these are the central questions. Even though American statesmen adopted different views on what the best military policy and SALT negotiation stance would be, they all hoped to influence favorably Soviet behavior through arms-control negotiations and agreements. (One irony is that changing technology and changing analyses have led each side to renounce positions that they once favored. The United States, for example, tried to ban land-mobile ICBMs in SALT I only to find that it needed them several years later.) Wolfe points out the ambiguity of the evidence and reaches the sound conclusion that neither side appears to have been willing to make major modifications in its "unilateral preferences and programs" in order to accommodate negotiated and mutually acceptable goals (pp. 252–53).

My only quarrel with Wolfe is not that any of his judgments are unreasonable, but rather that he choose more to describe than to explain and that he is hesitant to give his own views which must, given the nature of the problems, be partly speculative. Sticking close to the facts is of course admirable, but it also opens the way for others, with less information and fewer inhibitions, to set the tone of the debate about these important questions of history and policy.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency *by Duncan L. Clarke. New York, The Free Press, 1979. 277 pp. $15.95.*

Duncan Clarke, of American University, has produced a very good work from an underdeveloped genre of the otherwise glutted foreign-policy field of bureaucratic politics. The book is a well-written institutional analysis of a small, often troubled, occasionally important organization in the national security policymaking process. Clarke discusses the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political history of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); its delicate relations with administration leadership, executive competitors (including its parent, the State Department), Congress, and interest groups; and the formal and informal mechanisms through which the agency attempts to exert influence and defend itself from predators. The analysis is based primarily on interviews, congressional documents, and Clarke's contacts with the agency over a period of several years. Comparable studies of the Defense Department's Office of International Security Affairs or the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs would be useful complements. For some reason, however, most students of the policy process prefer to dissect single cases of issues that cross-cut organizations, rather than the reverse. Clarke's analysis is a welcome entry.

The author is forthright about his warm feelings for ACDA and his desire to enhance the agency's position. Occasionally this colors his interpretation of wrongs done to ACDA by hawkish skeptics, but only slightly. (For example, he emphasizes the purge of doves from the agency when Fred Ikle became director after the SALT I treaty, but denigrates the significance of opposing changes under Paul Warnke.) The one difficulty of the book—which may be inherent in the otherwise desirable choice of organization rather than policy as the focus of analysis—is the linkage between substance and process. While Clarke is concerned that ACDA does not get its due in policy councils, he does not *demonstrate* that the agency's positions have ever been any more correct than those of its opponents, such as the Defense Department. He also does not indicate sufficiently where external strategic determinants have been crucial, and internal politics trivial, in changing the agency's role. For example, he notes that administrations were more receptive to arms-control proposals in the late 1960s and 1970s than earlier. But this, I suspect, had little to do with bureaucratic or domestic politics. Until the end of the 1960s the United States was committed to maintaining nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, a policy which could only be threatened by serious arms control. Thus, negotiated regulation became acceptable and desirable only when the massive Soviet build-up approached parity and forced Washington to cede the policy of superiority.

To expect the author to tackle the merits of arms-control proposals in addition to the politics of the process would be to ask too much. As it stands, Clarke's book is a valuable survey in breadth and depth of ACDA's history, role, and enduring problems. It will be most useful to practitioners seeking to understand the background and variation of ACDA's role, activities, and influence or to scholars interested in the infrastructure of the policymaking process for strategy and arms control.

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949 *by Escott Reid. Toronto, Canada, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1979. 315 pp. $13.95.*

If the intensity of the debate between "traditionalists" and "revisionists" over the origins of the cold war has diminished in recent years, the outpouring of scholarly studies has not slowed. The greater availability of foreign archival sources has helped to refocus attention on the international context of the Soviet-American confrontation. An emerging theme of cold war scholarship is the extent to which Washington's policies were shaped by the urgings and counsels of America's allies, most notably England, France, and Canada. Escott Reid, who was deputy undersecretary of state for external affairs in Canada in 1947–49, has emphasized this theme of "ally influence" in his study of the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pact. Partly a graceful and witty memoir, Reid's book also rests upon thorough research in Canadian records and manuscripts, as well as familiarity with the secondary literature and published records elsewhere. Scholars using British and American sources may uncover new details, but they are unlikely to challenge Reid's central thesis that the making of the North Atlantic Treaty was a collaborative effort, that more than Dean Acheson and American statesmen were "present at the creation" (p. 63).

As suggested by his title, Reid argues that the twin motives of fear and hope gave birth to the NATO alliance. Fear of Soviet aggression predominated in the early stages of tripartite (United States, Britain, and Canada) discussion in Washington in March 1948. The Soviet-sponsored *coup* in Czechoslovakia in February and Russian pressures against Berlin and Norway generated a real sense of alarm and urgency. Although Kremlinologists like George Kennan and Charles Bohlen considered an armed Soviet attack highly unlikely, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King thought "we might see fire around the world before very long" (p. 18). The governments of Norway and Denmark were also thoroughly frightened. Reid rightly emphasizes that the Truman administration did not panic during the so-called spring crisis of 1948, but rather took advantage of Soviet scare tactics to get congressional backing for military rearmament, Marshall Plan appropriations, and collective security measures. In an ironic twist, Reid suggests that the presence of Soviet agent Donald Maclean during the preliminary (supposedly secret) negotiations in Washington may have influenced the Kremlin to undertake a "peace offensive" in April and May 1948. The Soviet blockade of Berlin in June, however, reinforced Western fears and renewed the impetus for a defensive alliance.

Reid writes most eloquently of the positive "hopes" he and other NATO architects had for supranational institutions and solutions that went well beyond old-fashioned military alliances. State Department spokesmen John D. Hickerson and Theodore C. Achilles, British Undersecretary Gladwyn Jebb, Reid himself—all thought in terms of building new federal institutions, either European or Atlantic. Canada's insistence on a North Atlantic structure, according to Reid, helped break down sentiment in Washington for a unilateral military guarantee. National sovereignty had its defenders, of course, most notably Senators Vandenberg and Connally (and occasionally Dean Acheson), but Reid fully documents the attraction and power of supranational visions. The inclusion of Article 2 in the NATO treaty, urging greater economic cooperation, marked a partial victory for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those supporting North Atlantic integration. Reid's biggest disappointment is that NATO has not moved further in this direction.

Although Reid's book will be of primary interest to cold war historians, it should be noted that Nicholson-like gems on the art of diplomacy are sprinkled throughout the narrative. One hopes that this is not Reid's last effort at combining memoir writing and scholarly research.

J. GARRY CLIFFORD
University of Connecticut

Rhetoric and Reality: Presidential Commissions and the Making of Public Policy *by Terrence R. Tutchings. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 164 pp. $18.50.*

The author sets out to describe advisory commissions as policymaking entities, analyze the linkage between official commission recommendations and actual policies, and clarify the gap between rhetoric and reality in the commission/policymaking process. Unfortunately, these important substantive issues are never satisfactorily analyzed within the context of the study. Moreover, this book tells you everything you did not know and probably did not need to know about the statistical significance of aggregating the official recommendations of ninety-nine public commissions operating between 1945 and 1972.

The author views the commission within the analytical context of Thomas Dye's policy-process model presented in *Who's Running America: Institutional Leadership in the United States* (Prentice-Hall, 1976). For Tutchings, "policy commissions capture all of the actors and actions of Dye's policy picture. . . . they draw their commissioners and staff members from among the prestigious and nonprestigious members of corporations, universities, foundations, the news media, other policy planning groups, the government, and from the general public. . . . 'policy inputs' flow to the policy commissions. From the commission, reports and policy recommendations flow to the president, and from the president, flow recommendations for legislative decisions or administrative actions" (p. 16).

Tutchings asks "do commissions make public policy or more rhetoric?" The data base is official, published commission reports which are later coded and subjected to content analysis. The ninety-nine public commissions are subsequently analyzed in terms of 5,053 "discrete recommendations" made by 1,259 commissioners (who are later compared with Dye's constitutional elites). For those interested, "no commission failed to make recommendations" (p. 56). The mean number of recommendations was 53.1, the median 30.0. Of the 5,053 recommendations, someone called "president" (Truman through Nixon) was involved in 168, or 3.3 percent, specific recommendations, while Congress was involved in 368, or 7.3 percent (p. 57). If you are interested in "frequency of actions in 5,053 recommendations," a category called "other" (vague and unspecified actions) occurred 1,518, or 30 percent of the time in commission action recommendations (p. 59). By mixing apples and oranges (in this case, for example, the 1964 Warren Commission with the 1948 Commission on Higher Education), we learn nothing about variation within and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between administrations or how the political process, environment, or presidential personalities shaped commission recommendations. Tutchings does note that "the crucial variable that is in operation throughout is the changing presidential style" (p. 112), and that commissions "are clearly shown to be but reflections of the man who occupies the office of the President of the United States. They are but extensions of the power of a political actor, tools of his choosing" (p. 113). Yet, no analysis of these key variations to style are undertaken.

At other times, normative and biased commentary replaces Tutchings's statistical analysis. Criticizing Richard Nixon for not placing commission recommendations on the national agenda, thus characterizing the 1970s as "the demise of 'government by commission' " (p. 113), Tutchings absurdly asks whether this might have been Nixon's "high crime and misdemeanor" (p. 113–14). Rather than a "breach of faith," Tutchings sees a "breach of the 'commission tradition' " in the Nixon years.

Several of Tutchings's more interesting findings are that while the ninety-nine commissions were dominated by corporate representatives, during the Nixon and Johnson administrations, policy results were practically nil. "In short, it mattered little which elite or nonelite sector was represented by the commissions, for few actions resulted on the part of the President" (p. 113). Moreover, between 1945 and 1972 commissions were used more frequently and grew in size; public dissent by members increased and corporate, not public, interests dominated commission membership. Yet presidential response literally disappeared. What then is the role of commissions and rhetoric? Here Tutchings has the interesting idea that policymakers "be held strictly accountable for that which they say. Rhetorical policy may not lead directly to action, but rhetorical policy does affect the hopes of those desiring action" (pp. 119–20). All of which reminds us of John Mitchell's warning, "Don't listen to what we say, watch what we do."

LARRY BERMAN
University of California, Davis

Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America *by E. Richard Brown. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. 283 pp. $12.95.*

Major changes occurred in the nature of the medical-care system in the United States during the Progressive Era (1880–1930). The system of scientific medicine was introduced and became the dominant modality; the hospital became the locus of medical-care delivery; medical education became research-oriented and university-based; and physicians became almost exclusively upper-middle-class white men. Many books have looked into the causes and nature of these changes, and most have concluded that medical science, operating autonomously, advanced itself by the sheer superiority of its ability to provide a better, more effective theory and practice of medicine. Recent research, though, indicates that not only was scientific medicine not more effective therapeutically but its theory, as understood at that time, was also badly flawed. How then can one account for the enormous changes that medicine underwent?

It has long been known that the large philanthropic foundations, primarily the Carne-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gie Foundation and the various Rockefeller philanthropies were active in the support of scientific medicine. The Carnegie Foundation sponsored the influential *Flexner Report on Medical Education* in 1910, and the Rockefeller General Education Board gave $154,000,000 to scientific medical education between 1910 and 1930. Aside from such nonanalytical and stock answers as humanitarianism, enlightened humanism, or public relations, no one has ever looked at why these foundations supported a particular modality of medicine.

Brown attempts this task in an original and insightful manner. As the subtitle suggests, he relates the new form of medicine to the needs of the prevailing economic system. Using the newly opened Rockefeller archives, Brown is able to document the actual dynamics of foundation involvement in the nascent medical-care system. He highlights the role of Frederick T. Gates, the chief aide to John D. Rockefeller on philanthropic matters, in getting the elder Rockefeller, along with his son, to give financial support to scientific medicine.

Scientific medicine based on the germ theory of disease, Brown argues, was an ideal ideological tool for capitalists during an era of intense social agitation. Gates believed that all disease was caused by bacteria and that given enough personnel and microscopes the cause of disease could be identified and the disease either prevented or cured. Being able to blame disease on asocial microbes rather than the conditions of existence and social relations under capitalism proved a boon to the legitimacy of capitalism. Changing the class basis of physicians, eliminating women, blacks, and working-class men, ensured that the new professionals would be supportive of the status quo and thus act as stabilizing influences in their communities.

Brown thoroughly documents the extent of foundation involvement in the changing medical-care scene. Starting with the origins of foundations, he traces their historical path from retail to wholesale philanthropy and then into medical research and education and their spread to Third World countries. Much attention is devoted to the clinical full-time plan, the mechanism through which clinical physicians gave up their private practices and located themselves full-time within the hospital. This helps to explain how the hospital became the prime delivery site for medical care and how clinical physicians were removed from their communities.

In the final chapter of the book, Brown explores the changes in foundations with respect to health policy since the 1930s. With the federal government taking up the bulk of the funding for health research, foundations have moved into a policymaking role. Brown shows how many of the problems with our health-care system—high cost; ineffectiveness; technological orientation—can be traced back to the foundations and their role in the American political economy. This is an invaluable book for anyone attempting to understand the nature and logic of health policy in the United States.

HOWARD S. BERLINER
New York University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unions in American National Politics *by Graham K. Wilson. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979. 168 pp. $18.95.*

Labor politics is a subject that is strangely ignored. Political scientists, economists, sociologists, lawyers, even journalists typically neglect it. Labor in the marketplace but not the political arena gets the attention. The deficiency is all the more striking in that Wilson sees labor as the "example *par excellence* of pressure group politics" (p. 147). Labor's highly developed political machine is one of the best. And the decline of the parties has made interest-group politics a major force.

Wilson further states that union politics is also often misunderstood. American liberals tend to look down upon the workers and their leaders as hard-hat bigots. Europeans tend to measure U.S. unions by a false model of class politics and labor-party evolution. Wilson tries to approach his subject without such preconceptions and succeeds better than most. The author researched his subject well through extensive interviews with members of Congress, officials in the executive branch, and many union officials. He is knowledgeable, sympathetic yet judicious, and at times critical. The book is a gem that could be read with profit by almost anyone.

For all his brevity, Wilson manages to cover much territory. He opens with some history, then treats electoral and lobby activities, the attitudes of union members, labor and the Democratic party, labor and the federal executive, and, finally, labor and foreign policy. The closing chapter assesses labor's achievements, potential, and weaknesses. A basic theme is labor's skill and effectiveness in mobilizing its resources politically, but in closing Wilson explores the reasons for labor's limited accomplishments. The judicious comparisons drawn here and elsewhere with the European experience are revealing.

Several major emphases emerge. One is that American workers are not bigoted Archie Bunker types. They lean toward the Democratic party but are close to mainstream America. Second, it is clear that unions are deeply involved in politics, especially with Democrats. American unions reject the labor party model and prefer, instead, group politics within the existing party system. Third, labor seeks much that extends beyond union labor interests. The best example is probably civil-rights legislation. For that matter, labor has had more success with broad-gauged social legislation than with measures strictly oriented toward the union. Labor's liberal allies tend to lose interest when the latter is on the agenda. In the end Wilson builds a persuasive case that American labor is neither as backward nor as unique as critics suggest.

If there be faults they are matters of interpretation and emphasis. This reviewer, for one, would cite prominently the attitude of George Meany in explaining organized labor's lack of growth. Meany long dominated the movement, and he simply did not give membership expansion a high priority. Second, one might emphasize even more forcefully than Wilson does labor's commitment to social unionism and the welfare state, as against a parochial business unionism. Labor, or at least key parts of it, was often consciously the cutting edge of those political forces that successfully expanded the American welfare state.

Perhaps, too, Wilson ends on an unduly optimistic note as to labor's future. The conservative tide has grown ever stronger since he completed his research. It hardly bodes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

well for labor's political machine, in spite of its great strengths. In any event, Wilson does a superb job of illuminating a neglected subject.

HARRY HOLLOWAY
University of Oklahoma

Judges and Justices: The Federal Appellate Judiciary *by John R. Schmidhauser. Boston, Mass., Little, Brown and Co., 1979. 248 pp. $5.95.*

Schmidhauser's thoroughly documented, short study of federal appellate courts and judges joins analogous works by Goldman and Jahnige and by Richardson and Vines. Dissimilar, however, is the author's use of a "conceptual framework . . . adapted from Max Weber's theory positing the close relationship of independent, professional judiciaries and market capitalism" (p. vii).

Weber's formalistic and rationalistic model serves as a standard against which the author measures institutionalization of the federal judiciary and its contribution to stability of the larger political order. Examined are structural foundations rooted in separate powers, jurisdiction and procedures, judicial review, and judicial selection. Impingement by political actors and agencies on the judiciary leads Schmidhauser to doubt the validity of Weber's model for the federal court system (p. 240).

Judges and Justices is a work of vast and ambitious scope because the author attempts to tie Weber's model to the federal judiciary's role in promoting American market capitalism, a subject which he apparently intends to pursue further under a recent "Project 87" award. The book's sweeping scope doubtless contributes to a perceptible quality of unevenness in coverage. The Judicial Conference of the United States and the subsequently established Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts exemplify institutionalization of the judicial branch; they provide chief justices with important means for controlling lower federal courts. Yet neither is indexed or mentioned other than in reference to the burden cast by them on chief justices, a view Taft and Burger might challenge. But judicial salary history receives detailed consideration.

The Supreme Court dominates the study. Partly this condition arises from the author's long-standing interest in and expertise on that Court and its members. Thus his essay on judges' characteristics largely describes those collectively held by Supreme Court justices, although immensely useful and novel statistical data on both justices and inferior federal judges are provided in accompanying tables. That benches in the District of Columbia and the Second Circuit loom large in presentation of intermediate appellate court material cannot be blamed on the author alone. Scholarly research in this field is comparatively scarce. Other voids seem unexplainable. If the author considers "regularization of the norm of relatively frequent dissenting and concurring opinions" the foremost procedural change of the modern era for the Supreme Court, any reader must wonder whether the courts of appeals have also caught the disease. Shortchanged, too, is the importance of *Swift* v. *Tyson* to development of public policies in the context of nineteenth-century, bipolar, private litigation and the emergence of such policies through multiparty, public law litigation in the twentieth century.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Raised but unanswered are some important questions, among them: If opinion publication is a sign of institutionalization (p. 180), is the modern explosion of unpublished appellate opinions a sign of deinstitutionalization? If Supreme Court judges gain "valuable time at the expense of unproductive ceremony" (p.184), what effect might this tradeoff have on the judiciary's legitimacy? Would a national court of appeals erode the High Court's status, as suggested, or is it more likely to reduce that of the intermediate appellate courts as the 1891 Act reduced the status of federal district judges? And, if "contemporary development of the American federal appellate judiciary is in the context of capitalistic economic dominance" (p. 232), then what light is shed by application of the due-process clauses to so-called government entitlements and by the Court's conception of classification on the basis of wealth under the equal-protection clause?

Schmidhauser's book provides a valuable source of information as well as an ample supply of provocative issues for further discussion and research in undergraduate courses on law and politics. A welcomed addition to the literature, *Judges and Justices* constitutes a likely starting point for further scholarly investigation of federal intermediate appellate courts.

PETER G. FISH
Duke University

Food, Politics, and Agricultural Development: Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural Modernization *edited by Raymond F. Hopkins, Donald J. Puchala, and Ross B. Talbot. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980. 311 pp. $24.75.*

This collection of case studies is organized around a number of rural modernization experiences, with the intention of clarifying basic issues of agricultural development policy in comparative perspective. That goal is not pursued in any systematic way, however. The integrative effort is confined to a brief introductory chapter by Hopkins and Puchala, which is neither a guide to the rest of the book nor very illuminating on its own. A few thoughtful points appear, for example, on the sequencing of rural investment targets, but these are no more than passing notes. The authors' aim is to elaborate classifications of "policy components" and "issues" for the analysis of comparative rural modernization. Unfortunately, the basis and purpose of these categories are never explained and not easy to decipher. For example, acceptability of markets and types of rural institutions are "components," while acceptability of external inputs and rural participation are "issues." The whole exercise is fairly sterile and, in any case, pointless since the collected chapters make no reference whatsoever to these components and issues as organizing devices, which is admitted by the editors (p. 14).

Among the country and regional chapters, two are of exceptional interest to students of rural political economy. Thomas Bernstein contributes an excellent comparative interpretation of "The State and Collective Farming in the Soviet Union and China." A brief review of Stalinist collectivization and its long-term legacy provides a base for Bernstein's analysis of Chinese rural development. Among his many provocative observations is that "in China, collectivization was accomplished by the effective mobilization of intravillage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pressures rather than by simply unleashing the power of the state on the village" (p. 80). The contrasting role of the state in these two socialist experiences is examined with respect to a range of rural development problems, demonstrating the comparative restraint of the state in the People's Republic of China and the resulting advantages for agricultural problem solving there in contrast to the Soviet Union.

Ronald Herring and Charles Kennedy, Jr., take a much narrower focus, but one which is well documented and carefully argued. "The Political Economy of Farm Mechanization Policy: Tractors in Pakistan" is a very fine case study of a major policy issue over time, from the colonial period through the Bhutto regime. This study raises the most fundamental questions of development: who wins and who loses from technical changes, and what is the role of the state in relation to local, national, and international interests involved with such changes? Tractors *can* be instruments of human liberation and great productivity advances, but "the institutional framework is critical." The author's conclusions are supportive of the findings of Keith Griffin and other rural political economists working in South Asia (and elsewhere): In Pakistan, "the benefits of technical change . . . accrue to those already privileged; the deprivations fall on those already deprived" (pp. 220–21). The causes of and the evidence for this outcome are presented in a balanced and convincing fashion.

Several other chapters deserve at least passing mention. Donald Puchala and Jane Staveley write a useful and clearly organized account of twentieth-century agricultural development on Taiwan, with particular emphasis on political and economic tradeoffs and on the consequences of land reform. Don Hadwiger and Ross Talbot offer the United States as "a unique development model," arguing that the American agribusiness model is not at all appropriate for the contemporary developing countries and may no longer even be appropriate for the United States! Ann Schulz discusses "Food in Iran: The Politics of Insufficiency," a critique of agricultural policy under the Shah, while Young Whan Kihl provides a laudatory overview of "Politics and Agrarian Change in South Korea" under the Park regime.

Also included in this collection is a very general historical comparison of "Agricultural Modernization in England, France, and Denmark" by Pamela Aall; a survey of "The Commercialization of Agriculture and the Rise of Rural Political Protest in Black Africa" during the colonial period by Robert Bates; and a slightly updated version of a previously published article by Norman Nicholson, John Esseks, and Ali Akhtar Khan on "The Politics of Food Scarcities in Developing Countries." Whatever the intrinsic merits of these pieces, it is not clear why they should have been included in this volume.

RICHARD E. STRYKER
Indiana University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Government Controlled Enterprises: International Strategic and Policy Decisions *by Renato Mazzolini. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1979. 400 pp. $39.75.*

The postwar era has witnessed a growth in that type of firm alternatively known as "public corporations," "mixed enterprises," or "government controlled enterprises (GCE)," although not so much in the United States. These firms have some attributes in common with both private and socialist firms: independent yet subject to the direction of governments; profit seeking yet serving the public interest directly; financed by both public and private funds; often competing with private firms. Their multiple goals and varying degrees of independence have frustrated attempts to develop a general theory that would predict their behavior under alternative circumstances. They raise many questions, such as their motivations, their reconciliation of profit and public-interest goals, how their efficiency compares with other firms having simpler mandates, and their independence.

Mazzolini studies the behavior of European GCEs, relying heavily on extensive interviews with GCE officials. He focuses on the forces that determine their "strategic" decisions, with emphasis on the question of locating operations in other countries. Before proceeding to his major task, he describes many of the GCE's attributes: financing, marketing, labor relations. He also points out how the mandate to serve the public interest as defined by the government—such as locating a plant in an economically depressed area—can conflict with the GCE's goal of profits and self-sustaining viability as an organization.

An economist would approach an understanding of the GCE by taking its goals as *given*: primarily profit maximization and long-term viability, and the necessity to act in the public interest. Since these goals could conflict, the next task would be to reconcile them. This could conceivably be done by assigning weights to the goals. But a superior operational technique would regard the public-interest goals as priority targets: after these targets are met, all further efforts would be devoted to profit maximization and long-run viability. These goals, together with an understanding of the constraints on the range of choices of values for the instrumental variables, would then enable the economist to deduce propositions regarding how the GCE would behave under alternative sets of circumstances.

Mazzolini, however, rejects this "traditional" approach and instead proposes the "organizational process" methodology, associated with Herbert Simon and the Carnegie school. With this methodology, it is organizational procedures with regard to problem and opportunity identification, search, and project development and evaluation that determine behavior. In contrast to the economist's view that the goals are given, in Mazzolini's methodology the goals are developed by the individuals and groups constituting the organization. The goals are the result of a kind of bargaining process in which politics, sociological groupings, psychology, the force of personalities, and direct economic interest play roles. On the basis of the many unquantifiable and impressionistic variables that could determine the goal selection, together with isolated quotations from his interviewees, Mazzolini attempts to explain on a rather ad hoc basis why particular

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GCEs have exhibited certain behavior. He does not, however, delve deeply enough into comparisons to enable much in the way of broad generalizations on behavior.

The organizational process approach has lost ground among economists in the last decade. This is partly so because this approach cannot yield general predictions as to what a firm will do: in effect the behavior of every firm would require a separate case study. But even more basic is an objection to the premise that the firm's organizational structure determines the firm's goals, rather than the goals determining the type of organization. This premise is rejected on the grounds that, in a competitive world, an organizational structure that fails to provide sufficient profits for a firm's survival would simply have to be changed, much as would an obsolete technology. Mazzolini's approach, however would have validity if the firm does not have to compete for capital on the basis of the financial returns to investors. Since many GCEs are in this enviable position and their structures are often not the hierarchical types associated with the private corporation, Mazzolini's methodology of taxonomy and case studies, mushy and intellectually unsatisfying as they may be, is nevertheless a useful way to gain at least an initial understanding of such complex firms as the GCE.

I know it is not fair to criticize a writer for not writing the book the reviewer would have liked. But I was disappointed that items such as the following were not investigated: comparisons of GCEs and private firms; implications of GCE structure and missions for market behavior within and between countries; and a more careful assessment of the interviews to uncover any patterns of behavior. Mazzolini himself is quite aware of his book's limitations. And, although much remains to be done to understand the GCE, I agree with Mazzolini that he has made a good start. He will also have helped bring this important topic to the attention of Americans.

IRVIN M. GROSSACK
Indiana University

Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea *by Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979. 394 pp. $15.95.*

Jacket blurbs praise this book for illuminating the politics of interdependence, the processes of international organizations, and the responses of international law to environmental needs. It does all three, but usually in ways hard on the reader. Chapters 2, 3, and 7 are relatively easy reading: they have one main theme and most footnotes only list references. The chapters on development of international law through conventions written under International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) auspices are quite difficult. They analyze the terms of proposed and adopted treaty rules, dissect the politics of the negotiations among (and to a lesser extent within) governments, and discuss the roles of nongovernmental actors. No one theme predominates, and information in the footnotes is as important to the development of each as is information in the main text. The reader thus must shift from text to notes constantly. In partial compensation, the reader is offered a number of tables summarizing the main legal developments or the main vot-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing alignments and a number of pictures showing major tanker accidents and other relevant scenes.

M'Gonigle and Zacher early state their concern for the environment and their interest in the creation of an international system more capable of protecting it (and managing interdependence generally). This concern, together with the nature of the issue they are investigating, leads them to place undue emphasis on economics as the focal point of international politics—at one point the authors assert that "in numerous ways, economic power dominates international politics *at all levels*" (p. 348). They can sustain this view only because ocean-related security issues are dealt with in forums other than IMCO.

In other hands, such strong commitment would feed conspiracy theories or inspire unattainable reform proposals. The authors sympathize with reform, but avoid conspiracy theories. M'Gonigle and Zacher do not seek villains (or heroes); they find actors serving their individual interests as they see them. Unfortunately, actors seldom see pollution per se as an important concern; outside pressure—usually from the public—must be applied. Therefore, the authors see those actors most open to public pressure as the most useful in efforts to control ocean pollution. On the whole, the reader is left feeling that nearly all actors are much too inclined to slight environmental concerns. As committed reformers, the authors cannot really sympathize with value hierarchies different from their own, but as thoughtful scholars they can explain actors' different perspectives and the factors encouraging or discouraging greater environmental concern.

M'Gonigle and Zacher usually retreat from their most careless assertions. For instance, after they criticize the "load on top" system of dealing with oil residues as falling far short of the pollution control standards on the books (pp. 17–18), they admit that governments had made enforcement of those standards impossible by removing all obligation to provide the necessary port residue-reception facilities (pp. 94–99). Later, they modify an assertion that governments were not seriously facing the problem of allowing coastal states sufficient authority to deal with pollution from passing vessels by noting that they were saving this question for the more general consideration of flag, coastal, and port state jurisdiction over shipping at the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (pp. 201–3). Occasionally, however, careless remarks remain uncorrected. Many discussions are quite thorough, and sensitive to all the factors involved. Discussions of the various groupings of governments in IMCO (pp. 263–98) or of the interrelationship of IMCO and UNCLOS talks (chap. 6) are but two examples.

Pollution, Politics, and International Law is an important contribution to the literature. The authors have assembled a wealth of information others will find invaluable for studies of intergovernmental organizations, the activities of nongovernmental and transnational actors, international politics in nonsecurity realms, and the international lawmaking process.

M.J. PETERSON
Harvard University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ethics, Functionalism and Power in International Politics: The Crisis in Values *by Kenneth W. Thompson. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1979. 170 pp. $10.95.*

Throughout a long career as an academician and foundation official, Kenneth W. Thompson, now Robert Kent Gooch Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, has grappled persistently with the problem of relating morality to politics. His quest for understanding has led him to attack both elements of the problem, for example, the definition of political power and the definition of political morality. In addressing both elements he has distinguished and analyzed relevant idealist-realist debates.

In this book, Thompson reviews these debates from the vantage point of one who has now left the foundation world and returned to the university. With the advantage of his foundation experiences he adds a new element to his analyses, the assessment of the functionalist approach of David Mitrany and others to the amelioration of the tension between power politics and political morality.

In the central portion of the book Thompson sketches his impressions of the utility of the functionalist approach in three areas with which he is familiar: higher education, agriculture, and the role of foundations in the developing world. In the realm of higher education, Thompson contends, a functionalist approach, that is, an emphasis on practical problem solving across national boundaries as distinguished from the "high politics" of the issues of war and peace, has offered "a striking new dimension to international thinking" (p. 64). On the other hand, he acknowledges the relation of higher education to national consciousness, especially in the Third World. Therein lies a major limitation on functionalism as a "utopian, antipolitical" phenomenon (p. 64).

With respect to agriculture, Thomson concludes: "Agricultural cooperation on the international plane appears to fit many of the important criteria of functionalism. It begins with an urgent problem, it has worldwide rather than local or national character, and it engages the best efforts of well-trained technical professionals" (p. 88). However, he notes limitations to functionalism, since "once decisions on world food production become a matter of high policy within states and engage its principal politicians a new set of concerns come into play," for example, the role of special interest groups, ideological forces, and the propensity to use food as an instrument of foreign policy (p. 89).

Finally, Thompson traces the pioneering work of the great American private foundations in developing the functionalist approach of intensive concentration on practical problems. He notes, among other things, the success of foundation development of health institutions that have gone from private to public and of early projects devoted to the "feeding of mankind" (p. 95). He concludes that foundations "help to illustrate in their work both the relevance and limitations of functionalism. . . . Thus functionalism remains an insightful approach to international problems, but not one that is wholly satisfactory. In this it shares the common plight of every other important theory of international relations" (p. 103).

In his concluding chapter Thompson outlines the main problems of contemporary international relations and the requirements of thought, education, and action necessary to meet them. His analysis reiterates his position of more than twenty years of writing on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this subject. The heart of his argument is the insistence on a renewal of the heritage of the West, the essence of which "lies in a return to moral reasoning" (p. 120). He decries the effects of several decades of value-free social science and calls for a renewed effort by scholars, moralists, statesmen, and responsible citizens to address the great issues of politics—the nature and relations of man, of the state, and of the international community.

This is a book of broad themes that invite reflection and elaboration. The impressionistic chapter on functionalism is interesting and suggestive of approaches to more extended analyses. Thompson's uncompromising insistence on the central importance of moral reasoning, in an era of overabundant information, scientistic fads in the social sciences, and endless pragmatic "quick fixes" in policies that somehow never get "fixed," is eminently appropriate at this point in world affairs as well as in the study of international relations.

WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN
Georgetown University

The Logic of Party Democracy *by Alan Ware. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1979. 209 pp. $16.95.*

The uses, limitations, and failings of political parties are on the minds of political observers today. Some write about the need for party reform, others describe the reforms, a few analyze their likely and actual consequences, and a large number see the whole topic rooted in a willful utopianism. This book borrows all of these traditions to some degree; it presents a logical and deductive analysis of the role of parties, and some data.

Ware's analysis of parties begins with a brief discussion of competing interpretations of democracy and accountability. One of these dualisms—populist versus liberal interpretations of democracy—provides a centerpiece for his analysis. In Ware's lexicon, populist interpretations of democracy place a premium on governmental responsiveness to the expressed wants of the population. Wants occasionally coincide with a clear-sighted formulation of the "real" interests of the citizenry; often they do not. Reconciling wants and interests is not Ware's principal concern, however. He raises the question only because he believes that it is the issue which makes sense of political parties. For Ware, parties solve the wants-interests dilemma by aggregating both into a judicious policy agenda. Although parties do not always perform their aggregating function well, they are, nonetheless, an institutional solution to the demand that government both serve the public interest and respond to popular wants.

With this demand for accountability lurking in the background he discusses the nature of electoral competition and electoral strategies.

In Ware's analysis, parties assure accountability by providing electors with the information necessary to allow them to determine what they want in the way of public policy and by selecting leaders who will implement the policy wants presented by the party and selected by the public. The key element in this model of electoral accountability is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party activist. Animated by policy concerns and involved in selecting and electing candidates, it is the activist, according to Ware, who makes parties programmatic and leaders responsive.

The second part of the book tests his predictions about the role activists play in producing accountable and programmatic parties. Data collected in a 1976 survey of members of the Democratic party central committee in Denver are the focus of this analysis.

The topic is interesting. *The Logic of Party Democracy* is another formulation of the long-standing interest in responsible parties. But it is not a very useful book, and it is often irritating. As a serious analysis it has two major flaws.

Ware's conceptual analysis and logic are replete with asserted facts and relationships. The evidence for his assertions is rarely more substantial than a footnote to someone whose views support what he believes and has written in *Party Democracy*. Arguments about the pernicious and antidemocratic tendencies of interest groups compared to parties (pp. 29–31), observations about the relationship between elite accountability and strategies for seeking office (chap. 4), and the critical role played by activists in assuring that parties attend to common rather than special interests (chap. 5) are largely barren of empirical warrant.

His semideductive reformulation of a responsible party doctrine would be useful if the second, "empirical" part of the book offered an interesting analysis of data which support his earlier hypotheses. Unfortunately it does not. He presents only marginal distributions of activist opinions; most of the data actually refute his hypotheses. The Denver activists do and believe things that undercut the development of a cohesive and programmatic Democratic party in Denver. Worse, his activists seem irrelevant to the influence of the party on policies and officeholders. The impact of the party declined, he concedes, for reasons which have nothing to do with any of the variables that were discussed in the first part of the book.

In sum, most of Ware's hypotheses seem wrong; he did not even attempt to test more than a few of them. His arguments for parties and intraparty democracy are neither novel nor compelling, and the data he has are not very interesting. It is not a book that I can offer many strong reasons to read.

JOHN PETROCIK
University of California, Los Angeles

The European Left: Italy, France, and Spain *edited by William E. Griffith. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979. 260 pp. $24.95.*

It should be acknowledged from the outset that this volume, the product of a conference on the Left in Latin Europe which was held in Bologna, Italy, in September 1978, suffers from many problems typical of its genre. It is not very well integrated (for example, the introduction provides no rationale for the structure of the book, and there is no conclusion), it is frightfully repetitive, it presents little that specialists will find new in terms of either data or analysis, and its component essays are of uneven quality. Never-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theless, the essays are of some interest, and together they provide a useful and concise introduction to the problems and prospects of the European Left.

The book is divided into nine chapters and, implicitly, into three parts. The first four chapters provide overviews of Left politics in all three national cases (Griffith's introduction), in Italy (Berner), in France (Tiersky) and in Spain (Mujal-León). Each of the next four chapters focuses on a specific aspect of Left politics or policy: views of the Left in Italy and France on economic issues (Sacco); the Left and security problems in Italy, France, and Spain (Silvestri); Democratic Socialists, Eurocommunists, and the West (Timmermann); and relations between the West European Communist parties and the Communist states of Eastern Europe (Urban). The final, and by far the shortest, chapter deals with the West European Communists as a foreign-policy problem for the West (Lowenthal).

Disparate as they are in many ways, these essays are united by a common theme: despite recent claims to the contrary, the central fact of life for the European Left is still internal (and sometimes internecine) division. On the national level, conflict between socialists and Communists has continued or intensified even in the face of powerful incentives for cooperation. In the most celebrated case, as Tiersky documents admirably, the French Left snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in 1978 because it "divided radically against itself" and proved once again to be little more than a "mythic beast" (p. 49). On the European level, the recently fashionable terms Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism have been discredited by the repeated failures of both groups to agree on common principles or policies. The essays by Sacco and Silvestri vividly illustrate, for example, the extent of disunity within each camp on such crucial issues as economic and security policy.

The problems of the European Left, overshadowed a few years ago by the seemingly inexorable increase in its popularity, are now so apparent that it is all too easy to underestimate the importance of the role it is likely to play in the coming decade. Many of the essays in this volume remind the reader that this would be a mistake. As Berner notes, "it has become impossible to govern Italy without or against the PCI [Italian Communist party]" (p. 38). In all three countries, the Left—or lefts—will continue to exercise influence through the unions and in local and regional governments (for example, "nearly 70 percent of the Spanish population lives in *municipios* with mayors elected by the left" [p. 81]. Moreover, as Griffith stresses, an intensification of the economic crisis in Europe "may give the Latin left something of a new lease on life" (p. 5).

In short, the European Left will continue to be a topic as important as it is complex. Flawed though it may be in some respects, this volume casts a good deal of light on the subject and deserves serious consideration by an audience ranging from specialists in the field to advanced undergraduates.

JOHN T.S. KEELER
University of Washington

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949–1977 *by Yitzhak Shichor. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979. 268 pp. $27.50.*

China has been at best a bit player in the turbulent politics of the Middle East, but offstage China's leaders have long realized the region's strategic and economic importance. Shichor's monograph, the first scholarly study of the subject, is a substantial contribution to our understanding of how the Chinese have viewed the Middle East and how they have operated in the region over the past thirty years. His central thesis is that the Chinese have consistently sought to reduce the influence of the two superpowers in the Middle East while encouraging the countries of the region to compose their differences and settle their problems among themselves.

Mao tse-tung, who thought naturally in global strategic terms, viewed the Middle East as part of the vast "intermediate zone" lying between the United States and the Soviet Union which any would-be hegemonic power would seek to master. Curiously in view of China's present anti-Israeli animus, the first Middle Eastern government to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) early in 1950 was Israel, but a series of cautious initiatives on both sides which Shichor reviews failed to produce diplomatic relations which are still lacking to this day. (Incidentally, at the request of the Israeli Communist party, Mao supposedly intervened with Khrushchev in 1957 at a meeting in Moscow seeking improved conditions for Soviet Jews!) Shichor very correctly reminds us that even after the famous Bandung Conference of African and Asian states in April 1955 most Middle Eastern governments with their conservative and religious traditions were still unwilling to deal with Peking. It was not until after China's admission to the United Nations in 1971 that these states switched their diplomatic representation from Taipei to Peking.

The divergence in Soviet and Chinese foreign policies in the mid-1950s and the Soviets' failure to consult fully or coordinate their policy with the Chinese are graphically demonstrated in the Middle East. A most valuable aspect of Shichor's presentation is his careful consideration of China's Middle East policy within the global political context. He demonstrates that China's interest in and attention to the Middle East has fluctuated considerably depending in large measure on Chinese perceptions of the world environment. For example, the emergence of independent African states in the early 1960s led to a shift of Chinese attention away from the Middle East.

To Chinese leaders preaching the need for self-reliant foreign policies, the proclivity of most Middle East states to align themselves with one or another of the two superpowers has been a source of continuing frustration. Of course, China's message may not be as disinterested as Shichor seems to imply. Unable to compete with the United States and the USSR in the delivery of arms or the provision of financial and economic aid (except in rare cases), the Chinese may be seeking to maximize their limited influence by weakening that of the Soviets and the Americans. In this they have not been notably successful, although Shichor suggests this may be changing.

Except for a relatively brief period in the late 1960s and early 1970s China has not been inclined to back insurgent or revolutionary movements in the Middle East. The withdrawal of China's support from the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) is an instructive example of Peking's growing appreciation for the anti-Soviet value of conservative Arab regimes. This reviewer would have liked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some more detail on the evolution of Chinese policy in this area, but Shichor, a cautious scholar, seems a bit reluctant to venture into this murky area. He is most comfortable when analyzing China's verbal behavior and itemizing its formal diplomacy in occasionally dry detail.

In sum, this book really does fill a significant gap in the literature on Chinese foreign policy and should be valued as such by specialists in that field.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

Japan and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities *edited by William J. Barnds. New York, New York University Press, 1979. 286 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $6.95.*

Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia *edited by Richard B. Foster, James E. Dornan, Jr., and William M. Carpenter. New York, Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1979. 315 pp. $19.50.*

These are among the latest additions to the seemingly endless list of publications on contemporary United States relations with the countries of East Asia. The timeliness and intrinsic quality of these publications vary from volume to volume, but on balance *Japan and the United States*, edited by William J. Barnds, stands out as one of the more successful collections of essays. Written by well-recognized and established authorities in their respective fields, the articles sum up the developments in U.S.-Japan relations during the 1970s and point to some underlying factors that had strained the alliance, such as the relative decline of American military power in the Pacific, the growing productivity and competitiveness of the Japanese economy, and domestic turmoil and instability in the two countries. Thus Martin Weinstein gives a succinct analysis of the steady "erosion" of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and I. M. Destler examines the nature of the trade dispute in the context of domestic politics. On the basis of these and other essays, Barnds offers a masterful summary and a reasonable guess as to the challenges that face the two nations in the 1980s.

But this effort to forecast the problems of the 1980s in the light of events in the preceding decade is only partially successful. Barnds writes, "the overall Japanese-American relationship will be significantly affected by the extent to which there is a basic harmony between the policies of the two countries on key Asian issues" (p. 234). In the 1970s Asian issues had indeed been of primary importance. But since late 1979, problems in Iran, Afghanistan, and the whole Persian Gulf region have tended to overshadow the issues of Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea, or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). No one writing in 1977–78, as the authors in this volume did, could have foreseen the extent to which the U.S.-Japanese alliance would be severely tested by the Iranian revolution or the Afghan crisis. Indeed, compared with the severity of international tensions at the beginning of the 1980s, the preceding decade would seem to have been comparatively calm and stable. To transpose conceptual frameworks and bilateral questions from that decade to the new decade may, therefore, be unproductive. Nevertheless, the essays make

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

useful guides to the key question: would the United States and Japan be able to respond flexibly to unforeseen external dangers without causing a serious rift in their bilateral relations? Here Gerald Curtis observes that Japan's "defensive responsiveness" to changes in the international environment "imparts to Japanese foreign policy both its resistance to change and its considerable flexibilty" (p. 78). The future of U.S.-Japanese relations may well hinge on the degree to which this sort of dual response fits into, and is accommodated by, the perceived needs of American foreign policy.

Compared with the Barnds volume, the essays in *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia* vary vastly in length and quality. Most of them narrowly focus on President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from the Republic of Korea. Such a focus inevitably limits the usefulness of the volume. At the same time, whereas the Barnds volume contains articles by American specialists, *Strategy and Security* makes an effort to publish writings by Japanese and Korean authors. While this is a useful device, so many of them are brief, impressionistic, and personal accounts, and adhere to a rigidly anti-Communist, anti-Soviet stance. There are some interesting articles, however, such as Miyoshi's coldly matter-of-fact discussion of Japan's military requirements, and Bae-ho Hahn's insistence that Japan play primarily economic and cultural, not military, roles in Asia. But it is unfortunate that the only essay in this book that deals with the crucial oil and energy question is a five-page piece that is tucked in at the end of the book as if it were an afterthought.

AKIRA IRIYE
University of Chicago

Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970–1973 *edited by Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos E., and Henry A. Landsberger, translated by John S. Gitlitz. Philadelphia, Pa., Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979. 480 pp. $24.50.*

A year and a half after the September 1973 military coup in Chile that overthrew Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government, the editors of this volume convened a conference at Chapel Hill, N.C., to examine what had gone wrong with the socialist experiment in that long-democratic country. Out of the conference has come this collection of twenty essays and commentaries by five high officials of the Allende government, five prominent members of the Christian Democratic opposition party, and North and Latin American social scientists.

Gil, Lagos, and Landsberger are, respectively, a political scientist, an economist, and a sociologist—all highly familiar with the Chilean scene. They organize the essays into three sections, the first two overlapping in subject matter. Part one provides an overview of the three Allende years. Part two deals with the causes of the coup. Part three is a set of essays comparing Chile's socialist experience and subsequent authoritarian regime with those of other countries in Europe and Latin America.

In this reviewer's opinion, the most interesting and valuable contributions are those focusing on particular issue areas—agrarian reform, socialization of production, foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy—that presented the planners and politicians with difficult choices and conflicting pressures. Director of Allende's agrarian reform agency Daniel Baytelmay concludes in his essay that the government as a whole should have been more tolerant of diverse forms of agricultural organization so as to have obtained greater peasant support—which in turn might have translated into higher food production.

Sergio Bitar, Allende's director of the state development corporation (CORFO), astutely examines the government's intention to incorporate private firms into the social property sector. Because of employer and congressional resistance to planned expansion of state control, one-third of the firms on the government's list of monopolistic enterprises targeted for takeover remained under private ownership at the time of the coup. Because of spontaneous worker seizures of plants, on the other hand, a number of plants that the government had never intended to take over were nonetheless added to the social property sector. Economic management, Bitar implies, became more difficult as a result.

Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda, in his essay on foreign policy, discusses whether the Popular Unity government should have allowed U.S. copper companies compensation for nationalization of the mines. Although this might have reduced U.S. government and business opposition to Allende, Almeyda makes the controversial assertion that it would have made no difference since U.S. opposition was basically political, not economic.

Several essays in part two take up the question of whether the Christian Democratic and Popular Unity parties could have negotiated an accord limiting the partisan conflict and thus thwarting a coup. Indeed, the parties did reach a pact on constitutional guarantees at the outset of Allende's term, but refused to renew it around other issues—such as a congressional strategy for breaking the deadlock with the executive on implementing the social property sector.

The editors supply a useful sixteen-page introduction summarizing the essays and delimiting their scope. They acknowledge the absence of detailed analysis of the military, of Allende's leadership, and of actors within the United States shaping policy toward Chile. There are no essays by spokesmen of the political Right or the extreme Left. The thrust of the volume is broad-ranging, multifactor analyses emphasizing party alliances, social mobilization, and economic policy choices.

How could the Allende regime have succeeded? This book provides readers not impatient for one-sided or overly systematic lessons with a good collection of thoughtful and solid essays.

PETER GOLDBERG
U.S. Bureau of the Census

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe *edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati. New York. Columbia University Press, 1979. 393 pp. $20.00.*

The editor of this volume has made important contributions to East European scholarship in the West, not only in his own research on Rumania, but by his editorship of the *East European Quarterly* and his service as general editor of the East European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

monograph series of Columbia University Press, one of the most important monographic series on Eastern Europe. But Fischer-Galati's purpose in editing this volume is not clear, nor does his introduction provide any clues as to his purpose. A collection of essays on the eight Communist parties in power in Eastern Europe, it is far too summary and atheoretical to be of much use to historians or social scientists. On the other hand, I suspect undergraduates will find it rather too dry and too narrow in its focus on the party to entice them into further study of the region. For the same reason, it is unlikely to appeal to the general reader. Still, the reader with a mild interest in East European communism can benefit from this convenient overview of the parties. Because most of the essays do follow a fairly similar format, the reader can make his own comparisons and draw his own conclusions, though one might have expected this to be done in a summary analytic essay.

Explicitly or not, all the authors assess the parties by the standards set by the Soviet Communist Party. The editor's opinion is that "the cracks in the 'granite-like' structure and unity of the Soviet camp in Eastern Europe are discernible to the quantitative analyst of East European Communism. The qualitative analyst, however, will have to conclude that the rock is solidly embedded in the principles and practices of Soviet Communism" (p. 3). The dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative analysts strikes me as artificial, as is shown by the essays in this very volume. Some may also disagree with Fischer-Galati's assertion that "meaningful deviations from Soviet norms such as Titoism or any other variant of 'socialism with a human face' can never hope to become prototypes for change within the Soviet bloc" (p. 3). While this has been true in the past, never is a very long time, and unless one assumes that "meaningful" change can "never" come about in the Soviet Union itself, this judgment may prove somewhat incautious.

As often is the case with anthologies, the essays are not all of the same quality. I found the essays on Poland (by M.K. Dziewanowski), Rumania (by Trond Gilberg), East Germany (Manfred Grote), and Yugoslavia (Paul Shoup) to be better than the others (no information on the authors is provided, by the way). Each essay outlines the history of the party and describes the organizational structure, membership, and leadership. Some of the authors pay more attention to the foreign relations of the parties, while others concentrate on the national environments within which they operate. Unfortunately, only one or two pay attention to political cultural factors that illuminate the appeals and repellent characteristics of communism in each national context. All the chapters are longer on the historical evolution of the parties than on their contemporary problems and policies.

The longest chapter in the book is also the weakest. Peter Toma's analysis of the Czechoslovak Communist Party is poorly organized, repetitious, and dotted with peculiar judgments unsupported by evidence. For example, Ludvik Svoboda, the late president of Czechoslovakia, is described as "an agent of the Soviet KGB since 1940" (p. 98); the "execution of Titoists" in 1951 is mentioned as a matter of fact rather than as trumped-up charges (p. 101). Toma cites a 1969 *Rude Pravo* editorial to support a description of a purge which took place in 1970 (p. 109). Despite what he says, there are good estimates of the scope of the Stalinist purges in Czechoslovakia—as Toma himself shows (p. 114). Many readers might also disagree with his judgment that the "Prague Spring did not become a model for state building and 'socialism with a human face'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turned out to be only a label affixed to a social movement" (p. 119). It certainly seemed to Brezhnev, Ulbricht, and Gomulka that the April 1969 "action program" of the Party was a definite model for an important variant of communism, and many in the West would agree with that judgment.

Miklos Molnar's essay on the Hungarian Communist Party is also somewhat puzzling, and its skimpy description of those domestic policies that have made Janos Kadar the most popular leader in the region is disappointing. One is also astonished at his unsubstantiated statement that "on our estimate, at least half the 500,000 Jews of prewar Hungary are still in the country" (p. 225). Has Mr. Molnar never heard of Adolf Eichmann?

There is wide agreement that systematic, detailed histories of the East European Communist parties are needed, as are comprehensive comparative analyses of these parties in operation. Neither of these needs has been met fully by this volume.

ZVI GITELMAN
University of Michigan

Palestinian Society and Politics *by Joel S. Migdal et. al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 290 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $6.95.*

Although the Arab-Israel dispute has focused the attention of scholars on the Palestinians, very little has been written on the interplay of social and political forces in Palestinian society. Certain aspects of Palestinian life, such as the recurrent crisis of leadership, have been alluded to in various studies as a key factor in the inability of the Palestinian Arabs to achieve their national goals. But to date there has been no comprehensive study of the social and political patterns which gave rise to these developments.

In Book I, Migdal discusses the fragmentation and political weakness of Palestinian Arab society. Through an analysis of the four regimes that have ruled the area in modern times—Ottoman, British, Jordanian, and Israeli—Migdal hopes to ascertain those conditions that deny societies social cohesion and coherent stratification patterns. The author analyzes the effects of the introduction of capitalism on Arab society in the light of the ruling regime's investment policies, policies establishing political alliances and security policies. The text is supplemented by excellent illustrative tables.

The other contributions to the book offer fascinating insights into West Bank village life. However, they do not together represent a cohesive whole. The essays treat different historical periods and are uneven. The book might well have benefited from an editorial overview to provide the reader with a sense of direction. The work also suffers, as Migdal admits, from the lack of contributions by Palestinian scholars.

The book does offer the reader a picture of the varied sources, ranging from archives to interviews, that researchers in Palestinian historical sociology are using. Migdal includes an appendix to Book I on conducting field research in an occupied territory, and there are occasional authors' notes in the other contributions. Especially interesting in this regard is Donna Robinson Divine's essay, "The Dialectics of Palestinian Politics," which uses

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an analysis of newspaper obituaries of *Fedayeen* to illustrate cleavages in Palestinian society. However, a section on methodology might well have enriched Migdal's book.

SYLVIA KOWITT CROSBIE
Immaculate Heart College

Debt and the Less Developed Countries *edited by Jonathan David Aronson. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. 359 pp. $24.50.*

This volume warrants attention and will serve as a useful reference, although the doubling of oil prices in 1979 has outdated much of its analysis while making the subject more urgent. Integration of the contributors' diverse viewpoints is predictably thin.

Brian G. Crowe finds no overall debt problem (1977) for less developed countries (LDC) but some bunching of repayments and some problem countries. He defends U.S. policy (for example, case-by-case reschedulings only). His data on forty-two reschedulings from 1956 to 1978 are useful reference material. Noting the rising share of privately held debt, he makes the important point that ample bank lending after 1974 induced countries to avoid the International Monetary Fund (IMF), making adjustment problems more extreme for those who finally did come to the fund. Jane D'Arista presents useful institutional background and data (such as loan-capital ratios suggesting that U.S. banks are lent-up to major LDCs). Her emphasis on concentration by lender and borrower lacks analysis of why concentration is bad, and her focus on payments imbalances within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been bypassed by events.

Using a flow-of-funds schema, Clark W. Reynolds discusses the developmental (even revolutionary) role of bankers in channeling surplus funds (such as rents from mining properties). W. Ladd Hollist's thesis that debt-led, upper-class-oriented growth in Brazil caused structural inability to respond to external shock remains without theoretical or empirical support, and he occasionally stumbles on facts (serious studies of Brazilian income distribution do not show absolute income declines for the masses as he asserts).

Barbara Stallings recounts how the banks learned a lesson in Peru: they cannot effectively enforce country performance conditions and will henceforth leave the job to the IMF. Her generally useful study is flawed by a tendency to blame Peru's misfortunes on policy requirements set by the banks and the IMF, without recognizing that economic disruption would have been even worse without bank-IMF lending and measures correcting previous policy errors. John S. Odell presents excellent case studies of debt rescheduling in Brazil, Ghana, and Chile. He is most fascinated with Ghana, the mouse that roared. Too harsh for their ōwn good, creditors precipitated a coup by new leaders who declared debt moratoriums and eventually achieved favorable rescheduling terms. As Odell seems to realize, this option may exist where most financing is concessional (because donors can decide for strategic reasons to give favorable rescheduling terms) but not where borrowing is mainly commercial (future inflows will be cut off). He concludes that while political division among creditors may help, the LDC generally is at a serious bargaining disadvantage in reschedulings. Jonathan David Aronson presents case studies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Zaire, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and Mexico. He shows how banks have consistently preferred to refinance rather than reschedule or declare a default. Aronson sees at least the larger, richer LDCs as having substantial bargaining power because the size of their debt has system-wide implications; but his thesis that banks have growing power over governments in the North (somehow, through the Eurocurrency market) and that they may use it to help the South in negotiations in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) is dubious.

Other chapters are by Susan Strange (a historical view), R. Peter de Witt and James F. Petras (a Marxian-dependency approach), Hyman P. Minsky (who advocates lower U.S. current-account deficits as essential to the monetary system), Arthur B. Laffer (who less than convincingly recommends his well-known curve to the South, arguing for lower taxes and less intervention), and Charles Lipson (who urges wider IMF action).

This book is to be commended for bridging political science and economics. Both disciplines have a long way to go before achieving satisfying, rigorous analysis of the politics of LDC debt and the economics of its optimal use.

WILLIAM R. CLINE
The Brookings Institution

Political Manipulation and Administrative Power: A Comparative Study *by Eva Etzioni-Halevy. Boston, Mass., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. 218 pp. $22.50.*

In this comparative study of politics in four advanced industrial nations (Britain, the United States, Israel, Australia), the author makes a convincing case for the importance of studying governmental institutions, if we are to understand the political process. The institutional approach to the study of comparative politics was displaced in the 1960s and early 1970s by an emphasis on political behavior, especially electoral behavior and party politics. More recently, as public-policy research has increasingly questioned the link between electoral politics and policy outputs, the focus of many researchers has shifted toward the study of governmental institutions and the political elites who operate within those institutions. This book follows that trend.

Etzioni-Halevy takes off from the widely held view that an expanding franchise and increasing popular participation have been more than offset by the growing ability of ruling elites to manipulate public opinion and participation for their own benefit. This study concentrates on one particular form of manipulation by political elites, that is, the giving of material inducements in return for votes. Such inducements range from jobs to cash bribes to government services, favors, or benefits to which the recipient would not ordinarily be entitled. In separate chapters, the author describes the variations in the use of such material inducements in the four nations under examination. Political elites in all four countries have at times resorted to favoritism, patronage, or even outright bribery to win elections. However, in two of the countries, Israel and the United States, the use of such inducements remains to this day an important feature of electoral politics, while the other two nations have undergone reforms that have drastically curtailed electoral cor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ruption and have increasingly insulated civil servants against manipulation by party politicians.

Why did such reforms come about? The author has two explanations—one ideological and the other structural. First, she claims that reform has occurred where the norms and values of elites have turned against electoral corruption—where elites have in effect reformed themselves. Britain provides the clearest example of a politically dominant aristocracy that gradually restrained its own electoral practices through a series of legislative acts limiting campaign expenditures, introducing the secret ballot, and establishing more severe penalties for corruption. Unfortunately, the author does not explain satisfactorily why British and Australian elites developed a reform ethos, while American and Israeli elites did not.

Turning to structural considerations, the author shows that the manipulation of government services and benefits to reward loyal followers is only possible where the government administration is vulnerable to penetration by partisan politics. Hence, such manipulation was markedly reduced by the gradual differentiation and specialization of governmental institutions that occurred in Britain and Australia, but not in the United States and Israel. (In presenting this argument concerning institutional differentiation, Etzioni-Halevy relies heavily on Huntington's work on political modernization.) In the United States and Israel, where civil-service reforms have been relatively weaker and administration is less clearly separated from electoral politics, machine-style politics is prevalent.

Despite a certain circular style of argument and occasional inconsistencies, the book has many strengths. Among them is an excellent introduction which places the analysis in the context of the sociological and political economy literature. The addition of Australia and Israel to supplement the standard British-American comparison produces some useful insights. As a nation of immigrants, Australia has nevertheless reformed its civil service, leading us to question the common belief that the presence of large numbers of immigrants is conducive to machine politics. The Israeli case calls into question the proposition that "machine politics" and "ideological politics" are mutually exclusive labels for political systems; Etzioni-Halevy presents Israel as a nation that is simultaneously dominated by machine-style politics and an intense ideological commitment to collectivist Zionism.

My only serious reservation about the book is that in opting for a politically neutral civil service, the author gives insufficient consideration to the problem of administrative accountability. She warns that the "over-development of political parties" jeopardizes the democratic process, by giving partisan politicians access to public resources that they can use to manipulate elections (p. 189). But insulating administrators from party politicians further diminishes their accountability to the electorate those politicians represent.

CAROLYN TEICH ADAMS
Temple University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies *by Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1979. 607 pp. $25.00.*

This is a major comparative study of the modes of political action (or more accurately the propensity for such action) in five Western democracies: Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. A team of ten researchers from the five nations conducted extensive national surveys in 1974 with the aim of discovering the mainsprings for the waves of political protest so characteristic of that decade and the preceding one. Without ignoring more conventional behaviors, notably voting, they asked: are we witnessing the genesis of a new form of political participation, and if so, by whom and for what reasons? Are these developments nation-specific or characteristic of postindustrial societies? The theoretical starting point for the research, carefully laid out by Kaase and Marsh in the first six chapters, is "the contention [that] a new political cleavage is presently emerging, crystallizing around a Materialist/Postmaterialist dimension. . . . One element of the 'New Politics' is a strong emphasis on broadening opportunities for political participation beyond the established sphere of electoral politics, which integrates to a large extent conventional and unconventional politics" (p. 531). Included under the rubric of unconventional behaviors are many which, at least in the Anglo-Saxon nations, actually have a long and honorable tradition (such as petitions, boycotts).

The dependent variable which the authors seek to explain is political behavior. They concentrate on three types of behavior (conventional behavior, protest potential, and repression potential). Each behavior is further subdivided in order to capture all possible nuances. A similar procedure is followed for measuring the conjectured antecedents of such behavior. Throughout the book, measures are developed with extaordinary care and sophistication and are fully documented. The outstandingly high quality of measurement development alone sets this book apart from much that passes for social *science* these days.

The antecedents for political behaviors are sought in standard sociostructural variables and, more importantly, in a variety of orientations and attitudes. Among the most important are: levels of cognitive sophistication (Klingemann here builds on the work of Philip Converse but develops it well beyond that); levels of satisfaction-dissatisfaction with life in general and politics in specific; and value orientations, most specifically the notion of postmaterialism developed some time ago by Ronald Inglehart. The authors are particularly interested in discovering the relation of these orientations to unconventional political acts. They argue that individuals who hold strongly to postmaterialist values or are otherwise dissatisfied with existing policies will be inclined to political participation, especially unconventional ones.

Their hypotheses were generally confirmed although not in all cases and not always equally clearly and convincingly. The frequent absence of stark cross-national differences is one of the most significant findings. Although the magnitudes of the findings may differ from nation to nation, the relationships among the variables tend to be the same. Occasionally results are inconsistent, and authors frankly confess to their inability to explain them. Greater sensitivity to historical developments and to structural differences might

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

just possibly have helped here. Perhaps in the best of all possible worlds an endeavor of this magnitude should not have been undertaken without the active collaboration of historians. But since when has research ever operated in such a world? Among the important findings are that protest potential tends to be joined to conventional behavior, thus giving the individual a greatly widened participation repertory. Unfortunately authors did not separate protest potential from protest behavior and thereby might have inflated the extent of protest.

Klingemann and Inglehart prove convincingly that value priorities have the predicted impact on the choice of political actions, but in a separate chapter Klingemann documents that "ideologically structured belief systems do give values more weight in the selection of modes of political action" (p. 300). His chapters on ideology are especially tightly reasoned, alerting readers that cognition may well have been a neglected variable in political research. In a joint chapter, the two authors offer strong evidence that postmaterialists are more inclined toward unconventional behaviors than materialists. Postmaterialists, again as predicted, tend to come from the ranks of the better educated and more affluent young.

The finding that the well-off and educated in the prosperous nations are the ones who attach particular importance to aesthetic values and the general quality of life is plausible indeed. Would the same individuals, however, subscribe equally strongly to postmaterialism if they had to give up some material comforts, some lowering of their personal standard of living, no matter how slight? And what if the postindustrial era were to become the era of scarcity? Would postmaterialism and postindustrialism still remain conjoined? The theory's validity depends in part on answers to these questions.

Barnes, Farah, and Heunks find no support for the frustration-aggression theory (or the J curve for that matter), which leads them to some very persuasive speculation about the irrelevance of politics and political action for perceptions of individual comfort and happiness. Their chapters will force readers to rethink some of the "conventional wisdom" on relative deprivation and alienation. Perhaps the most unanticipated findings are those by Jennings, Allerbeck, and Rosenmayr who compared parents and youths (both on the aggregate and the pair level) with respect to value orientations and political preferences. Although parents tended to be somewhat more conservative and materialist than their offspring, they found little evidence for the alleged generation gap. They conclude "plausible or not, generational conflict theories are quite incompatible with the unambiguous message of cited results. . . . It is clear that parents serve as positive referents much more frequently than as negative referents" (p. 516).

Some of the unanticipated findings, like the two cited above, are perhaps as important as the anticipated ones. They also suggest new directions for future research. For example, the failure to find a strong relationship between protest behavior and dissatisfaction casts some doubt on the usefulness of concentrating on protest. Maybe future research would be better served if it substituted for a concentration on protest a broader category, such as change-oriented behavior (for example, community activism), since it too is an avenue for the expression of dissatisfaction.

These findings are but a few from a work that provides readers with a wealth of empirical observations bearing on the relationship of political action to value preferences, cognitive sophistication, and policy preferences. The strength of the book, however, lies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less in its specific findings than in the rigor of its methodology and its attempt at theory building. No one who will in the future do research either in comparative politics or in political participation will be able to ignore this work.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL
Douglass College, Rutgers University

Who Benefits from Government Expenditures? A Case Study of Colombia *by Marcelo Selowsky. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979. 186 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $4.95.*

Questions of national income distribution and development have political as well as economic dimensions, but this World Bank research publication by Marcelo Selowsky deals exclusively with the economic aspects of the allocation of governmental services in Colombia. This ambitious project is based on a 1974 countrywide survey of the service consumption and income of 4,019 households in Colombia. In the author's view such surveys are more valuable for identifying distribution patterns than the commonly used governmental service data because they provide information on households not consuming a particular service as well as on those consuming the service. Selowsky suggests that such surveys should be repeated periodically to monitor changes in the distribution effects of government programs.

The research addresses Colombian performance in reaching the poorest income groups through public expenditures. It identifies beneficiaries of publicly provided services (primarily education, health, electricity, water, and sewerage), estimates the education and health subsidies received by consuming households, and attempts to explain variations in public utilities service consumption in terms of supply and demand factors. The survey data are divided into rural and urban locations and the urban data are further distinguished by city size.

Selowsky's findings provide information on the distribution of one-third of total governmental expenditures, with education subsidies constituting 11.2 percent and health 3.6 percent of total expenditures. The author estimates that subsidies per household from education and health are similar across income groups, but variations appear when subsidies are disaggregated by type of education and health service. For example, subsidies for primary education are larger for low-income households than for high-income households, but for higher education the reverse is true. Variations across income groups are also revealed when subsidies per capita are examined rather than per household because household size is larger for the low-income households; thus, individuals in low-income families receive less relative to individuals in high-income families.

Selowsky finds more variation across income groups in the consumption of electricity, water, and sewerage than in health and education. The poorest 40 percent of the households only constitutes 25 to 30 percent of the households receiving public utility services, while the richest 40 percent of the households constitutes 50 to 55 percent of the consuming households. The urban bias in the distribution of these services has, according to the author, declined between 1970 and 1974, since 46 to 55 percent of the newly connected

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

households are from the poorest 40 percent of the households. Selowsky's multivariate analysis in urban public utility consumption shows that lack of demand due to costs rather than supply problems accounts for a substantial proportion of the families without services, especially for piped water and electricity.

The book consists of meticulous explications of the data analysis that led to the findings and comparisons with earlier research on Colombian expenditure patterns. Over one-quarter of the book is devoted to methodological and statistical appendixes. As a technical research report it will be of interest primarily to specialists.

A wide audience would have been possible if the author had gone beyond a narrow economic analysis to elaborate on both the economic and political dimensions of his findings. Fuller consideration is needed of the costs and benefits of using surveys rather than government service data to study service distribution. How important are the differences in the findings? How valid are citizen reports as a measure of consumption? Attention should also be given to the political context that shapes the patterns of distribution and consumption. While Selowsky suggests that analysis of the present distribution of public expenditures is a necessary step toward changing the composition and distribution of government benefits in order to eradicate the extremes of poverty, he does not consider the policy implications of his results or even assess them by comparisons with distribution patterns in other countries as reported in the growing literature on the subject. Nevertheless, this book presents useful data that can be used to address the larger issues.

DALE ROGERS MARSHALL
University of California, Davis

Socialism, Politics, and Equality: Hierarchy and Change in Eastern Europe and the USSR *by Walter D. Connor. New York, Columbia University Press, 1979. 389 pp. $20.00.*

This is a pioneering effort in the study of the social systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, using data published in these countries in order to analyze patterns of social mobility, income distribution, and other dimensions of inequality in Communist states. Research of this kind has already been carried out by Western scholars on the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Poland. Connor broadens the investigation to include all Eastern European states for which there are data (namely Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). It is difficult to think of a book dealing with the comparative analysis of Communist systems which has cast its net so widely since R. V. Burks's much acclaimed volume, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe.*

The data with which Connor must work are, in many cases, woefully incomplete. Like Burks before him, Connor wisely chooses to place these figures in the framework of a historical analysis, to which the first several chapters of the book are devoted. While the author is in full command of the complex techniques needed to measure social inequalities, the data are presented in a simple and direct form, easily accessible to the average reader. Analysis of the data is interspersed with anecdotal materials, including

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the author's own impressions, meant to shed light on class differences in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Two major conclusions are reached in this study: first, that patterns of social mobility, income distribution, and the prestige accorded various occupations are not vastly different from those in the West; and second, that the bulk of what is seen here as a high level of social mobility has been accomplished through rapid industrialization and the concomitant creation of new jobs, rather than through circulation of individuals among strata. Indeed, in respect to the latter, Connor finds less *downward* mobility from elite to other strata in Communist societies than in non-Communist ones (p. 170). From the preceding, the author draws the conclusion that the Communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, if they are to continue to enjoy high rates of upward social mobility, must continue to grow, economically, in the process creating new middle-level and elite job opportunities. The prognosis for the future, in this respect, is not optimistic; in the author's words, "the logic of maturation process and annual figures on labor force distribution across sectors of the economy suggest that the mass mobility of the past cannot be duplicated" (p. 343). Connor holds out the possibility (at least in Eastern Europe) that "frustrated aspirations will lead to unrest" and to a class politics in which "bread and butter issues of distributive justice would play an increasingly important role" (p. 344).

The major findings of Connor's book are generally supportive of earlier, more limited studies that have stressed underlying similarities between patterns of inequality in Communist systems and those in other industrialized states. By and large these conclusions seem warranted by the data. Nevertheless Connor recognizes that there are unique elements in the pattern of social mobility in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He notes the large number of persons of lower-class origins to be found in elite strata, and the fact that greater equality and more circulation among strata appear to be associated with higher levels of industrial development in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia being a striking case in point. These facts have political implications worthy of further exploration. Data on the social background of university students—not included in Connor's volume—might suggest further differences between Communist and non-Communist social systems. Finally, it might be noted that while patterns of social mobility and income distribution in Eastern Europe generally resemble those in industrialized Western societies, Eastern European societies are far more egalitarian than either Soviet society or the societies of Western Europe. This fact is somewhat obscured in Connor's analysis, which stresses similarities between traditional class distinctions that still prevail in Western and Eastern Europe.

In bringing together this data and presenting it in a lively and readable fashion, Connor has made an immense contribution to the study of Communist societies. Many problems of analysis and interpretation remain, as this volume makes clear. But this truly pioneering work has made the path easier for all those who wish to undertake comparative analyses of Communist systems in the future. The field of Communist studies is much in his debt.

PAUL. S. SHOUP
University of Virginia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Change in Public Bureaucracies *by Marshall W. Meyer. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979. 251 pp. $19.95.*

The ambiguity of the terms in the title of this book necessitates saying at the outset what this book is not. In political science and public administration, the terms "change" and "bureaucracy" used in the same sentence can, among other things, suggest a concern for a fundamental tension implicit in a democracy. This tension involves the need to reconcile simultaneous and conflicting demands for change and continuity. Consequently, readers of a political science journal might anticipate that a book so titled would somehow address the macropolitical issues implicit in the bureaucratic decision-making process. One might expect, for example, that it would contribute to a literature in bureaucratic politics that includes such works as Rourke's *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy* and Heclo's *A Government of Strangers.* This book does not attempt to make such a contribution.

This is not, however, to deny the value of the book. Indeed, the work contributes significantly to the growing literature in organization theory. Marshall Meyer is a sociologist and a frequent contributor to a literature that attempts to link various organizational properties such as size, structure, technology, and various other attributes of bureaucracy through comparative, quantitative analysis. This is the second book Meyer has developed out of a research project associated with the Comparative Organization Research Program founded in the mid-1960s and directed by Peter Blau at the University of Chicago. The study involved a survey of 254 city, county, and state departments of finance. The research focus and the findings reported in the first book, *Bureaucratic Structure and Authority*, are fundamentally different from the theoretical orientations and conclusions contained in this book.

The two books seem to reflect a basic shift in the cognitive map of the author. The first survey was a cross section of the finance agencies as they existed in 1966 and early 1967 when the data were collected. This book reports the results of a longitudinal study comparing the original data with a second wave of data collected in 1972. In the earlier report, Meyer emphasized that the study deliberately focused on the internal dynamics of organizations, the finance agencies having been selected for analysis because of their relatively stable environments. Organizations were treated "as more or less closed, self-contained systems" (*Bureaucratic Structure and Authority*, p. 9). In *Change in Public Bureaucracies*, Meyer has fundamentally altered his perspective. Earlier evidence of Meyer's break with traditional Weberian organization theory dominated by a closed systems view of organizations appeared in a book which he edited in 1978, *Organizations and Environment.*

Much of Meyer's early research reflects his schooling in closed systems theory and evinces a fundamental concern for organizational structure as a focus of inquiry. Not surprisingly then, one question addressed in this book is: "Whether elements of organization normally labelled as structural have sufficient stability and interrelatedness to be worthy of study by themselves; or whether, contrariwise, there is apparent instability and unconnectedness in organizations such that organizational patterns require explanation primarily in terms of external events" (p. 75). Meyer's conclusions reflect the latter view. The focus of the longitudinal study is external; it reflects a basic assumption that uncer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tainties in the environment have significant implications for internal arrangements and processes. Indeed, although the 1972 survey was planned as an instrument for "ferreting out the direction of causal relationships" between organizational and environmental variables, Meyer admits being surprised at the "richness of environmental effects." He concludes that: "Most of the causal links found in the longitudinal study are between the environment and organizational properties, and in all instances but one causality runs unambiguously from the environment to organizations" (p. 67).

This book is essential reading to organizational theorists in that it challenges conventional theoretical assumptions and offers some changes in the puzzles that have traditionally occupied organizational researchers. For example, Meyer's discussion of one of the "central issues" in organization theory, whether organizations should be viewed as open or closed systems, is provocative, insightful, and could possibly have significant implications for future research. He notes that the open versus closed systems polarity yields results that are counterintuitive, such as: "Organizations normally considered to be the most rigid and closed, such as bureaucracies, turn out to be especially vulnerable to the environment because of the weak or nonexistent causal link running from organizational structure to goals" (p. 30). Meyer also suggests that "bureaucracies may be more vulnerable to their environments than firms, and that their rigidity and proliferation of layers may be more a response to openness than evidence of closedness" (pp. 25–26). It is suggested that the most fundamental difference between organizations is not whether they are open or closed, but whether they are stable or changing. Too much concern with distinguishing openness from closedness is dysfunctional in that it may divert attention from fundamental differences among organizations—"namely whether or not they have feedback mechanisms that allow dampening or buffering of environmental disturbances" (p. 30). Since bureaucracies lack these mechanisms, and in the absence of acceptable effectiveness criteria, "their rule-boundedness and tendency to elaborate structure can be understood at least partly as adaptive responses to intrusions from the environment" (p. 30). Although he accepts J.D. Thompson's view of organizations as open yet intendedly closed as a partial resolution to this problem, Thompson's approach is modified. Buffering is more a product of delay than organizational design, and it tends to occur throughout the organization rather than in specialized boundary-spanning units. Meyer offers three alternative mechanisms to those offered by Thompson that potentially mediate the environment and organizational change: leadership, claims to domain, and organizational continuity as opposed to reorganization. A chapter is devoted to each. Propositions that relate to how those organizational mechanisms either accelerate or impede change are articulated and discussed.

Meyer concludes by discussing the implications of his research for the theory of organizations and for the management of public organizations. It is emphasized that this book is but an "interim report." The results need to be confirmed and extended, a task Meyer promises to continue as he pursues his research on the process of change in public bureaucracies. I, for one, look forward to future reports. In the meantime, this book should engender a critical but constructive dialogue among students of organizations.

RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
University of Georgia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Naval Diplomacy *edited by Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell. New York, Pergamon Press, 1979. 409 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $9.95.*

The Soviet Navy is a force to be reckoned with worldwide. No longer geared to support land-force operations near Soviet territory, the navy now has demonstrated its ability to deploy its power to distant waters, whether in the form of large-scale worldwide exercises, subtle (and often not-so-subtle) pressure upon Third World states, or confrontations with major elements of the U.S. fleet. This collection of essays prepared by members of the Center for Naval Analyses provides an exhaustive chronicle of the Soviet fleet's development, the result of over two decades of single-minded effort by that remarkable man, Sergei Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet Navy.

Employing what the editors term an "intensive case study method" (p. xv), the book offers a wealth of information on all aspects of Soviet naval development as it has related to the political aims of the USSR in the Third World. Particularly noteworthy are Charles C. Petersen's essay on trends in Soviet naval behavior, which includes descriptions of Soviet exercises and fleet support activity, and the essay by Abram N. Shulsky, which provides an in-depth examination of Soviet naval coercive diplomacy in Third World regions. Although this book is too technical for the general reader, its factual content renders it a major contribution not only to naval studies but, more generally, to the study of recent international history.

Soviet Naval Diplomacy successfully refutes a number of theories about the Soviet Navy, such as the belief that Soviet naval operations in the Third World are based primarily on bluff. Nevertheless, the book is considerably less successful as a study of the whys and wherefores of Soviet naval development. A large part of its analytical content embodies a form of Kremlinology, speculations often based on a small group of Soviet writings (of which Admiral Gorshkov's are the most prominent) to explain Soviet motives regarding shipbuilding strategy, operations, training, overseas presence, and coercive diplomacy. An example of this approach is the importance attached to the novel thesis—unsupported by evidence other than Delphic Soviet pronouncements—that the October 1957 ouster of Marshal Zhukov was closely tied to his decision to send naval units on a port visit to Syria the previous month (pp. 8–10). Equally unconvincing is the assertion that "there is not the slightest sign of official disenchantment" with Soviet naval diplomacy because Admiral Gorshkov (hardly a disinterested observer) has written optimistically about the prospects of this mission (p. 303).

Kremlinology also provides one element of the book's most comprehensive theoretical contribution to the study of Soviet behavior in superpower naval confrontations—James M. McConnell's exposition of "rules of the game." The author contends that either superpower will be most motivated to act on behalf of a client state when a shift in the status quo will seriously threaten an important state interest. In McConnell's view the "crucial variable in superpower military and naval diplomacy is the question of which patron is defending the status quo" (p. 276). Recent events in Afghanistan do much to call this theory into question. Just whose interpretation of the status quo applies? Was the Soviet Union trying to preserve the status quo in Afghanistan? Did the U.S. response—the call for a boycott of the Olympics, for example—represent the kind of acknowledgment of Soviet interests that the "rules of the game" theory might call for?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To be sure, the case of Afghanistan might be viewed as irrelevant to a book whose apparent fundamental premise is that naval force deployment and operations can be analyzed independently of other Soviet political-military behavior. This premise is open to question, however. Recent Soviet naval behavior, notably during the 1976 Angolan Civil War and the 1977–78 conflict on the Horn of Africa, points to the use of the Soviet Navy as a supporting arm of Soviet-Cuban interventions that relied primarily on ground-force operations and the movements of resupply by air. The editors might well have devoted more than passing attention to the implications of the Soviets' critical inability to project significant sea-based power ashore (briefly noted on p. 23). They could also have expanded their all-too-brief comments on the prospect of Soviet development of a sea-based tactical air projection capability, which could serve as a substitute for the current reliance on land-based firepower for overland operations (pp. 309 and 315, n. 36). Indeed, the insertion of a full chapter (by Bradford Dismukes) devoted solely to Soviet ground and air-force operations in Egypt during 1969–70 is the most telling evidence that even the editors recognized the limitations of focusing solely on the naval aspect of Soviet military-political diplomacy in the Third World. Ironically, this description of Soviet-Egyptian interaction is one of the most lucidly written portions of a book that otherwise could have benefited from a more assertive editor's hand.

Nevertheless, much can be forgiven of a book that is, after all, the first of its kind, a comprehensive analysis of a new Soviet political-military force in world politics. Some of the theory may have been overtaken by events; but the Soviet Navy remains very much on the scene. That this book presents the record of how it arrived there ensures a place for *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* in any important library of world affairs.

Dov S. Zakheim
Congressional Budget Office

Reference Books and Source Materials Received

America's Governments: A Fact Book of Census Data on the Organization, Finances, and Employment of Federal, State, and Local Governments *compiled by Richard P. Nathan and Mary M. Nathan. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1980. 332 pp. $19.95.*

American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–1978 *by Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980. 388 pp. $25.00.*

American Social Attitudes Data Sourcebook, 1947–1978 *by Philip E. Converse et al. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980. 441 pp. $25.00.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Census '80: Continuing the Factfinder Tradition *by Charles P. Kaplan and Thomas L. Van Valey. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 490 pp. $7.50.*

City Government Finances in 1977–78 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 111 pp. $2.30.*

County Government Finances in 1977–78 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 76 pp. $1.75.*

Directory of Data Files: Machine-Readable Data Available from the Bureau of the Census *prepared by the Data Users Services Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1979. 119 pp. $11.00.*

Finances of Public School Systems in 1977–78 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 48 pp. $.85.*

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Second Series: January 1, 1937–August 31, 1939, 13 volumes and index *edited by Donald B. Schewe. New York, Clearwater Publishing Company. $375.00.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1978–1979 *prepared by Survey Research Consultants International, Inc. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1980. 386 pp. $59.95.*

The International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion, 1978 *by George H. Gallup. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980. 510 pp. $49.50.*

Local Government Employment in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties: 1978 *prepared by the Governments Division, Bureau of the Census. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1980. 117 pp. $2.15.*

Major Regulatory Initiatives during 1979: The Agencies, the Courts, the Congress *compiled by the Center for the Study of Government Regulation, American Enterprise Institute. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. 46 pp. $3.75.*

The Municipal Year Book 1980 *edited by Leslie A. Jackson. Washington, D. C., International City Management Association, 1980. 421 pp. $36.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 32: 1915 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 563 pp. $30.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 33: 1915 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 575 pp. $30.00.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955 *edited by Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt. Champaign, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1980. 273 pp. $15.00.*

The Public Papers of Governor Bert T. Combs, 1959–1963 *edited by George W. Robinson. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1980. 539 pp. $28.00.*

The Soviet Navy, 1941–78: A Guide to Sources in English *compiled by Myron J. Smith, Jr. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio, Inc., 1980. 211 pp. $23.75.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICA

Reserve your copies now

Independence without Freedom:
The Political Economy of Colonial Education in Southern Africa

Agrippah T. Mugomba
Mougo Nyaggah

A unique, interdisciplinary, and comparative study of the emergence of politically and economically viable, independent states in southern Africa. The ten original essays by political scientists and historians are principally concerned with "unraveling the mysteries of colonial miseducation and assessing its truly devastating impact."

June 1980. 304pp. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. CIP.
Hardcover $27.50

South Africa
Reuben Musiker

The only source for all important bibliographies on South Africa. Recent reference material is also included - official publications, textbooks, periodicals, directories, surveys, much more. The objectivity maintained throughout the annotations provides well-balanced sources for a country of major international concern.

1979. 194pp. Index. Map. British CIP.
Hardcover $25.25

Lesotho
Shelagh M. Willet
David Ambrose

More than 2500 critically annotated references to the history, education, language and ecology of this new African nation are included in this book. A substantial scholarly essay on the history of publishing in Lesotho has been added.

November 1980.
c. 600pp. British CIP.
Hardcover.
Price to announced.



World Bibliographical Series

For detailed information on specific books or series call (805) 963-7737 or write:

ABC CLIO

Dept.PSQ980, Riviera Campus, 2040 A.P.S.
Box 4397, Santa Barbara, California 93103

Publisher of Historical Abstracts, America: History and Life, ABC POL SCI

Serving information professionals for 25 years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



MEMO

TO: Political Science professors
FROM: Pocket Books
RE: Election Year

Voters of the future need the facts of the past.

Thomas Powers
THE MAN WHO KEPT THE SECRETS: Richard Helms and the CIA. At last! "A realistic portrait of American intelligence beset by bureaucratic rivalries, personality clashes and presidential caprice." **Time** 83654/$2.95/February.

William Shawcross
SIDESHOW: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. Nominated for a special Pulitzer Award for reporting, this devastating exposé of the Nixon-Kissinger administration's secret and terrible war in Cambodia was condemned by Kissinger, and highly praised by **The New York Times, Time** Magazine, **The Boston Globe,** and nearly everyone else who read it. 83525-4/$2.95

John Dean
BLIND AMBITION
82343-4/$2.75

Joe McGinnis
THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1968 83437-1/$2.75

Leon Jaworski
THE RIGHT & THE POWER
82368-X/$2.75

Martin Schram
RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT
A Journal of the Carter Campaign
81901-1/$1.95

Henry Fairlee
THE PARTIES
81347-1/$2.25

Ron Kovic
BORN ON THE FOURTH OF JULY
83463-0/$2.25

POCKET BOOKS, Education Department
1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10020

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MIT Political Science International Affairs

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
by Jacques S. Gansler
The first detailed post-Vietnam analysis of how one of our most critical national enterprises functions, based on the author's extensive experience in technical and management positions on both sides of the military-industrial complex.
$19.95

FOOD FOR WAR/ FOOD FOR PEACE:
United States Food Aid in a Global Context
by Mitchel B. Wallerstein
"An outstanding and thorough job. . . . Future researchers on this subject owe Wallerstein a permanent debt."—Martin M. McLaughlin, Senior Fellow, Overseas Development Council
$30.00

NEWSPAPERS AND DEMOCRACY
edited by Anthony Smith
Thirteen original essays by scholars and journalists in the United States, western Europe, and Japan examine the political, social, economic, and technical issues confronting the international press.
$25.00

THE SOVIET UNION AND SALT
by Samuel Burton Payne, Jr.
Describes and analyzes the character, content, issues, and tactics of the Soviet proponents and opponents of arms control since 1968, as expressed primarily in published Soviet statements and writings.
$15.00 est.

IMAGES OF DEVELOPMENT:
Egyptian Engineers in Search of Industry
by Clement Henry Moore
$25.00

New Paperbacks

The Brandt Report
NORTH-SOUTH
A Program for Survival
"Brandt's book is the kind of detailed global report that a Martian spy would love about the present condition of Planet Earth . . . Its 300 pages are . . . like safety directions on a bundle of dynamite sticks."—TRB, *The New Republic*
$4.95

AMERICAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
edited by Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg
$8.95

DECISION TO PROSECUTE:
Organization and Public Policy in the Antitrust Division
by Suzanne Weaver
$5.95

THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS:
The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations
A Twentieth Century Fund Study
by Annmarie Hauck Walsh
$9.95

The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



NEW Selections for 1981

SCOPE AND METHODS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, *Third Edition* (paperbound)
Alan C. Isaak, *Western Michigan University*

FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY ANALYSIS (paperbound)
Garry D. Brewer, *Yale University* and
Peter de Leon, *Science Applications, Inc.*

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
Wallace Mendelson, *The University of Texas at Austin*

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, *Fifth Edition* (paperbound)
Lyman Tower Sargent, *University of Missouri, St. Louis*

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request. Please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS
Homewood, Illinois 60430

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Theory & Practice

Dilemmas of Italian Socialism
The Politics of Filippo Turati
SPENCER DISCALA

"The resulting picture enables the reader to understand clearly the development of the Italian Socialist Party during the twenty years from its foundation to the eve of the Great War, with special reference to Turati's role in the Party's ideological debates"—Arturo Colombo, University of Pavia. $17.50

The Existential Sociology of Jean-Paul Sartre
GILA J. HAYIM

"Exciting and important"—Kurt H. Wolff, Brandeis University.

Professor Hayim analyzes the existential ideas of Sartre in the light of the social theories of Weber, Freud, Mead, Durkheim, and others. The author shows how *Being and Nothingness* has its logical conclusion in Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason.* $13.50

How the Rural Poor Got Power
Narrative of a Grass-Roots Organizer
PAUL DAVID WELLSTONE

"In a short preface, the Harvard psychologist Robert Coles points out that social change of the kind sought by those portrayed in this book 'is a matter of gradual, undramatic, localist transformation—arguably the essence of a democratic process, in contrast to a totalitarian one.' This book may be a landmark in the description of that process"—*The New York Times Book Review.* $6.50 paper

On the Silence of the Declaration of Independence
PAUL EIDELBERG

"Professor Eidelberg argues, quite persuasively, that the language of the 18th century has carried forth to the 20th century; the silent assumptions [of aristocratic statesmanship] have not. The result has been a departure to moral relativism in American foreign policy. Eidelberg's book is a serious attempt to revitalize American policy"—*The Journal of Politics.* $5.95 paper

Soviet Society and the Communist Party
EDITED BY KARL W. RYAVEC

"The volume compares favorably with other works on political change in the USSR and the Party (e.g., Herry Hough, Chalmers Johnson, Brezinski and Huntington, etc.); in some respects, it sets new standards"—*Perspective.* $10.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS PRESS
BOX 429 AMHERST, MA 01004

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hugo Black and the Constitution

Mr. Justice Black
Absolutist on the Court

James J. Magee

"Professor Magee identifies, explains, analyzes, and evaluates Black's articulation of and commitment to "absolutism" with rare objectivity and insight. He sheds significant bright light on both its genesis and its denouement. He is an ardent admirer, but he is not blind to demonstrable warts. He recognizes the pitfalls of a total embrace of the Black jurisprudential twins of absolutism and literalism. Yet he succeeds admirably in bringing to life the towering role their contemporary creator and guardian played in enhancing not justice at any cost, but equal justice under law."
200 pp., $15.00. —*Henry J. Abraham*

also of interest

Mr. Justice Black and His Books

Daniel J. Meador

"Professor Meador's book is unique and recommended not only as a sourcebook for scholars of the Supreme Court but also for students, lawyers, judges, and people who love books. It illustrates how great literature influenced the life of a major American figure."
208 pp., $15.00. —*American Bar Association Journal*

The Papers of James Madison
Volume 12: March 1789-January 1790
With Supplement, 1775-1789

Edited by Charles F. Hobson and Robert A. Rutland

Volume 12 covers the crucial first session of the House of Representatives created by the new Constitution. It gives intriguing chronological evidence of the way in which Madison introduced the amendments that finally became the Bill of Rights and battled to send them to the states for ratification. *505 pp., $17.50.*

send your orders today to:

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF VIRGINIA
BOX 3608 UNIVERSITY STATION . CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA 22903

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, INC.

THE PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS SERIES

Editorial Board

Frank Freidel, Richard S. Kirkendall, Daun van Ee

Minutes and Documents of the Cabinet Meetings of President Eisenhower (1953-1961)

The fact that comprehensive minutes and supporting documents of the Cabinet meetings of an American President are at last readily available is exciting news for everyone who is interested in American history and politics. Minutes of the actual meetings, records of Cabinet actions, memoranda for the President, and Cabinet reports are all part of this collection. From domestic politics to international diplomacy, from economic problems to the beginnings of the civil rights movement, this collection lets us witness the highest level of discussion within the Executive Branch. Published here for the first time, this documentary material offers professors and students an entirely new dimension of research possiblities.

Available now. 10 reels microfilm with printed guide. $520.

Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter (1953-1961)

A fierce believer in the need for a strong, firmly directed American foreign policy, John Foster Dulles was a brutally honest—some would say tactless—politician and diplomat, the archetypal "cold warrior"; hence his telephone conversations are doubtlessly among the very best and most interesting sources which will ever be available for the study of the inner workings of the Eisenhower Administration. This collection contains the minutes of nearly all of the telephone conversations of Dulles as Secretary of State, as well as those of his successor, Christian Herter. We can now read the minutes of the conversations of Dulles and Herter with the President, the Vice President, the White House staff, fellow Cabinet members, the State Department staff, members of Congress, and friends both in and out of government. Naturally, the international developments of 1953-1961—Korea, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Geneva Conference of 1955, Cuba, the volatile situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and all the others—are discussed at great length.

Available now. 11 reels microfilm with printed guide. $560.

A complete catalog of the twelve currently available titles in this series will be sent upon request.

Among our other research series are *Documents of the National Security Council, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* the *Complete Oral Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States,* and many others.

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, INC.
44 North Market St. • Frederick, MD 21701 • (301) 694-0100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ALETHEIA BOOKS

The UNITED STATES and IRAN: A Documentary History

Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, Editors

This book is the first to document the *entire history* of the complex and controversial relationship between the United States and Iran. Previously *unprinted* documents from the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the O.S.S., and the intelligence branches of the State Department, as well as printed sources such as treaties, Presidential papers, and diplomatic correspondence, have been selected by the editors to give detailed coverage of a wide range of pivotal events: the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1856; missions of the pre- and post-World War I era; the Azerbaijan crisis with the Soviet Union in 1946; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1950); the overthrow of Premier Mossadeq and the return of the Shah; the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine; increased arms shipments, growing anti-American sentiment, and reports of human rights violations in the 1970s; and the final chain of events which included the overthrow of the Shah, the rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and the hostage crisis.

Yonah Alexander is Professor International Studies at the State University of New York and is a Senior Staff Associate of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. **Allan Nanes** is a Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Congressional Research Service in the Library of Congress.

Available now. 450 pages. (hardbound) $24. (softcover) $8.

Operation ZAPATA: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs

Introduction by LUIS AGUILAR, Professor of History, Georgetown University

"It was not a CIA debacle. It was a government debacle."

—Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Board of Inquiry testimony

Forming a watershed policy statement in the history of U.S. foreign relations, the report and testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs invasion offered leading officials the opportunity not only to present the definitive version of the events surrounding the invasion, but also to draw up a comprehensive blueprint for a much intensified Cold War. Rather than reassess and reshape the underlying strategy which had led inexorably to the abject failure of the invasion, the Board of Inquiry (General Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and others) insisted that the U.S. redouble its efforts in order to increase covert activities, increase guerrilla warfare, increase military commitments abroad, and increase international tension so that the American people and the entire world would have no doubt of the life-and-death nature of the struggle with Communism. *Operation ZAPATA* is very sobering reading indeed.

Available now. 400 pages. (hardbound) $24. (softcover) $8.

ALETHEIA BOOKS
44 North Market St. • Frederick, MD 21701 • (301) 694-0100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Singular in the Social Sciences
because Dorsey is:

Dedicated to publishing carefully selected, top-quality books in Anthropology, History, Political Science, Public Administration, Psychology, Social Welfare, and Sociology.

Open to opportunities to publish and promote books in the Social Sciences that break new ground. Recognizing that creative thinking and writing are not exclusive to any one school of thought, Dorsey has been receptive to many different approaches and techniques.

Respected in the publishing industry for providing the works of many widely acclaimed authors to educational institutions in the United States, Canada, and abroad.

Specialized in the Social Science field, The Dorsey Press employs a solid editorial staff with extensive education and field training in their particular areas of expertise.

Experienced in textbook publishing, The Dorsey Press executes unusually effective methods of editing, designing, manufacturing, selling, and promoting college texts.

Yearly produces many new and revised texts in the same quality manner that has been used for over 20 years.

DP

The Dorsey Press

HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS 60430

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economic Democracy

The Challenge of the 1980s

By Martin Carnoy and Derek Shearer

"An excellent primer on the politics of 1980s.... An indispensible guide to political action in what — current signs to the contrary — could turn out to be a decade of exciting politics."

—Carey McWilliams, The Nation

Cloth $15.00 Paper $7.95 Distributed by Pantheon Books

The Future of Taiwan

A Difference of Opinion

Edited by Victor H. Li

"The hopes of Chinese-Americans for Taiwan significantly affect its future. This sensitive exploration of their diverse views is ingenious, representative, articulate, and moving."

$17.50 *—Edwin A. Winckler, Columbia University*

A Society in the Making

Hungarian Social and Societal Policy 1945-75

By Zsuzsa Ferge

Preface by S. M. Miller

"...a milestone in social policy analysis.... an enormously rich melding of social policy perspectives developed by writers like Marshall and Titmus with systematic Marxist analysis. Ferge's approach provides a rich paradigm for social policy analysts of the future."

$22.50 *—Lee Rainwater, Harvard University*

Socialist Population Politics

The Political Implications of Demographic Trends in the USSR and Eastern Europe

By John F. Besemeres

"...a bold and fascinating political analysis of the implications ensuing from the current and pending shifts in the population of the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia.... Besemeres fills a gap between ideology, domestic and international politics, and demography with particularly interesting materials and speculation." *—Murray Feshbach, Fellow/The Wilson Center*

$25.00

Rudolf Bahro: Critical Responses

Edited by Ulf Wolter

Political essays by Herbert Marcuse, Rudi Dutschke, Jiri Pelikan, Lucio Lombardo Radice, Lawrence Krader, Pierre Frank, Helmut Fleischer, Hassan Givsan, and Hermann Weber from the 1978 Bahro Conference, Berlin. The authors explore the political and theoretical implications of Bahro's analysis of contemporary industrial society.

$22.50

Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory

By Paul Mattick

A thorough historical and theoretical analysis of economic crises from the classics to current theory. Major interpretations of Marxian theory are critically investigated, and Keynesian attempts to control the crisis cycle and to ensure crisis-free economic development are explored.

$18.50

M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

901 North Broadway, White Plains, New York 10603

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now available

Environmental Impact Assessment Review

editor: **Lawrence Susskind,** Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* is a new quarterly publication for planners, engineers, scientists, and administrators involved in the practice of impact assessment. The *Review* highlights approaches to forecasting and assessing environmental, social, economic, and technological impacts, and seeks to bridge the gap between theory and practice.

Subscription: Volume 1, 1980 (4 issues) $35.00
Institutional rate $70.00

International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems

editor: **S. K. Chang,** University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The *International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems* addresses the ever-increasing applications of computer technology to policy analysis in the social sciences. It offers a forum for the discussion of basic issues arising in the application of modern systems theory and the knowledge-based systems to modeling of socioeconomic and political systems and to the analysis of policy decision.

Subscription: Volume 4, 1980 (4 issues) $30.00
Institutional rate $60.00

The Universal Reference System
Political Science, Government, and Public Policy Series 1978 Annual Supplement

edited by **George W. Johnson**

in three volumes

This invaluable work indexes and abstracts all important books, monographs, and articles needed for political science research. Its scope includes international affairs, the legislative process, bureaucracy, law, political economics, public policy, and comparative government. 2314 pp., 1979, 3 volume set: $325.00.

American Political Science Research Guide Volume 1

edited by **George W. Johnson**

A quick and reliable source of primary and secondary information, this research guide abstracts 2,760 recent political and social science documents in four major categories—public administration, state and local government, legislative and executive, and the judiciary. 242 pp., 1977. $20.00

THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE
Plenum
PUBLISHING CORPORATION

227 West 17th Street
New York, N.Y. 10011

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Once in a great while a concept changes the course of history.

The Entropy Law states that all energy flows from orderly to disorderly, from usable to unusable. In his new book "ENTROPY", Jeremy Rifkin explains how this inexorable process governs every aspect of our life.

"It describes with clarity the intellectual wreckage that must be cleared away before human beings can construct a social order that is at peace with the natural order." *—Quest 80*

"It has compelled me to re-evaluate much of the safe and comfortable thinking which governs our day to day lives." *—Senator Mark Hatfield*

"A cogent and urgent arguement . . . sobering and hard hitting." *—Publisher's Weekly*

" . . . most articulate and comprehensive . . . I do believe the book should be widely read and taken to heart . . . " *—Hugh Downs, ABC-News*

" . . . penetrates to the heart of the energy equation in human history. Rifkin has painted a picture of the moral order that must eventuate." *—Theodore A. Wertime, Smithsonian Institution*

On Sale Now at Your Book Store. VIKING. $10.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yale Paperbounds in Political Science

Who Votes?

Raymond E. Wolfinger and
Steven J. Rosenstone

Elections are at the heart of the American political system, but in 1976 only 54 percent of the voting age population went to the polls. Based on data from the 1972 and 1974 Census Bureau surveys, Wolfinger and Rosenstone are able to identify for the first time those social and economic groups that are most likely to vote and to explain sensibly and convincingly those factors that influence voter turnout.

"*Who Votes?*' is not only the most recent but also the best of the scholarly studies of voting and nonvoting in the United States."
—Austin Ranney Cloth $15.00 Paper $3.95

Europe between the Superpowers

The Enduring Balance

A. W. DePorte

"If I had to give a prize to the most sensible book written about the role of Western Europe in the postwar international system, A. W. DePorte's would be the winner."
—Stanley Hoffmann

"A stimulating, original work."
—*Foreign Affairs*
A Council on Foreign Relations Book
Cloth $20.00 Paper $6.95

Congress and the Bureaucracy

A Theory of Influence

R. Douglas Arnold

"The best book now available on the decision-making processes linking bureaucrats and congressmen."—Richard F. Fenno, Jr.

"An indispensable book for political scientists studying Congress, and highly relevant for many others whose interest is in bureaucratic decision-making."
—Samuel C. Patterson
Cloth $20.00 Paper $5.95

Money in Congressional Elections

Gary C. Jacobson

"An excellent analysis of the role campaign contributions and expenditures play in congressional elections.... Jacobson makes a persuasive and well-documented case that it is spending by challengers—not incumbents—which affects competition in congressional campaigns."
—Norman J. Ornstein, *The Washington Post*
Cloth $17.50 Paper $5.95

Political Parties and Linkage

A Comparative Perspective

edited by Kay Lawson

In this book Kay Lawson and eighteen collaborators examine the ways in which political parties do or do not link voters to policy-making in a variety of countries throughout the world. To the large and growing number of political scientists interested in parties as organizations, this volume will offer incomparable empirical data and provocative theoretical insights.
Cloth $35.00 Paper $8.95

Political Subjectivity

Applications of Q Methodology in Political Science

Steven R. Brown
Foreword by William Stephenson

Steven Brown sets forth in this book a scientific and statistically valid method of conducting social and political research that uses as its framework the point of view of the individual being studied and not the conceptual system of the observing scholar. Brown begins by explaining the major principles and presuppositions of Q technique and goes on to show precisely how it can be used by an individual scholar conducting his own independent research.
Cloth $35.00 Paper $9.95

Yale University Press
New Haven and London

YALE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON SOVIET DISSENT

Interviews with Piero Ostellino

ROY MEDVEDEV. In interview form, the leading Soviet dissident historian examines the Soviet dissident movement today: its origins, its problems, and its prospects. Quoting from the "party trial" he underwent because of his outspoken book *Let History Judge,* and citing the cases of Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Medvedev provides an immediate, vivid portrait of dissent in the USSR.

160 pages, $10.95

UNCERTAIN YEARS

Chinese-American Relations, 1947-50

DOROTHY BORG AND WALDO HEINRICHS, EDITORS. "Taking the scholarship on Sino-American relations during the Chiang-Mao contest to a new stage, this richly documented set of original essays provides fresh perspectives from talented scholars. This book will be a point of departure for years to come."—*Thomas G. Patterson, The University of Connecticut*

Studies of the East Asian Institute 336 pages, $17.50

GLOBAL FOOD INTERDEPENDENCE

Challenge to American Foreign Policy

RAYMOND F. HOPKINS AND DONALD J. PUCHALA. Throughout this century the United States has been the world's major exporter of food, influencing prices, flow of trade, incentives for production, and degree of food security for other countries. *Global Food Interdependence* is a searching examination of United States' food policies in the areas of production, trade, and aid—policies which directly affect broader reaches of international affairs.

224 pages, $20.00 cloth, $7.00 paper

INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

American Interests

ROBERT PRINGLE. This authoritative study examines in detail the nature of U.S. interests in Indonesia and the Philippines. Pringle focuses on six specific policy areas in what George T. McKahin of Cornell University called "the most important study of U.S. policy toward insular Southeast Asia yet published."

312 pages, $30.00 cloth, $9.00 paper

To order send check or money order to **Dept. JN** at the address below, including $1.30 per order for postage and handling.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Grayson Kirk
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Thomas M. Macioce
Vice President and Treasurer

Leland M. Goodrich
Secretary

Courtney C. Brown
Arthur F. Burns
John V. Connorton
Eli S. Jacobs
Robert MacCrate
George B. Munroe
Alfred C. Neal
Edward L. Palmer
Mary G. Roebling
George T. Scharffenberger
Franz Schneider
Harold A. Stevens
John R. Stevenson
Alan H. Temple
Clarence C. Walton
Aaron W. Warner

HONORARY MEMBERS

Miguel Alemán
George W. Ball
Claude T. Bissell
Roberto de O. Campos
Jorge Castañeda
John Sherman Cooper
Arthur H. Dean
Milton S. Eisenhower
Luther Gulick
W. Averell Harriman
Oveta Culp Hobby
Jerome H. Holland
Lady Bird Johnson
Mary Lasker
John J. McCloy
W. Earle McLaughlin
Harold Macmillan
Charles Malik
Paul Martin
N. A. Palkhivala
Galo Plaza
Gordon Robertson
Lord Roll of Ipsden, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Carlos P. Romulo
Dean Rusk
S.M. Sikri
Margaret Chase Smith
Robert Stanfield
Sir Duncan Wilson, G.C.M.G.

The Academy of Political Science was founded in 1880 to promote objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting widely divergent views of these problems. It does not make specific policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE twice a year at irregular intervals. Members receive both publications and invitations to all Academy conferences and functions.

Regular membership: One year, $17.50. Three years, $46.00. Student, $13.00 a year. Foreign postage, $2 additional per year.

Special membership: Contributing, $25. Sustaining, $35. Supporting, $50. Life, $300. Patron, $1,000 or more. Special members receive a certificate.

Contributions are tax deductible.

Dues are payable in advance. Checks should be made to the Academy of Political Science and mailed to 619 West 114th Street, Suite 500, New York, New York 10025.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED